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Abstract
This research investigates context effects in social surveys. Context effects, the ways in 
which previous questions affect responses to later questions, can occur when questions 
deal with aspects of closely related issues. Such effects have been explained by 
reference to social cognition, social judgement and cognitive consistency theories. 
Following a review of the literature, three ‘split-ballot’ experiments, exploring how 
increasing the salience of particular topics affects responses to related questions, were 
conducted in a multi-wave national panel survey in Iceland. The first experiment 
investigates the effects of knowledge questions on expressed political interest. 
Respondents who were asked the knowledge questions first reported less interest in 
politics than did other respondents. Contrary to self-perception theory, it is argued that 
the knowledge questions serve as a frame of reference for the interpretation of the vague 
phrase, ‘to follow what is going on in government and public affairs’. In the second 
experiment the accessibility of particular topics was increased by providing specific or 
general examples in the preamble to a question asking about the most important 
problems facing the nation. The results lend support to the principle of cognitive 
accessibility, which suggests that respondents do not systematically retrieve all relevant 
information stored in memory but base their answers on the most accessible 
information. It is argued that the specific examples widen the question's frame of 
reference and thus change its meaning. In the third experiment general attitude 
questions about abortion and nuclear weapons were placed either in pro- or anti­
contexts. Respondents who agreed with the context items showed an assimilation effect, 
whereas those who disagreed showed a contrast effect. It is concluded that due to the 
inherent instability and complexity of attitudes, responses to attitude questions are likely 
to be influenced by the immediate context in which they are asked.
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Introduction
Theoretical background
This research investigates context effects in social surveys. Context effects, the ways 
in which previous questions affect responses to later questions, can occur when two 
or more questions deal with aspects of the same or closely related issues. My 
fascination for ‘scientific’ methodology guided my decision to choose this area of 
research. It was my sincere belief that in order to study psychology and gain reliable 
knowledge about human behaviour, attitudes or public opinion, rigorous methods 
were needed. It seems intuitively straightforward to conclude that there can be no 
better way to study public opinion or a nation’s attitudes and behaviours than to take 
a representative sample and ask people standardized questions. Such a systematic 
method allows one to make generalizations about the population with known 
confidence limits. Everything appears to be under full control, all respondents are 
exposed to the same stimuli. So why should different responses reflect anything 
other than differences in opinion? With an appropriate choice of response 
alternatives, there are a number of statistical methods that allow one to explore the 
relations between different questions. We can test whether significant relationships 
exist between independent and dependent variables, although we have to 
acknowledge that inferences about causality are problematic on the basis of 
correlational data. So, if the method is so perfect, why do we repeatedly observe 
substantial ‘noise in attitude measurement’ (Converse, 1970), why are people’s 
responses so unreliable? Is there something that we are overlooking in our reliance 
on the standardized survey interview, even when we are following all the rules? 
Various artifacts have been shown to be operating in experimental conditions, effects 
caused by subjects’ awareness of being the object of observation (Ome, 1962, 1969;
18
Rosenthal, 1966). Is the ‘noise’ caused by some such variables operating in the 
survey interview? Is it possible that we have neglected the simple fact that not only 
do researchers think, but so do their respondents? Or has the observed unreliablilty 
something to do with the nature of attitudes? These questions, along with more 
practical considerations guided the research described in this thesis. Despite the fact 
that English-speaking nations have been using sample surveys to gather data about 
the general public’s opinions since the middle of the twentieth century, the method 
did not gain popularity in Iceland until the mid-1980s and very few people had 
specialized in survey methodolgy. Hence, this research provided the opportunity to 
combine the best of both worlds, i.e., to satiate my curiosity and to give me practical 
experience for future research in social surveys.
Suggestions that asking people questions in a survey interview, can lead to a change 
both in people’s attitudes and behaviours guided the design of the research although 
no attempt was made to observe people’s behaviours (cf. Bishop, 1987). My choice 
of questions was influenced not only by the context effects literature but also by a 
colleagues disciplinary interest in politics. Hence, I selected questions that had some 
bearing on attitudes towards politics or political behaviour. Bearing in mind the idea 
of reactivity, i.e., that simply asking questions may lead to a change in people’s 
attitudes an attempt was made to examine how long lasting context effects are by 
interviewing the same sample on three different occasions. Are context effects 
temporary or will the context in the first interview possibly influence responses in 
interviews taken a month later?
Some of the questions that I chose can hardly be argued to be attitude questions -  
such as a question about people’s level of political interest or people’s opinions 
about the most important issues facing the nation. As survey researchers often use 
the terms belief, attitude, and opinion interchangeably, the distinctions made in 
social psychology are of little relevance here.
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The questions that shaped the orientations and conduct of this project reflected the 
above concerns. My main foci in this respect were:
• Do preceding questions affect responses to subsequent questions in a 
questionnaire in a systematic fashion?
• Do we change people’s attitudes and self-perceptions by asking them 
questions?
• If asking questions has the effect of changing people’s attitudes, how long- 
lasting are these changes?
• Are context effects artifactual or can they be explained with reference to the 
social nature of the interview situation?
• Can theories about the nature of attitudes explain some of the instability 
frequently observed in attitudinal responses?
Overview of the contents
The fact that this thesis describes research that was carried out in 1987, i.e., prior to 
some significant developments in the field, is discernible throughout. Relatively little 
had been written about context and order effects in surveys at that time but in the 
years to follow a substantial body of literature emerged (cf. Hippier and Schwarz, 
1987; Schuman, 1992; Schwarz and Sudman, 1992; Schwarz and Sudman, 1995; 
Sudman, Bradbum and Schwarz, 1995; Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski, 2000). I 
have here made an attempt to review relevant articles and books that have been 
published after completion of the data collection and sometimes I explain my 
findings with reference to ideas or theories that had not been put forth at the time of 
my designing the experiments described here. This is obvious in chapter 1, which 
describes context and order effects in surveys and how they have been explained 
throughout the years. Here the bulk of the explanatory models or theories described
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were published after I designed my research and collected my data. A tentative 
categorization of attitudes on criteria of stability/instability is presented in chapter 1. 
This categoriztion did not inform the design of the study but may provide a basis for 
interpreting the results and be informative for further research. It is argued that 
responses to questions about attitudes that are inherently unstable or attitudes in 
which little emotion is invested are likely to be susceptible to the context within 
which they are asked. Furthermore, when the wording of questions is vague or 
unclear, respondents are likley to use adjacent questions to aid in the interpretation. 
Thus, it is important for questionnaire designers to ask clear and specific questions. 
The clearer the question, the less likely it is that respondents need to guess what the 
questioner means and the less likely they are to use previous questions to clarify the 
meaning.
Chapter 2 describes a pilot study that was designed to test various questions’ 
susceptibility to context and order effects before a final decision was made about 
which questions to choose for the main study. Three experiments were counducted to 
test: 1) the effect of political knowledge questions on responses to a question on 
interest in government and public affairs; 2) the effect of giving examples 
(prompting) in the preamble to a question asking which issues of national 
importance respondents are most concerned about, and; 3) sequence effects, i.e., the 
positioning of the question about the most important issues was varied. The pilot 
experiment on sequence effects did not provide any convincing results, and being of 
another nature than the other two experiments (not related to the content of the 
previous questions or the target question itself) it was omitted from the main study.
Chapter 3 describes the sample of 1500 respondents, the methodology of the main 
study, i.e., the design of the three main experiments that were carried out in a three- 
wave panel survey, ‘think-aloud’ interviews or experiments and the methods used 
for the analyses. The experiments were, as in the pilot study, on: 1) the effect of
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political knowledge questions on interest; 2) the effect of prompting when asking 
about the most important issues facing the nation; and finally, not tested in the pilot 
study; 3) the effect of asking respondents if they agreed or disagreed with pro- or 
anti-attitudinal assertions before asking about their attitude towards abortion and 
separately declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons. Think-aloud 
interviews (cf. Ericsson and Simon, 1980) were conducted in an attempt to identify 
the cognitive steps involved in answering survey questions and to gain insight into 
respondents’ train of thought. Each of the three experiments is discussed in detail in 
the following chapters.
Chapter 4 discusses the results of the experiment on the effect of asking political 
knowledge questions immediately before asking about how often people follow what 
goes on in government and public affairs. It is concluded that that researcher 
interventions do not change people’s self-perceptions of how frequently they think 
they follow what is going on in government and public affairs, but rather that such 
interventions provide the definition of what is meant by following government and 
public affairs ‘most of the time’. That is, asking respondents about their ‘political 
knowledge’ in the same questionnaire as the question about how well they follow 
what is going on in government and public affairs implies that a person who follows 
what is going on ‘most of the time’ knows the answers to these and similar 
questions.
Chapter 5 describes the results of giving examples of general or specific issues in the 
preamble to a question about which issues of national importance respondents are 
most concerned about. The type of prompting was found to affect stability of 
responses in such a way that respondents prompted with the specific examples were 
found to be less likely to say that they had no opinion on which issues were the most 
important in Wave 1. They were not, however, more likely to ‘borrow’ the prompts 
than respondents who were given more general examples. In Wave 2, the main
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difference between the two groups that were prompted was that the respondents 
prompted with the specific examples were much more likely to proclaim issues other 
than the examples given as the most important ones. This result, along with no 
differences found between the group prompted with the general examples and the 
group not prompted at all, strongly suggest that the specific examples had an effect 
on the interpretation of the question by widening its frame of reference.
Chapter 6 explains how the probability of respondents giving a favourable response 
to questions about attitudes towards abortion and declaring the Nordic countries free 
of nuclear weapons is increased or decreased by asking them if they agreed or 
disagreed with pro- or anti-attitudinal assertions. It was found that the context did 
not have a strong effect leading to respondents changing their attitudes from one side 
to the other. For both attitudes towards abortion and attitudes towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons did strength of the attitude affect reliability 
in such a way that respondents with very strong attitudes were less likely to change 
their response. This does not necessarily mean that respondents with ‘not very 
strong’ attitudes were more susceptible to the context, and, indeed the pattern of the 
changes among these respondents suggests that these changes may to a large extent 
be explained by random variations.
In the final chapter, chapter 7, I draw together the results of all three experiments. 
Although it is demonstrated that slight changes in context or wording can lead to 
substantial changes in respondents’ interpretations and responses, I do not make an 
attempt to argue that any one wording is more valid than another. Rather, one has to 
pay attention to the context within which the question is asked. Or as Schwarz, 
Groves and Schuman (1998) claim: ‘To interpret answers as representing in a literal 
way the inner dispositions of a population is to forget the extent to which survey 
responses are shaped by situational influences’ (p. 158). In this chapter I offer a 
tentative classification of attitudes into four different levels of strength according to
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expected stability and strength of attitude. According to this model one would expect 
attitudes at different levels to differ substantially, both in terms of reliability of 
attitudinal responses and in terms of susceptibility to context effects i f  context 
effects can be argued to be the result of a change in people's attitude. Hence, further 
research should focus on finding a way to separate random fluctuations due to low 
reliability from systematic changes in response to a particular context.
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1Context effects and attitude research
1.1 Origins o f the sample survey
The sample survey is undoubtedly the most important method in monitoring public 
opinion (Phillips, 1971) and the National Research Council in the USA has claimed 
it to be ‘the single most important information-gathering invention in the social 
sciences’ (Adams, Smelser, & Treiman, 1982). Information gathered through survey 
interviews is widely used to plan and evaluate public policy, political and advertising 
campaigns, and to monitor various trends in society. Although the method as such, 
that of asking people questions, has been used for centuries for the collection of 
census data, it was not until the late 1930s and early 1940s that it took on the form 
we know today. For the most part, contemporary survey research is a product of 
American researchers in the twentieth century, although Karl Marx as early as 1880 
mailed questionnaires to some 25,000 French workers to determine the extent of 
exploitation by employers (Babbie, 1973) and others had questioned respondents 
even earlier.
The development of the modem sample survey can be traced to three different 
streams of research (Rossi et al., 1983). The notion that social conditions could be 
measured and counted came from the early social surveys, which were mainly 
concerned with topics such as income, expenditure, patterns of working life, housing 
conditions and the like. The term ‘survey’ was used in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries for any kind of ‘first-hand investigation’ of a community or 
group {Encyclopaedia o f the Social Sciences, 1934; cited in Turner and Martin,
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1984, p. 25). The most famous of the early surveys conducted in Great Britain were 
Mayhew’s (1861-1862) London Labour and the London Poor and Booth’s enquiry 
into the Labour and Life o f the People o f London (Booth, 1889-1902) (Moser and 
Kalton, 1971). The idea that people could be asked about their preferences and 
behaviour came early in the twentieth century from journalists who were engaged in 
predicting election results, using a method commonly known as the ‘straw vote’. The 
Encyclopaedia o f the Social Sciences (1934) defines the ‘straw vote’ as ‘an 
unofficial canvass of an electorate to determine the division of popular sentiment on 
public issues or on candidates for governmental office’ (Turner and Martin, 1984, p. 
25). Although the journalists have been credited with having established the 
credibility of asking people about their opinions, some of the early social surveys 
were based on interviews with respondents who were themselves the focus of the 
research. However, the aim of the social surveys was to gather information about 
facts as opposed to opinion, which should be avoided. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
Mayhew’s (1861-1862) research on poverty was based on interviews with the poor 
themselves. At that time the general belief was that it was not advisable to interview 
a respondent who was at the same time the subject of the inquiry and the informant. 
Hence the most disturbing of Mayhew’s findings were rejected by The Economist as 
“‘entirely false and irreconcilable with known, recorded and public facts” being 
based on the statements of the poor themselves whose “utter untrustworthiness” was 
well known (Thompson, 1973, p. 43)’ (Marsh, 1982, p. 18). Booth, unlike M.ayhew, 
did not rely on statements of the poor themselves, but instead relied on the expert 
testimony of school-board visitors, police, rate-collectors, sanitary inspectors and 
almoners. In addition, Booth obtained some qualitative impressions from visiting 
and observing his subjects. The rejection of the validity of interviewing the subjects 
of the research has undoubtedly led to disregard for the problems of wording 
questions, but once the tradition of direct interviewing was established, other 
important methodological breakthroughs were made possible. The use of standard 
question-wording and clear definitions of the concepts under investigation became
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vital. One of Booth’s successors, an industrialist named Rowntree, who conducted 
an inquiry into poverty in a ‘typical’ English town, can be regarded as one of the 
pioneers in this field. His work was in many respects more sophisticated than 
Booth’s. He used interviewers and structured schedules to obtain the information he 
wanted directly from the families and placed greater emphasis on defining the 
concept of poverty. But, according to Marsh (1982, p. 25), it was Bowley who was 
responsible for ‘the decisive methodological breakthroughs for the social survey as 
we know it today. He was responsible for a much more rigorous attitude towards the 
precise questions to be asked and the precise definitions of the unit under 
investigation’ and his book The Measurement o f Social Phenomena was published in 
1915. However, the careful administration of standardized questionnaires is often 
traced to psychologists working in market research, using methods reminiscent of 
laboratory experiments. It is here, through the emphasis on standardization that the 
philosophy of behaviourism filters into survey methodology. As a result, a question 
in a questionnaire came to be treated as an isolated stimulus and the answer to the 
question as a response to that particular stimulus.
Both the early social surveys and the pre-election studies or the ‘straw-vote’ were 
based on the assumption that the bigger the sample, the more accurate the estimates 
obtained. One of the most famous straw votes was the Literary Digest poll. This poll 
had a fairly good record of forecasting American elections from 1916 to 1932, but 
failed disastrously to forecast correctly the 1936 presidential election. This failure 
has partly been attributed to the use of telephone directories and automobile 
registration lists as the sample frame. However, as pointed out by Parten (1950) and 
Turner and Martin (1984), the major problem was probably the reliance on volunteer 
responses. In the 1936 straw vote approximately 10 million ballots were sent out, but 
only about 2 million were returned. Several public opinion polling organizations 
with much smaller samples than the Literary Digest sample came much closer to 
predicting the actual election results. These samples were selected in such a way that
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interviewers were each given an assigned quota specifying the number of men, 
women and persons of various economic levels to be interviewed (Mosteller et al., 
1949). This provided the polls or the sample surveys with more respectability and 
emphasis was placed on further development of the sampling techniques. In 
England, some major advances had been made in surveying long before this, even 
before the First World War. The statistical ideas underlying random sampling had 
been known for a long time, the chi-square distribution had been discovered and 
Gossett (Student) and Fisher had discovered the distribution of a large number of 
sample statistics before the First World War, but Bowley was among the first to 
apply these ideas to social surveys. In 1913, Bowley who is more famous for his use 
of practical sampling schemes than for his emphasis on standardized questions and 
definitions, constructed complete lists of houses and drew a random sample from 
this. He also made an attempt to estimate the reliability of his research and calculated 
confidence intervals for his findings (Marsh, 1982). These factors, i.e., 
‘standardized’ interviews and particular sampling methods, along with advances in 
multivariate data analysis have come to constitute the core of the sample survey 
method, making it a relatively systematic and standardized approach to the collection 
of information.
In the period between the World Wars the questionnaire had become the main 
measuring instrument and the focus of most studies was on collecting objective data 
only. The few studies that included questions on subjective issues, such as leisure, 
crime or religious activities, were quite sterile. In reaction to this, The Mass- 
Observation Organisation was founded in England in 1937. Volunteers were 
inspired by the programme to engage in writing diaries, poems, making films, or in 
observing by more or less unobtrusive methods the behaviour and speech of others. 
The Mass-Observation Organisation ‘sought to supply accurate observations of 
everyday life and real (not just published) public moods, an anthropology and a 
mass documentation for a vast sector of normal life which did not, at that time, seem
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to be adequately considered by the media, the arts, the social scientists or even by the 
political leaders’ (Harrisson, 1978, p. 13; cited in Marsh, 1982, p. 32). Marsh (1982) 
argues that the Mass-Observations must be treated as an important precursor of the 
‘systematic social observation’ survey method in the USA. During the Second World 
War government survey activity, both in the UK and the USA, increased markedly. 
Not only was it intended to examine the physical conditions of those who were 
expected to fight or work in the munitions industry, but also to survey the conditions 
of the civilian population in the UK, since it was feared that civilian morale might 
collapse under the pressure of aerial bombardment. Public opinion polling was first 
systematically used for policy purposes in the USA and in the UK after the Second 
World War began. Although the Wartime Social Survey, founded in England in 
1940, was in the beginning run by academics, the active involvement of academics 
was much more marked in the USA. The most extensive use of the American data 
was probably through the Department of the Army’s Information and Education 
Branch, headed by Samuel A. Stouffer (Rossi et al., 1983), but the major difference 
between the British and the American wartime surveys lay in the use that was made 
of the material. The British data were covered by the Official Secrets act and not 
released to anyone, whereas the American data were carefully analysed by 
academics and results published in The American Soldier, edited by Stouffer et al. 
(1949).
The employment of survey research methods started in academic institutions in the 
late 1930s with the work of Hadley Cantril at Princeton University and Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld at Newark University. This research began to flourish at the end of the 
Second World War, when social scientists who had been working for the American 
government came back into the universities. Along with the growing use of survey 
measurements within universities, emphasis was placed on establishing the validity 
and reliability of those measures. In 1945 the National Research Council and the 
Social Science Research Council in America established a ‘Joint Committee on the
29
Measurement of Opinion, Attitudes and Consumer Wants’, chaired by Samuel 
Stouffer. One of the most important problems identified by this committee was ‘the 
validity of statements, opinion and information furnished by respondents’ (Turner 
and Martin, 1984). The committee recommended that methodological research was 
concentrated on the improvement of sampling methods, questions concerning 
interviewer bias, concealment of opinions, selection and training of interviewers, and 
the relation between opinions and behaviours.
At that time (i.e., in the 1940s) it was already recognized by survey researchers that 
the overall response distribution to a question was in part a function of the question 
wording. Parten (1950) claims that poor question framing (the wording of the 
question) is one of the greatest sources of bias in surveys. That is, ‘leading questions, 
those that state the issues in a biased manner, questions which assume knowledge on 
the part of the informant in fields where his knowledge is very slight or lacking 
entirely will lead to biased replies’ (p. 407).
Most of the research on question wording has depended on the use of what are 
generally known as ‘split-ballot’ experiments, i.e., random subsamples are 
administered different forms of the questionnaire. Differences in responses that 
exceed sample fluctuations are then attributable to differences in questionnaire form. 
The most influential of the early reports on split-ballot wording experiments were 
Hadley Cantril’s ‘Gauging Public Opinion (1944)’ and Stanley Payne’s ‘The Art of 
Asking Questions (1951)’. The fact that most of the early reports of experiments 
were restricted to univariate results led to the assumption that while marginals 
cannot be trusted, associations between variables were not subject to the same degree 
of instability (Stouffer and DeVinney, 1949). Furthermore, the issue of why effects 
occurred received little attention. By 1950 these experiments had largely disappeared 
from major surveys (Schuman and Presser, 1981). It was not until the late 1970s that 
the Institute for Social Research and National Opinion Research Centre in the USA
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and Social and Community Planning Research in England began to give the matter 
some attention.
1.2 Context effects
‘Students of public opinion research are fast coming to the realization 
that, relatively speaking, too much attention has been directed toward 
sample design, and too little toward question design’ (Gallup, 1947, p.
385).
Despite the fact that the above quotation was written in 1947 it is as good a 
description of the 1970s and ‘80s as it was of the ‘40s. At that time it was already 
recognized that different questionnaire designs can lead to much greater variation in 
results than different sampling techniques. From the 1950s to the 1970s wording 
experiments came to be treated anecdotally and reported as illustrative warnings but 
they were not developed within a theoretical framework. Researchers concentrated 
more on the interviewer as a source of bias. In the 1970s, however, research on 
survey methodology shifted again from focusing on interviewer characteristics to 
formal characteristics of survey questions, partly as a result of the work of Ome 
(1962, 1969), Rosenthal (1966) and others (cf. Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1969) in 
psychology, who demonstrated experimenter and other effects on responses even in 
experimental studies previously believed robust. Another factor contributing to this 
revived interest in question wording and question form was the finding by Schuman 
and Duncan (1974) that the relationship between variables depended on the specific 
questions asked. Finally, since 1970 there has been a constant growth in the use of 
survey measurements of subjective phenomena1 both in the USA and in Britain. 
Researchers interested in social trends have stressed the need for measuring such 
phenomena and authors of the British annual report Social Trends have argued that 
‘the way forward lies not in adding more measures of conventional hard statistics,
1 - ‘subjective phenomena are those that, in principle, can be directly known, if at all, only by the 
persons themselves, although a person’s intimate associates or a skilled observer may be able to 
surmise from indirect evidence what is going on “inside”’ (Turner and Martin, 1984, p. 8)
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but rather in supplementing the existing ones by adding ... a dimension of the 
satisfaction (happiness, contentment, psychological well-being, etc.) felt by those 
who constitute the community’ (Abrams, 1973, p. 36; cited in Turner and Martin, 
1984, p. 4). This growing use of survey measurements of subjective phenomena has 
again raised questions concerning the reliability and validity of such measurements.
Since the early 1970s numerous studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of 
survey questions to different contexts (see Sudman and Bradbum, 1974; Schuman 
and Presser, 1981; Hippier and Schwarz, 1987; Schuman, 1992; Schwarz and 
Sudman, 1995; Sudman, Bradbum and Schwarz, 1995 for reviews), although there 
has not been full agreement as to the pervasiveness of these effects. An apparent 
change can be seen over the last decades of the twentieth century in the importance 
social scientists give to such effects:
‘What strikes me most as a social psychologist is the extent to which 
respondents apparently consider each question in and of itself without 
much attention to the earlier questions presented to them. The well 
managed survey interview is more like a slide show than a motion 
picture, with each item viewed quite apart from what preceded or is to 
succeed it.’ (Schuman, 1974).
In 1992 the same author asks himself:
‘How could I have been so clearly wrong in 1974, particularly when it 
seems intuitively obvious that context shapes all of our behavior?’ 
(Schuman, 1992, p. 5).
In an attempt to estimate the pervasiveness of unanticipated context effects Smith 
(1992) conjectures that such effects may occur once in every 40-60 questions (p. 
174)2. Turner and Krauss (1978) point out that context effects in surveys pose a 
particularly serious threat when surveys are used to derive ‘indicators of the 
subjective state of the nation’. This type of research combines data from two or more
2 To get to this estimate, Smith examined the 1988 GSS where a within-year split-ballot design was 
employed (see Smith, 1988).
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surveys and usually interprets differences of 5-10% as indicators of ‘true’ changes in 
the population. In light of the research that has been done on context and order 
effects, there is little justification for interpreting such a small fluctuation as a ‘true’ 
change without some further support. Turner and Krauss argue that ‘Inferences about 
changes in the state of the nation may be misleading if based upon indicator 
fluctuations of less than 15%.... Social indicators that are this insensitive would be 
of limited usefulness except for confirming obvious social changes after they have 
happened’ (p. 469). Other reasons for systematic research on context effects are that 
attempts to generalize survey results must be suspect if responses are a function of 
the particular context - or if opinions of respondents can be altered simply by the 
mode of administration of the questionnaire (Billiet, Loosveldt, and Waterplas, 
1989). Still further complications may arise if only certain groups are affected by the 
context. Many studies have found interactions between context and background 
variables such as education (Schuman and Presser, 1981) and marital status 
(McClendon and O’Brien, 1988). Finally, conclusions drawn from experimental 
research on question wording, or question form may be misleading if context effects 
caused by preceding questions intervene (Schuman and Presser, 1981).
Many researchers have used the terms ‘context effects’ and ‘question order effects’ 
more or less interchangeably, despite the fact that there are important differences 
between these terms. For example, we can have order effects that are not caused by 
‘tranfers of meaning’ (Schuman and Presser, 1981, p. 23) but are due to the position 
of the question within the questionnaire (e.g., fatigue and rapport effects). It may be 
argued that despite the diversity of context and order effects there are four major 
types of effects (Smith, 1986). These are effects that are:
1) unrelated to the substance of the question itself, i.e., sequence 
effects such as fatigue and rapport effects (pure order effects)
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2) unrelated to the substance of the previous questions but related to 
the content of the target question or its response scale (wording, 
etc.)
3) related to the content of the prior questions but not dependent on 
the way in which they were answered (unconditional context 
effects)
4) related to the content of preceding questions and to the way in 
which these questions were answered (conditional context effects)
Context effects are believed to occur when two or more questions deal with aspects 
of the same or closely related issues. Questions that require a general evaluation 
about a particular issue seem to be more sensitive to context effects than are more 
specific questions. This may well be because the general questions’ frame of 
reference is open to many different interpretations and respondents may find it 
difficult to answer such questions without specifying them in some way (Schuman 
and Presser, 1981). The behaviour in question may also be ill-defined and open to 
interpretation. As Schwarz (1990) points out, this is particularly likely when 
researchers are interested in subjective experiences. For example, before a 
respondent can give an answer to how often (s)he has been recently ‘really annoyed’, 
(s)he must decide what the researcher means by ‘really annoyed’. If the respondent 
cannot ask the interviewer to explain what (s)he means, or the interviewer cannot or 
must not define it, the respondent is likely to look for some relevant information in 
the questionnaire that can help her/him clarify the meaning. If the antecedent 
questions deal with some specific aspects of the same issue, they may provide 
respondents with the specification or clarification they need, and hence, lead to a 
context effect.
Smith (1992) identifies two major approaches that have been employed to try to 
explain why context effects occur:
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1) Classification of context effects into different types according to 
their cause and effect.
2) Delimitation of the cognitive steps involved in answering a 
question and an explanation of how context effects may arise at 
each step.
Among those researchers who have attempted to classify order and context effects 
with respect to their cause (question type) and effect are Schuman and Presser (1981) 
and Bradbum (Bradbum and Mason, 1964; Bradbum, 1983). Their classification of 
effects can be seen in table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Classification of context and order effects
Schuman and Presser Bradbum
I. Context effects (transfers of meaning)
A. Part-part consistency
1. Normative principles
2. Logical inference 1. Consistency
B. Part-whole consistency
C. Part-part contrast
D. Part-whole contrast
1. Subtraction 2. Redundancy
2. Simple contrast
E. Salience 3. Salience
II. Sequence effects (mechanical types
of artifacts)
A. Rapport 4. Rapport
B. Fatigue 5. Fatigue
C. Initial frame of reference
From: Smith (1992).
Sequence effects or the mechanical effects (effects II.A., H.B., II.C., 4 and 5 in table 
1.1) do not depend on the context but are only dependent on the number of questions 
that appear before the target question in a questionnaire. Rapport effects are believed 
to occur when the respondent begins to feel more comfortable in her/his role as a
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respondent, leading to more accurate or precise answers. Fatigue effects occur when 
the respondent begins to feel tired, leading to less thoughtful and less complete 
answers. The final type of sequence effects are the so-called initial frame of 
reference effects. That is, an item receives its highest or lowest score when presented 
first in a block of related items, and then serves as an anchor or a standard of 
comparison for the following items. Since these effects are believed to be 
independent of the content of previous questions, they will not be further discussed.
Context effects, i.e., effects that are due to transfers of meaning, either from previous 
questions or possibly an interaction between the content of the previous questions 
and the target question’s response scale, are of two major types. Effects I.A., I.B., 
and 1. in table 1.1 are in the direction of consistency, also called assimilation 
(Schwarz and Bless, 1992), or carryover effects (Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1986; 
Tourangeau, 1987), making responses to the target question similar to or consistent 
with responses to antecedent questions. Effects I.C., I.D., and 2. are contrast effects, 
or ‘backfire effects’ (Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1986; Tourangeau, 1987), making 
responses dissimilar. Salience effects (I.E., and 3. in table 1.1) can be either in the 
direction of consistency or contrast. Consistency effects have been explained by 
reference to people’s need to appear consistent and logically sound (cf. Heider, 
1958; Festinger, 1957; McGuire, 1960; Bern, 1967, 1972). Thus, preceding questions 
may create a consistency effect by making particular beliefs salient, or they may 
emphasize normative principles such as the norm of ‘even-handedness’ (Schuman & 
Presser, 1981) that has been demonstrated in experiments varying the order of 
questions asking, on the one hand, whether Communist reporters should be allowed 
to gather news in America, and on the other hand, whether American reporters 
should be allowed to cover events in a Communist country such as Russia. Placing 
the question about Communist reporters first, reduces support for free access for 
American reporters to a Communist country, whereas starting with the question 
about the American reporters increases respondents’ willingness to admit
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Communist reporters to America. Schuman and Presser (1981) call this a part-part 
consistency effect since both questions are at the same level of abstraction. They 
argue that this effect cannot be attributed to ambiguities or vagueness in the question 
wording. As Schuman and Presser (1981, p. 30) claim, ‘the ambiguity has to do with 
the nature of language, the fact that words and sentences take part of their meaning 
from the context in which they occur (cf. Searle, 1979)’. It is difficult to distinguish 
between what Schuman and Presser call part-whole consistency effects and salience 
effects. A typical part-whole consistency effect they quote was reported by Smith 
(1979). He found that asking married people about their marital happiness before 
asking about their general happiness led to more positive responses to the general 
question. This certainly is a part-whole consistency effect, i.e., positive responses to 
the specific question (part) increase the likelihood of a positive response to the 
general item (whole), but it may well be due to the ‘consciousness-raising process’ 
(Schuman and Presser, 1981, p. 44) created by the marital item.
Not many part-part contrast effects have been demonstrated, but one such effect was 
reported by Willick and Ashley (1971). They found that students were more likely to 
say that their political party identification was the same as their parents if the 
question about the parents’ party preceded, rather than followed, the question on 
one’s own views.
Contrast effects such as redundancy/subtraction effects have been explained by the 
following argumentation: If a respondent has already mentioned certain attitudes or 
behaviours, (s)he may think it redundant to mention them again. (S)he may even 
think that these elements should be excluded from subsequent questions (answers), 
which may lead to a redefinition effect. For example, Schuman and Presser (1981) 
found that people who had already expressed favourable attitudes towards abortion 
in such cases where there was a danger of serious birth defects, or where the 
mother’s life was under threat, were less likely to agree to abortion on demand.
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Schuman and Presser argue that this may be because respondents subtract these 
special circumstances from the general question and thus redefine the question to 
mean abortion under other circumstances than those mentioned above.
Until the late 1970s or early 1980s, research on context effects was mainly 
concerned with finding ways to avoid these effects. However, in the early 1980s a 
collaborative research programme between cognitive psychologists and survey 
researchers was initiated (cf. Jabine, Straf, Tanur and Tourangeau, 1984; Hippier, 
Schwarz and Sudman, 1987; Schwarz and Sudman, 1992, Tanur, 1992). This 
programme shifted the focus of research away from attempts to circumvent context 
effects towards a search for theoretical explanations of why and how they are likely 
to occur. Thus, in the last fifteen years of the twentieth century we have seen the 
emergence of a number of cognitive theories of the processes and stages involved in 
answering survey questions (cf. Feldman and Lynch, 1988; Schwarz, 1990; Strack 
and Martin, 1987; Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988) paying greater attention to the 
interaction between interviewer and respondents, and properties of language (cf. 
Schwarz and Strack, 1991; Schwarz, 1994). Several theorists have proposed a 
cognitive account of answering questions (e.g. Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1986, 
1988; Strube, 1987; Strack and Martin, 1987; see figure 1.1). They all contend that 
there are four major cognitive processes involved in answering questions: 1) 
Interpretation or comprehension; 2) Recall of relevant memories; 3) Formation of the 
overall judgement; and 4) Selection and editing of the response. Context effects can 
arise in any of these processes. Prior items can affect responses by suggesting an 
interpretation of the issue or by increasing the accessibility of some of the relevant 
beliefs (Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1986). It is not only necessary for the respondent 
to understand the semantic or the literal meaning of the words in the question, but 
also the pragmatic or the intended meaning. This ‘need’ to understand the intended 
meaning originates from the respondent’s desire to co-operate in a type of social 
situation in which the respondent is expected to provide information. Although, in
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principle, it is possible for the respondent to ask for clarification if (s)he is faced 
with some sort of ambiguity, (s)he is not likely to get any further explanations in the 
survey interview. For the sake of standardization, interviewers are usually 
discouraged from explaining terms or questions to respondents (cf. Martin, 1984, p. 
280). In such situations, the respondent is likely to use any information available to 
her/him to infer what the survey researcher wants to know. Strack and Martin (1987)’ 
argue that this information can be obtained from three different sources:
1) Content of the question itself
2) The question’s response scale
3) Preceding questions that may provide information
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Figure 1.1 Respondents’ task in a survey situation
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NOYES
Interpreting the question
Generating an opinion
Format the 
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Edit the 
response
Recall prior 
judgement
Decide how 
to use the 
information
'Compute'
the
judgement
Access
relevant
information
From: Strack & Martin (1987, p. 125)
Common to all approaches studying comprehension is the emphasis on our use of 
prior knowledge in interpretation (cf. Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Abelson, 1981; 
Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Miller, 1979). These approaches also share the 
notion that context allows us to activate and use the relevant pieces from our vast 
fund of background information. Without context, we are unable to determine what 
information is relevant; with changing contexts we draw on radically different pieces 
of information in the comprehension process, leading to radically different readings
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or understandings. (Tourangeau, 1984). Hence it should come as no surprise to find 
that previous questions and answers to those questions influence responses to later 
questions.
Having interpreted or misinterpreted the question, the respondent faces the problem 
of how to answer it. Almost all questions require us to search memories for an 
answer. Anderson (1976) views long-term memory as an associative network and 
argues that we remember by searching relevant portions of the memory network. 
This perspective implies that good cues for remembering something are those that 
activate the right part of the network and that in most cases the best cue is the item 
itself. The principle of cognitive accessibility (Wyer, 1980; Wyer and Srull, 1986) 
suggests that when answering survey questions, respondents do not systematically 
retrieve all the information stored in memory that might be relevant, but that they 
search only until they encounter some information upon which to base their answer. 
Hence, they are likely to use the most accessible or salient information. An important 
factor in determining the accessibility is the recency with which the information has 
been cognitively processed or thought about. Because heightened accessibility is 
believed to be temporary and to decrease over time (Anderson, 1983; Posner, 1978), 
it should be possible to diminish context effects by interposing buffers of unrelated 
items between the specific context questions and the more general target question. 
But as Bishop et al. (1983), Tourangeau et al. (1989a), and others have pointed out, 
evidence on this buffering prediction is mixed.
Many types of questions require considerable cognitive work from the respondent 
after the relevant facts have been retrieved. The question may call for a judgement 
that requires several pieces of information to be combined and it may call for some 
inference. While there is no agreement on how respondents reach a certain 
judgement, according to information integration theory, in making a judgement we 
evaluate the individual pieces of information we have and then we integrate them by
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following a simple rule, such as multiplication, addition or averaging. The most 
important assumptions made here are: a) people readily evaluate diverse pieces of 
information on a common scale and b) they then combine the information according 
to simple formulae (Anderson, 1974; 1981). Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) also claim that 
people follow simple rules when they are making a judgement, but they emphasize 
that the span of human memory is so limited that each judgement is only based on 5- 
9 pieces of information, the most salient beliefs at any one time. A contrasting view 
presented by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) is that we apply loose rules of thumb in 
making judgements. They have identified three such heuristics and shown how they 
can lead to systematic errors in judgement of frequency and likelihood. These 
heuristics are availability, representativeness and anchoring and adjustment. 
Although Tversky and Kahneman’s view is fundamentally different from that of 
Anderson and of Fishbein and Ajzen, it may well explain which beliefs are the most 
salient at any one time.
The models of the cognitive stages involved in answering survey questions are all 
sequential. This is surely an oversimplification since it is likely that both the 
propositions retrieved and the judgements made can lead to redefinition of the 
question, which requires a form of feedback mechanism from stages 2 and 3 (the 
retrieval and the judgement stages) into stage 1, the interpretation stage. Smith 
(1992) discusses what type of effect is likely to occur at each of these cognitive 
stages (see table 1.2)
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Table 1.2 Context effects and cognitive stages in the question- 
answering process
Question-answer stage  Reaction to prior question(s)_____
Carryover/ Backfire/
consistency/ contrast
assimilation
A. Interpretation redefinition/clarification
B. Retrieval stimulation
focus/salience
C. Judgement constraint (normative and
logical)
D. Response selection
1. Mapping
2. Editing
a) consistency constraint (normative and
logical)
focus/salience
b) self-presentation
Adapted from Smith (1992).
Although the prevailing view is that context effects arise because prior questions 
increase the accessibility of particular beliefs, prior questions can also affect the way 
in which the respondent uses the retrieved information. However, predictions about 
what effects the context will have, have proved to be difficult. The effect can be 
either in the direction of consistency, to make responses to one question similar to 
responses to other (i.e., what Schwarz and Bless, 1992 call an assimilation effect), or 
a contrast effect, making responses dissimilar (also called a ‘backfire-effect’ 
(Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1986)).
Although accessibility is believed to be temporary and to decrease over time, several 
studies (cf. Bishop, Oldendick and Tuchfarber, 1983; Schuman, Kalton and Ludwig, 
1983) have demonstrated that it is not the temporal contiguity of questions that 
determines the context effect, but rather the perceived relevance of the questions. 
Schwarz and Bless (1992) have proposed a model to account for how this may 
happen. If the respondent perceives the information activated by the preceding
redundancy
simple contrast 
simple contrast
simple contrast
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questions as relevant to the judgement (s)he has to make, (s)he will include this 
information in the data-base (s)he uses to make his judgement, making responses to 
questions consistent with one another. On the other hand, if the respondent does not 
believe that the information bears on the judgement, (s)he will exclude it. This 
exclusion may then (but not necessarily) lead to a contrast effect, since the 
information may still affect the judgement, either by serving as a standard of 
comparison (Kahneman and Miller, 1986) or as a reference point for anchoring the 
response scale (Ostrom and Upshaw, 1968). Since the context can push respondents 
in opposite directions, the context effects may cancel one another in a heterogenous 
sample. Although this overall cancellation of context effects may give us an accurate 
estimate for the sample as a whole, it will make comparisons between subgroups 
problematic and spurious (Schwarz and Strack, 1991).
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Figure 1.2. Inclusion/exclusion and the emergence of assimilation and
contrast effects
Judgemental task
1
Construct representation of 
target category
1
May the information that comes 
to mind bear on the task? ~
1
Yes
Determine what to do with it:
No Ignore 
(no effect)
a. Does it come to mind due to irrelevant influences? 
(e.g. awareness of priming episode)
No
b. Does it “belong” to the category?
Yes
(e.g. representativeness, category width, 
explicit categorization)
Yes
c. Am I intended to use it? 
(conversational norms)
i Yes
INCLUDE 
in temporary 
representation 
of target category
No
ASSIMILATION
EFFECT
CONTRAST 
EFFECT 
LIMITED 
TO TARGET
No
No
EXCLUDE 
from temporary 
representation 
of target category
Does it bear on dimension 
of judgement?
| Yes
Use to construct 
standard/anchor
I
CONTRAST
EFFECT
ACROSS
TARGETS
From: Schwarz & Bless (1992, p. 238)
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1.3 Errors in attitude measurement
‘“What is the truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an 
answer.” Thus Francis Bacon opens his essay “Of Truth”. Yet we cannot 
scoff at truth in trying to deal with measurement and error. We must 
begin with some sense or understanding or even faith that there is a true 
quantity, a true value under measurement, for error means discrepancy 
from truth.’ (Turner and Martin, 1984, p. 97).
There are numerous aspects of the social survey that can lead to ‘errors’ in 
measurement, and thus poor reliability and validity. These ‘errors’ have generally 
been divided into two main classes: sampling errors (variability due to sample size 
and complexity of sampling plan) and nonsampling errors. Sampling theory is 
relatively well established, but theories and knowledge about nonsampling errors are 
more fragmented. Nonsampling errors are of two major types: 1) non-response 
errors arising from difficulties in the execution of the sample, either by item non­
response or by failure to get interviews with members of the selected sample, and 2) 
response errors caused by other factors such as respondents misinterpreting a 
question or deliberately lying. Sudman and Bradbum (1974) distinguish three 
sources of response errors: the characteristics of the task itself (the questionnaire), 
the interviewer’s performance and the respondent. Hence, a theory of response 
errors has to take into account the interaction between these three sources. Despite 
realizing the importance of this interaction, the questionnaire and context and order 
effects will be the focus of attention in this thesis, since the bulk of research on 
response errors has focussed on the characteristics of the interviewer.
Survey questions are of many different types and different problems can be expected 
to arise in the question answering process, depending on the kind of question under 
consideration. Sykes (1982) distinguishes four types of questions commonly used in 
surveys. These are questions that request factual or behavioural information; 
questions that assess the respondents’ awareness or knowledge of a subject; 
questions that call for a reason or explanation; and questions that elicit attitudes or 
opinions. The two former question types, i.e., those dealing with behaviour and
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knowledge, can be argued to be inherently different from the two others. There is 
little doubt that when we ask a person how often (s)he has been to a dinner party in 
the last six months there is a true value that exists. That is, although the definition of 
a dinner party may be vague, the person has been to a specific number of such 
parties. The same applies to knowledge questions. There is usually a true answer to 
such questions, which the respondent knows or does not know. However, the fact 
that both behavioural questions and knowledge questions are known to be subject to 
various kinds of errors or biases depending on factors such as interpretation of 
concepts, ease of retrieval from memory, amount of telescoping of behaviour and 
self-presentation should not be ignored (cf. Kalton & Schuman, 1982). For example, 
attitude questions about crime have been shown to lead to more reports of criminal 
victimization (Cowan Murphy, & Wiener, 1978; Gibson, Shapiro, Murphy, & 
Stanko, 1978).
In the case of attitude questions and questions calling for a reason or explanation it is 
more debatable whether there exists a ‘true value’ to measure. If there is no ‘true 
value’ one can hardly talk about error in measurement, but the instability of attitudes 
or measures of attitudes has become apparent in survey research. Attitude questions, 
especially general ones, have been found to be vulnerable to the context in which 
they are administered, variations in the wording of the question, and the formal 
properties of the question’s structure (Krosnick & Schuman, 1988). Attitudes have 
been shown to be sensitive to a range of influences: beliefs, values, norms, feelings, 
other attitudes, behaviours and arguments (Tourangeau 1984, 1992; Tourangeau and 
Rasinski, 1988). Context effects on attitudinal questions have often been treated as 
‘measurement artifacts’ (Schuman, 1982), which implies that attitudes are conceived 
of as stable phenomena, and problems of measurement are blamed for the observed 
inconsistencies. This view is also reflected in the use of the term response error. 
However, many researchers argue that despite the fluctuation in people’s survey 
responses they do have underlying ‘true attitudes’ that are overwhelmingly stable
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(Brown, 1970; Pierce & Rose, 1974; Achen, 1975, 1983; Dean and Moran, 1977; 
Erikson, 1979; Feldman, 1989). They contend that the fluctuations or measurement 
errors stem from the difficulty of mapping the attitudes onto the unavoidably vague 
language of survey questions. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between two 
different types of attitude stability: stability at the psychological level, i.e., stability 
of the hypothetical attitude concept, and stability of attitudinal responses. Following 
Bradbum (1983) I question the use of the term error in the case of attitude questions, 
because, as argued above, it is by no means clear that there is ‘one’ true value for 
attitudes, opinions, beliefs, emotions, etc. Hence, a question that needs to be 
addressed is whether the apparent inconsistencies are purely artifacts of changes in 
question order and/or response scales, or to some extent due to the inherent nature of 
attitudes. Is the observed instability only at the response level or can it also be found 
at the psychological level in the hypothetical construct (if in fact an attitude exists at 
the psychological level)?
The determination of potential attitude stability and attitude changeability is an 
important prerequisite for the prediction and explanation of context effects. How 
much do we expect attitudes to fluctuate? What is needed for an attitude to change? 
Which characteristics of the respondent in a survey situation are most likely to 
influence or mediate effects of previous questions (i.e., the context)?
Attitude stability involves two components and it is important not to confuse them. 
When talking about how stable attitudes are, firstly, one is referring to how resistant 
to change they are, and secondly, how much random error of measurement they have 
associated with them. A number of attempts have been made to separate chance 
variability in attitude statements from long-term change, and it has repeatedly been 
found that response instability consists almost exclusively of chance variation 
around a largely stable central tendency (Converse, 1964; Achen, 1975; Dean & 
Moran, 1977; Erikson, 1979; Judd & Milbum, 1980; Judd, Milbum & Krosnick,
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1981; Feldman, 1989; Zaller, 1990). However, most researchers dealing with the 
consistency or stability of attitudes over time have made little attempt to separate 
random error of measurement from ‘true attitude change’ (Kendall, 1954; Converse, 
1964, 1970, 1980; Schuman & Presser, 1981), but have instead made the assumption 
that no attitude change took place from one time to another and all the 
inconsistencies over time could be attributed to random measurement error. Viewing 
all fluctuations in attitudes as random measurement error also implies that there 
exists a fixed attitude which, in theory, one should be able to measure. Therefore, 
one would like to separate random fluctuations at the intermediate level and random 
error of measurement related to the measuring device, the questionnaire. Random 
error of measurement can be argued to occur at the level of measurement only, 
whereas random fluctuations in attitudes and systematic attitude change also occur at 
the intermediate level, in the hypothetical construct itself.
As pointed out by Zaller and Feldman (1992): ‘Virtually all public opinion research 
proceeds on the assumption that citizens possess reasonably well formed attitudes on 
major political issues, and that surveys are passive measures of these attitudes. The 
standard view is that when survey respondents say they favor X they are simply 
describing a preexisting state of feeling favorably toward X’ (p. 579). But do attitude 
theories lend support to this prevailing view of survey researchers that attitudes are 
preexisting psychological states that should not be affected by measurement? Can 
one assume that despite considerable instability in attitudinal responses the attitude 
will maintain its stability at the intermediate level?
Thurstone, in his article (1928), claims that: ‘It will be conceded at the outset that an 
attitude is a complex affair which cannot be wholly described by any single 
numerical index’, and he continues: ‘We shall state or imply by the context the 
aspect of people’s attitudes that we are measuring’ (p. 530). Thus, Thurstone would 
not have expected attitudes to be so stable that they would remain the same in every
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context. This view seems to be the prevailing view within the psychological attitude 
theories, but whether survey researchers and other social scientists have accepted 
this is not clear. Cantril (1944) contends that ‘the respondent’s mental context is 
solidly structured ... the same answer is likely to be obtained irrespective of the way 
questions are asked (pp. 48-49). A similar view is reflected in Payne’s (1951) 
argument: ‘Where people have strong convictions, the wording of the question 
should not greatly change the stand they take. The question can be loaded heavily on 
one side, or heavily on the other side, but if people feel strongly their replies should 
come out about the same. It is only issues where opinion is not crystallized that 
answers can be swayed from one side of the issue to the other by changes in the 
statement of the issue’ (p. 179).
Many of the traditional theories on attitudes are based on the assumption that 
attitudes are psychological entities in people’s minds although they vary 
considerably in their view of the stability or endurance of attitudes. The main 
challenge for the psychologist in the 1930s and ‘40s was finding a way to get to 
those attitudes, i.e., measure them with acceptable precision. This is apparent in the 
writings of Allport (1935) where he states that: ‘Attitude scales should be regarded 
only as the roughest approximations of the way in which attitudes actually exist in 
the mental life of individuals’ (in Fishbein, 1967, pp. 11-12). Unreliable measures 
were a major concern, but fluctuations should also be expected because ‘attitudes 
often change, and an investigation made under one set of conditions may not for 
long present a true picture of the attitudes of any given group’ (in Fishbein, 1967, p. 
12).
Theories differ significantly in the perspective they adopt concerning attitude 
stability, and whereas the majority undoubtedly views the attitude as a stable 
hypothetical construct (that may be measured as a point-on-a-continuum) others 
postulate a considerable instability, not only in responses but also in the attitude
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itself. Attitude theories that explicitly allow for some instability in attitudes are for 
example Sherif and Hovland’s (1961) concept of latitude of acceptance, McGuire’s 
(1969; McGuire & McGuire, 1991) loose linkages and Kaplowitz, Fink and Bauer’s 
(1983) oscillations. Such theories are based on the idea that attitudes may be divided 
into different components, i.e., stable basal components plus peripheral components 
that are readily changed by persuasion (N.H. Anderson, 1959; Lazarsfeld, 1959; 
Kelman, 1980).
Sherif and Hovland’s (1961) assimilation-contrast theory of attitude change is based 
on the premise that when repeatedly presented with a number of stimuli, individuals 
form reference scales that allow for the relative placement of these stimuli along one 
or more dimensions. A particular attitude is perceived as an ‘internal anchor’. A 
communication or a persuasive message is seen as an ‘external anchor’. Thus, 
attitude change is brought about by confrontation of the discrepancy between two 
anchors. Contrast is a shift in judgement away from an anchor, whereas assimilation 
is a shift toward an anchor. According to the assimilation-contrast theory a primary 
factor affecting the influence of a persuasive communication, or for that matter 
information contained in previous questions in a questionnaire, is the degree of 
discrepancy between the communication and the person’s latitude of acceptance. If 
the communication advocates a position that is not too discrepant from that of the 
recipient, (s)he will see it as favourable and will be influenced by it, i.e., (s)he will 
change her/his position in the direction of the external anchor and assimilation will 
take place. If, on the other hand, the communication advocates a position that is 
highly discrepant from that of the recipient, in the latitude of rejection, contrast will 
result, and the individual will perceive the communication as unfavourable, and will 
be either minimally positively influenced or negatively influenced. Hence, Sherif 
and Ho viand (1961) conceive of the individual’s attitude not as a single point but as 
a range of related acceptable positions, i.e., a latitude of acceptance. The width of 
the latitudes of acceptance and rejection varies with the degree of the individual’s
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ego-involvement with the issue in question. The higher the ego-involvement, the 
narrower will be the latitude of acceptance, making high ego-involvement attitudes 
more resistant to change. The relationship between the discrepancy of the two 
anchors and attitude change is a curvilinear one (see figure 1.3). As long as the 
communication remains within the individual’s latitude of acceptance, the greater 
the discrepancy, the greater the influence will be (Insko, 1967)
Figure 1.3 Latitudes of acceptance, non-commitment and rejection:
Target-communicator discrepancy and attitude change
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The figure shows the relation between discrepancy o f message and attitude change for two 
hypothetical individuals. Both hold a negative attitude towards the attitude object (denoted by X on 
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individual (adapted from Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
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The theory of assimilation-contrast places greatest emphasis on the target- 
communicator discrepancy (see also Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a; Granberg & 
Campbell, 1977). There are two major problems with the discrepancy idea. First, the 
principle of regression toward the mean guarantees that the most discrepant 
individuals (i.e., furthest away from the mean) will change the most. Second/ 
individuals occupying the most extreme positions are known to be more certain of 
their stand (Cantril, 1944; Suchman, 1950) and are considered to be more ego- 
involved (Sherif and Hovland, 1961). Thus, a neutral communication is more likely 
to influence the least discrepant individuals than the most discrepant individuals. In 
other words, discrepancy is confounded with certainty and ego-involvement (Insko, 
1967).
McGuire & McGuire’s (1991) theory of attitude structure, or the structure of thought 
systems is an elaboration of the probabilogical model (McGuire, 1981), which 
suggests that merely responding to an attitude question on a given issue can lead to 
changes (polarization) in attitudes towards related issues (Henninger & Wyer, 1976; 
Judd, Drake, Downing & Krosnick, 1991). This theory is composed of five major 
postulates: the utility-maximizing postulate, the congruent-origins postulate, the 
wishful-thinking postulate, the sufficient-reason postulate, and the rationalization 
postulate. These five postulates constitute the core of the theory, but an auxiliary 
loose-linkage postulate provides the theory with the flexibility to cope with 
fluctuations in attitude measurement. McGuire’s (1969) loose-linkage postulate 
asserts that a change in attitudes needs to reach a certain degree, or a threshold, 
before the Socratic effect takes place, i.e., before the change in the particular attitude 
that has been affected starts spreading to related beliefs. McGuire introduced the 
loose-linkage postulate not only as a response to empirical observations of a 
‘slackness in thought-system organization, but also to avoid theoretical 
implausibility’ (McGuire & McGuire, 1991, p. 8). As the McGuires point out, it 
would be implausible, given the massive amount of information constantly
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impinging upon us, to assume that any change in a belief or an attitude would spread 
to related beliefs. They contend that ‘the loose-linkage postulate avoids this 
implausible and maladaptive scenario by allowing for remote changes within the 
loosely linked thought system but dampening them by the “give” between the 
successive links, thus adaptively allowing moderate degrees of useful responsiveness 
and connectedness in thought systems without sacrificing completely the need for 
stability’ (McGuire & McGuire, 1991, p. 8). Thus it is not until a certain threshold in 
attitude change has been reached that a ‘true’ change has taken place.
Anderson & Hovland (1957) in their proportional-change model, which is a special 
case within the more recent information integration theory (Anderson, 1974) 
suggested that the degree of attitude or opinion change could be described with the 
following equation:
Xi = X0 + S (C - X0) [1]
where:
Xq is the opinion before presentation of the communication
X \  is the opinion after presentation of the communication
C is the fixed point of the communication 
S is the coefficient of proportionality
When testing hypotheses derived from this model, and hypotheses concerning the 
order of communications, Anderson (1959) found that after repeated exposures to 
various pairs of persuasive communications the effects of the order of 
communications changed from recency effects to a primacy effect. Anderson 
explains this finding by suggesting that an opinion or an attitude is not based on one 
component but two: ‘a basal component which is relatively little affected by the 
communications once it is formed, and a superficial component which is quite 
labile’ (p. 379). These two components, he claims, act together to produce the 
observed opinion response. Anderson (1959, p. 380) concludes that: ‘The two- 
component hypothesis suggests a ... basic problem, namely that the structure of
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opinion may be too complex to be represented by a single number on an opinion 
scale’.
A number of other mathematical models have been proposed to predict attitude 
change (Saltiel & Woelfel, 1975; Danes, Hunter & Woelfel, 1978; Laroche, 1977; 
Fink, Kaplowitz, & Bauer, 1983). Most of these models are static, and thus, lack the 
flexibility to account for fluctuations or changes that take place in the absence of a 
persuasive message or some other external force. A dynamic model of attitude 
change was proposed by Kaplowitz, Fink and Bauer (1983). While most of the 
mathematical theories of attitude change only try to predict the end point of the 
attitude change process, Kaplowitz, Fink and Bauer attempt to explain the process 
by which the end point may be reached with their theory of oscillation. As a number 
of studies have demonstrated, attitudes change over time even in the absence of new 
external messages (cf. McGuire, 1960; Walster, 1964; Tesser & Conlee, 1975). To 
explain such changes it is necessary to introduce some sort of theoretical apparatus. 
The oscillation model posits two dynamic components: translation to a new 
equilibrium and oscillation around the moving equilibrium. Kaplowitz, Fink and 
Bauer contend that concepts are interrelated and that attitudes that are well anchored 
or related to other concepts are more resistant to change (see also Nelson, 1968; 
Holt, 1970; McGuire, 1964). This view also accords with cognitive dissonance 
theory (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1969) which has shown that people will reject or 
distort messages that conflict with cherished beliefs. According to oscillation theory, 
concepts can be linked by two different mechanisms. One is the rigid brace, in 
which the distances between the various concepts remain fixed. The other is a spring 
mechanism, in which the distances between concepts can be changed by the 
presence of oscillation (Woelfel & Fink, 1980). These mechanisms allow for a 
change in the direction of the message, and a movement back towards the initial 
position (see figure 1.4).
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Figure 1.4________Spring model of attitude change over time
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A=anchor, J=implicated concept, ycent=location of center of mass, yA=location of anchor, 
y=location o f implicated concept, ytran=amount of system translation, yosc=amount of oscillation, 
yA=amount of spring stretch. (Adapted from Kaplowitz, Fink and Bauer, 1983)
Failures to predict behaviour from attitudes and other inconsistencies in attitude 
measurement have led many researchers to question or even reject the idea of the 
attitude as a psychological entity in people’s minds, or a hypothetical construct (cf. 
Abelson, 1972; Wicker, 1971). Tesser (1978), Wilson and Hodges (1992) and Wyer 
and Srull (1989) have suggested that attitudes might be constructed each time they 
are needed on the basis of whatever information is salient. Bern (1972) adopts an 
extreme position where he eschews the traditional view and postulates that ‘to the 
extent that internal cues are weak, ambiguous or uninterpretable’ (p. 2) people infer 
from their own overt behaviour what their ‘attitudes’ are. He suggests that people
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use the same cues as any observer would when they infer from their overt behaviour 
what their attitude may be. Hence according to Bern’s self-perception theory one can 
not expect much consistency in attitudes unless one’s behaviour is persistent.
Others, such as Converse (1970), who more reluctant to abandon the concept of 
attitudes completely, explain low test-retest attitude correlations with poor 
measuring instruments, i.e., Converse suggests that the low coefficients are due to 
the researchers’ ‘very poor job of tapping the attitudinal dimensions at which [they] 
originally aimed’ (p. 171). He suggests that there are ‘two sharply discontinuous 
classes of respondents, the stable and the random’ (p. 175), and only the stable can 
be argued to have a true underlying attitude. He argues that the random responses 
are due to the psychological state of a ‘non-attitude’, and thus concludes that it is not 
possible in the case of attitude questions to distinguish between random error of 
measurement and random error resulting from having a ‘non-attitude’. Hence, 
reliability of attitude questions can not be viewed only as a property attached to the 
measuring instrument, but rather ‘a joint property of the instrument and the object 
being measured’ (Converse, 1970, p. 177). Other theories have stressed the 
importance of centrality (Sherif & Cantril, 1947) or personal importance (Festinger, 
1957) as factors influencing attitude stability. Converse’s postulate differs from 
these since he rejects the idea of an attitude continuum and contends that there 
simply is a large number of social objects that people do not have an attitude 
towards. Nevertheless, when people are asked about their attitude towards these 
objects they feel obliged to answer the question, thus forming an attitude on the spot 
in a more or less random manner, and leading to a great deal of ‘noise’ in attitude 
measurement. Because of the weak correlations that Converse found he argues that 
respondents show little ideological coherence. These findings revivified doubts 
about the attitude concept and the assumption usually made by survey researchers 
that people have reasonably well formed attitudes on most socially significant issues. 
As a result, Zaller and Feldman (1992) propose a different understanding of survey
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responses. They suggest that people do not possess preformed attitudes at the level 
of specificity required in surveys. Rather, they have ideas and considerations that are 
not necessarily consistent. When questioned, respondents call to mind a sample of 
these ideas, and are likely to oversample ideas that may have been highlighted by the 
context of the question or have been called to mind recently. To explain the 
frequently observed response instability, Zaller (1992) has formulated the RAS- 
model (Receive-Accept-Sample), composed of four major axioms (see table 1.3).
Table 1.3 Axioms of Zaller’s Recieve-Accept-Sample model
1. Reception Axiom:
2. Resistance Axiom:
3. Accessibility Axiom:
4. Response Axiom:
The greater a person’s level of cognitive engage­
ment with an issue, the more likely he or she is to 
be exposed to and comprehend - in a word, to 
receive - political messages concerning that issue.
People tend to resist arguments that are incon­
sistent with their political predispositions, but 
they do so only to the extent that they possess the 
contextual information necessary to perceive a re­
lationship between the message and their predis­
positions.
The more recently a consideration has been 
called to mind or thought about, the less time it 
takes to retrieve that consideration or related 
considerations from memory and bring them to 
the top of the head for use.
Individuals answer survey questions by averaging 
across the considerations that are immediately 
salient or accessible to them.
(From Zaller, 1992, p. 58)
A slightly different version of this model is proposed by Zaller & Feldman (1992). 
This version relies on three axioms, i.e., the ambivalence axiom, response axiom, 
and accessibility axiom, and emphasizes the view that people may have a number of 
different attitudes towards one object and that people’s considerations on particular
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issues may be opposing, which might lead them to decide the issue either way. This 
model anticipates response instability, and it also posits a definite structure to the 
instability. They explain the structure in the following manner: ‘Suppose that 80% of 
the considerations in one person’s head induce her toward a liberal response on a 
given issue, while 20% induce her toward a conservative response; and suppose that
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for a second person, these proportions are reversed. If each based her survey 
responses on a one-element sample from the distribution of considerations in her 
head, the first person would be liberal 80% of the time and the second would be 
conservative 80% of the time’ (Zaller & Feldman, 1992, p. 597). Thus, as Zaller and 
Feldman argue, people would have central tendencies that are stable over time, but 
responses to attitude questions would fluctuate around these tendencies. An attitude 
towards an issue should be regarded as a range of reactions to that issue rather than a 
single ‘true attitude’ (Zaller & Feldman, 1992).
Abelson (1986) treats what Converse calls ‘non-attitudes’ in a very different manner. 
He argues that attitudes can be regarded as evaluative beliefs and that ‘beliefs are 
like possessions’. According to Abelson, it is important to make a distinction 
between a ‘testable belief, belief about objects within the immediate experience of 
the person that allow appropriate action and feedback, and distal belief belief about 
objects only remotely experienced or not sensibly verifiable’ (p. 229). Abelson 
claims that the fact that people generally answer survey questions about distal 
matters and their answers enter into systematic relationships supports the 
psychological validity of distal beliefs. If beliefs can be regarded as possessions, it 
follows naturally that people do not have a belief about everything. And if they don’t 
possess a belief, they may well ‘borrow’ one to format a response to a survey 
question on the spur of the moment. Abelson (1986) lists seven factors that can 
induce a state of ownership and at the same time increase the stability of beliefs or 
attitudes, but by ‘belief he means ‘a conjectural proposition about some object in 
the world’ and he takes ‘an “attitude” to be an evaluative belief, that is a belief that
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an object is good or bad in some way(s)’ (note 1, p. 242). These factors are: public 
commitment to a belief, suffering for a belief, explaining a belief, elaborating a 
belief or tracing it’s origins, defending a belief, attributing longevity to a belief, 
becoming aware of the value of a belief.
Other researchers, such as Achen (1975) and Krosnick (1988), have objected to 
Converse’s conclusion about non-attitudes. Achen reanalysed the data from 
Converse’s research and attempted to separate error variance due to instability in 
people’s attitudes and error variance due to low reliability of survey questions. He 
corrected the data for measurement errors and found substantially higher correlations 
than had been found by Converse. Achen (1975) thus concludes that: ‘Measurement 
error is primarily a fault of the instrument, not of the respondents’ (p. 1229). 
Krosnick (1988) claims that Converse (1964, 1970, 1980), Kendall (1954), and 
Schuman and Presser (1981) are errant in assuming that greater inconsistency in 
responses to questions concerning non-important attitudes (or non-attitudes) 
necessarily reflects a greater degree of error in measurement. He stresses the 
importance of estimating the amount of attitude change occurring between the two 
points of measurement, but these researchers all based their conclusion on the 
assumption that no ‘real’ change in attitudes had taken place.
More recent theories of persuasion and attitude change, such as Petty & Cacioppo’s 
(1981) Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) attempt to integrate the ‘conflicting 
findings in the persuasion literature under one conceptual umbrella by specifying a 
finite number of ways in which source, message, recipient and other variables have 
an impact on attitude change’ (Petty, Cacioppo & Haugtvedt, 1992, p. 151). The 
ELM model is based on the assumption that people are motivated to generate 
attitudes that are consistent and functional. The model tries to identify the main ways 
in which people can form their attitudes, and it makes an explicit distinction between 
two different routes of attitude persuasion (see figure 1.5). They define an attitude as
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people’s general evaluation of the attitude object, whether the object is themselves, 
other people, objects or issues.
Figure 1.5 The elaboration-likelihood model of attitude change: two 
routes to persuasion________________________________
PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION
MOTIVATED TO PROCESS? 
personal relevance; need 
for cognition; personal 
responsibility; etc.
Yes
PERIPHERAL ATTITUDE 
SHIFT
attitude is relatively temporary 
.susceptible and unpredictive 
o f behaviour
Yes
ABILITY TO PROCESS?
distraction; repetition; 
prior knowledge; message 
comprehensibility; etc.
No
^ Y e s
t
PERIPHERAL CUE 
PRESENT?
positive, negative 
affect; attractive 
expert sources; 
number o f arguments; 
etc.
NATURE OF COGNITIVE PROCESSING: 
(initial attitude, argument quality etc.)
FAVOURABLE
THOUGHTS
PREDOMINATE
UNFAVOURABLE
THOUGHTS
PREDOMINATE
NEITHER OR
NEUTRAL
PREDOMINATE
No
COGNITIVE STRUCTURE 
CHANGE:
Are new cognitions adopted and 
stored in memory?; are different 
responses made salient?
RETAIN OR 
REGAIN 
INITIAL 
ATTITUDE
No
Yes
(Favourable)
Yes
(Unfavourable)
/ C e n t r a l cen tr a lN v
/  POSITIVE NEGATVIE \
/  ATTITUDE ATTITUDE \
[ CHANGE CHANGE )
Attitude is relatively enduring, 
resistant and predictive 
o f behaviour
Adapted from Petty & Cacioppo (1981; 1986b).
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An attitude change based on effortful evaluation of relevant beliefs and arguments is 
a change that occurs via the central route to persuasion. Such attitudes are perceived 
as relatively enduring, resistant, and predictive of behaviour. Central attitude change 
calls for careful and thorough processing of new and old information. Petty, 
Cacioppo and Haugtvedt (1992) argue that it is neither functional nor possible for 
people to scrutinize all of the persuasive communications to which they are exposed, 
and they often act as ‘lazy organisms’ (McGuire, 1969) or ‘cognitive misers’ 
(Taylor, 1981). Hence attitudes may be changed by fairly simple associations (as in 
classical conditioning; Staats & Staats, 1958), or inferences (as in self-perception; 
Bern, 1972; or the use of decision heuristics; Chaiken, 1987). Such changes in 
attitudes are referred to as following the peripheral route to persuasion. Peripheral 
attitude changes are relatively temporary, susceptible, and unpredictive of behaviour. 
As indicated in figure 1.5 peripheral attitude change will occur when the person is 
not motivated or not able to process all relevant information. In the survey situation 
people are encouraged to answer questions quickly and not to spend a long time 
thinking about each question. Different contexts in a questionnaire are therefore 
likely to increase the accessibility of some particular beliefs or ideas, and thus are 
likely to result in peripheral attitude change. Hence such attitude change should be 
temporary and presumably one would also find high inconsistency in responses to 
any one attitude question.
The ELM model proposes that when personal relevance or ego-involvement is high, 
attitude change will depend more on the cogency of the persuasive arguments than 
when ego-involvement is low. Contrary to Sherif and Sherif s (cf. Sherif and 
Hovland, 1961) contention that high importance or ego-involvement invariably 
makes attitudes more resistant to change, the ELM model predicts that: ‘if a message 
presented highly compelling arguments, the greater elaboration induced by high 
relevance could lead to increased persuasion’ (Petty, Cacioppo, and Haugtvedt, 
1992, p. 153). On the other hand, if a message can easily be counterargued,
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increasing involvement should certainly lead to resistance to change. Attitude 
change in highly relevant or ego-involved attitudes is contingent on the content of 
the message, whereas change in low-relevance is more likely to be dependent on 
peripheral cues such as source credibility, attractiveness, etc. Petty, Heesacker, 
Haugtvedt, Rennier, and Cacioppo (1990) have also shown that attitude change that 
takes place under high-relevance conditions is much more persistent than attitude 
change that occurs under low-relevance conditions.
The major drawback in the ELM model seems to be its inability to foretell whether a 
particular message or persuasive communication will lead to a central or a peripheral 
change in attitude.
As has been shown, a large number of attitude theories and theories of survey 
responses include some sort of mechanism to deal with attitude fluctuations. 
However, some of the best known traditional theories do not explicitly take attitude 
instability into account. The traditional balance or consistency theories such as 
Heider’s (1958) balance theory, Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, 
Abelson and Rosenberg’s (1958) psycho-logic theory, and Osgood and 
Tannenbaum’s (1955) congruity theory are all based on the assumption that some 
sort of mental conflict is necessary to induce attitude change. Hence, as long as no 
discrepant beliefs are made salient or new information introduced there should not 
be any change or fluctuation in a person’s attitudes. Current research on the 
cognitive dissonance phenomenon suggests that dissonance occurs when people 
believe that they are personally responsible for bringing about some foreseeable 
negative consequence or outcome (Cooper and Fazio, 1984; Scher and Cooper, 
1989, Petty, Priester and Wegener, 1994). Thus, even if an act or a belief is 
inconsistent with one’s attitude it should not lead to dissonance unless it leads to a 
negative outcome (Cooper and Worchel, 1970).
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Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) define an attitude as the 
‘person’s location on a bipolar evaluative dimension with respect to some object’ 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975, p. 216). They furthermore assume that some attitudes 
may be relatively stable over time, whereas others may exhibit frequent shifts. 
However, they claim that at any given point in time, a person’s attitude toward an 
object may be viewed as determined by her/his salient set of beliefs about the object. 
They assume that human beings are quite rational and make systematic use of 
information available to them according to equation 2:
A=S(biei) [2]
where:
b: salient beliefs about an object’s attributes
e: evaluation of attributes
As a result of the limited span of short-term memory a person will base her/his 
attitude on five to nine (Miller, 1956; Mandler, 1967) salient beliefs only, which can 
be both positive and negative. Hence, although Fishbein and Ajzen do not postulate 
a specific mechanism to deal with fluctuations or instability in attitudes, their 
reference to the limitations of memory implies substantial ‘natural’ fluctuations, not 
random, but presumably systematically influenced by the context in which the 
attitude question is asked. That is, the context can make particular beliefs more 
salient than others.
Most of the attitude theories discussed so far (excluding Zaller and Feldman’s gener­
ation idea, which is not an attitude theory) are based on the assumption that 
anwering a survey question or stating an opinion is a process of mapping the so- 
called response continuum (people’s subjective [mental] responses to a particular 
stimulus) onto the judgement continuum (the response alternatives), which 
represents the person’s observable judgement to the stimulus (Ostrom, 1987). This is 
the dimensional perspective of attitudes and what is generally regarded as the 
traditional view. Another more recent approach (developed in the second half of the
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twentieth century) is the information-processing approach, which is mainly 
concerned with the structural relations among attitudinal beliefs. The key difference 
between these two approaches lies in their conceptualisation of beliefs. Whereas the 
dimensional approach is only concerned with locating beliefs on the response 
continuum (Ostrom, 1981a, 1981b; Devine and Ostrom, 1985) and assumes that a 
belief can contribute slightly, moderately, or extensively to a judgement, the 
information-processing approach generally views a beliefs contribution as being all- 
or-none, i.e., a cognition is either activated or it is not, it either contributes or it does 
not.
Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) argue that attitude instability is not necessarily a 
sign of non-attitudes, but that it may well be that the structure of attitudes is such 
that they appear to be unstable, or that they are inherently unstable. They posit that 
an attitude is a ‘structure containing propositions both supporting and refuting a 
particular viewpoint’ (Rasinski, 1991, p. 167) (see figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6 An associative network representation of one respondent’s
ideas about abortion
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to the process of the interview because many of the respondents were embarrassed at 
not being able to answer them; hence many of the interviewers saw themselves 
forced to comfort people by telling them that the answers to these questions were not 
common knowledge. This might indeed have diminished the long-term effect of the 
knowledge questions. The interviewers were instructed to inform people whether 
they were right or not and to tell the respondents who did not know, the correct 
answer.
The main hypothesis was that there would be no differences between forms 1 and 3, 
but that respondents who were given form 2 would report following what is going on 
in government and public affairs less frequently than respondents who were given 
forms 1 and 3. However, this shift was only expected to occur if respondents did not 
know the answers to the knowledge questions. Hence, respondents were classified in 
three groups with respect to the knowledge questions; 1) both answers correct; 2) 
either answer correct; and 3) both answers wrong or did not know. Furthermore, less 
educated respondents and women were hypothesized to be more susceptible to the 
effects of the knowledge questions than the more educated respondents and men. 
Testing these hypotheses requires the following analysis:
1) Test for main effects of experimental condition on reported interest in 
government and public affairs (chi-square).
2) Test for the conditioning effects of level of knowledge on the effects of the 
experimental condition (i.e., interaction between knowledge and condition).
3) Test for the conditioning effects of demographic variables on the effects of the 
experimental condition.
In Wave 2 all respondents were presented with the general question without the 
knowledge questions to see if the effects found in Wave 1 (if any) could still be 
detected 2-3 weeks later. If this were the case, one might expect the differences 
between conditions (forms) 1 and 2 to have lessened because all the respondents in
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these conditions were confronted with the knowledge questions. Assuming that the 
knowledge questions would actually affect responses to the general question in Wave 
1, the following would also be examined:
1) Changes in political interest.
2) The effects of experimental condition in study 1 on changes in political 
interest (i.e., is it possible that the context in the first questionnnaire affects 
responses in the second questionnaire administered a fortnight later?).
Experiment 2 - The most important national issues
In many respects the second experiment, concerning the most important national 
issues, can be regarded as parallel to the research that has been done on open vs. 
closed forms of questions. One of the main arguments of the superiority of open 
questions is that specific closed alternatives will influence respondents and that 
therefore the open ended questions will give a more valid picture of respondent 
choice because respondents must produce an answer themselves (Bradbum and 
Sudman, 1979; Converse and Presser, 1986). Questions generally asked in an open 
form are questions that involve multiple nominal responses to broad inquiries about 
values and problems. Such questions are often closed for practical reasons. Hence, it 
is of immense importance to survey researchers to be aware of how the form can 
direct responses to such questions. A number of experiments on open vs. closed 
question format have revealed significant and substantively important differences in 
marginal distributions between open and closed forms (Belson and Duncan, 1962; 
Bradbum and Sudman, 1979; Dohrenwend, 1965; Marquis, Marshall, and Oskamp, 
1972; Rugg and Cantril, 1944; Schuman and Presser, 1981). In this experiment, 
however, the question was not closed, but a couple of examples of issues were 
provided in the preamble to the question. Comparisons of ‘complete’ lists and lists 
omitting certain alternatives but adding an explicit ‘other’ category have shown that 
the omitted alternatives are mentioned less frequently as part of the ‘other’ category
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than when they are included in the checklist (Lindzey and Guest, 1951; Belson and 
Duncan, 1962). This effect can be argued to be related to the problem of 
acquiescence, i.e., respondents agree with the interviewer rather than investing 
cognitive effort in searching for ‘their own opinion*. Acquiescence has been shown 
to be dependent on respondents’ education (Lenski and Leggett, 1960; Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Carr, 1971; Schuman and Presser, 1981). Hence, 
one would expect to find an interaction between the effects of prompting and 
respondents’ education. The focus of this experiment was on the effects of providing 
respondents with incomplete lists of possible responses. How does it affect responses 
to the open ended question ‘Which issues of national importance are you most 
concerned about these days?’, to give two examples of such issues?
Form 1
Issues such as the Albert’s affair4 and discussions about declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons are much talked about these 
days. Which issues of national importance are you most concerned about 
these days?
Form 2
Issues such as inflation and industrial disputes are much talked about 
these days. Which issues of national importance are you most concerned 
about these days?
Form 3
Which issues of national importance are you most concerned about these 
days?
4 The Minister of Industry was forced to resign because of suspected tax fraud. This was made 
public a couple of days before the commencement of Wave 1 and resulted in the establishment of 
his own political party, which stood for election to parliament.
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What the two specific examples, the Albert’s affair and discussions about declaring 
the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons, have in common is that they 
constituted the content of many media news and current affairs programmes in the 
week before the commencement of Wave 1. As such, they were specific to that 
period (March 1987). The two examples in form 2 are not as specific since they are 
an inherent part of the general economic situation at all times. These examples were 
selected on the basis of the pilot study, where these were among the most frequently 
given responses to the open-ended question.
In Wave 2 all respondents were asked which issues they were most concerned about 
without being given any examples, and in Wave 3 respondents were asked which 
issues of national importance they thought had been the most important in the 
election campaign.
Figure 3.2 Design of experiment on giving examples in a question about
________________ the most important national issues_______________________
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Form 1 
Two specific examples
All forms 
Retrospective account 
of the most imp. issues 
in the election campaign
given in the preamble 
to the question
Form 2 All forms
Two general examples
No examples givengiven in the preamble
to the question
Form 3
No examples given
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The results of the pilot study and various studies on acquiescence using open vs. 
closed question format give reason to suspect that the effects of prompting are 
smaller for some parts of the population than for others, in particular for more 
educated as against less educated respondents. That is, the least educated people are 
more likely to consent to the examples given as those issues that they are most 
concerned about.
The major problem in the analysis of this experiment is deciding how to code the 
responses to such a question that involves multiple nominal responses (Respondents 
were asked to mention the three most important national issues). The analysis 
involved a simple examination of percentage differences and a more refined analysis 
of the examples given, although most of it was based on three categories, i.e., the 
specific examples, the general examples, and other issues.
Experiment 3  -  Context effects on attitudes towards abortion and  
declaring the Nordic countries free  o f  nuclear weapons
This experiment was based on experiments reported by Tourangeau and Rasinski
(1986), who found that it was possible to increase or decrease the probability of
respondents giving a favourable response to an attitude question by asking them if
they agreed or disagreed with assertions that were either pro- or anti-attitudinal.
The first two waves were used to obtain base rate data and measures of strength and 
ambivalence of attitudes towards abortion and declaring the Nordic countries free of 
nuclear weapons. In Wave 1 respondents only received the questions about attitudes 
towards abortion and questions aimed at measuring the strength of their attitude, - 
since it has been shown that respondents with mixed views are more susceptible to 
the influence of context than are partisan respondents (Tourangeau and Rasinski, 
1986; Schuman and Presser, 1981).
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In Wave 2 the question about abortion was replaced with a question about attitudes 
towards nuclear weapons, and again respondents were presented with questions to 
measure the strength and ambivalence of the attitude.
Finally in Wave 3 the sample was divided into four subsamples. One half was asked 
about attitudes towards abortion, and the other half about attitudes towards a nuclear- 
weapon-free North. The attitude questions were preceded either by two ‘pro-attitude* 
agree-disagree statements, or by two ‘anti-attitude’ statements. The context items 
were intended to push respondents in a favourable or unfavourable direction. For 
abortion, the pro context items concerned women’s rights, the anti items concerned 
traditional values. For the nuclear-free North, the pro items concerned the threat of 
nuclear war, the anti items concerned the threat of Soviet domination (an issue at the 
time). The design was as follows (see also figure 3.3):
Wave 1
‘Some people are very certain about their feelings about when legal 
abortions should be permitted. Other people see this issue as a difficult 
one to reach a decision on. Would you say that you are more like those 
who are very certain, or that you are more like those who see this issue 
as a difficult one to reach a decision on?’ —> ‘How strong are your 
feelings about the topic of abortion?’ —> ‘Do you favour or oppose 
abortion on demand?’
Wave 2
‘Do you favour or oppose declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear 
weapons?’ —» ‘How strongly do you feel about the issue of nuclear 
weapons?’.
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Wave 3
Form 1: Pro-abortion context:
‘Women should stay at home and leave running the country up to men’, 
(agree - disagree, 5 point scale) —> ‘Even for such jobs as police officers, 
women should be evaluated on the basis of their individual qualifications 
rather than their sex’. —> ‘Do you favour or oppose abortion on demand?’
Form 2: Anti-abortion context
‘The trouble with modem society is that it is too easy not to take 
responsibility for your actions.’ —» ‘It is wrong for a married person to 
have sexual relations with someone other than the marriage partner’. —> 
‘Do you favour or oppose abortion on demand?’.
Form 3 :Pro-nuclear free zone context
‘Increasing the number of nuclear weapons elevates the danger of a 
nuclear war.’ —> ‘The only sensible way to prevent a nuclear war is to 
eliminate all nuclear weapons.’ —> ‘Do you favour or oppose declaring 
the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons?’ .
Form 4: Anti-nuclear free zone context
‘Unilateral elimination of British nuclear weapons would increase the 
Soviet Union’s military superiority.’ —> ‘Closing down the NATO 
control stations in Iceland and Greenland would lead to total domination 
of the Soviet nuclear fleet in the north Atlantic.’ —> ‘Do you favour or 
oppose declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons?’.
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Figure 3.3 Design of experiment on context effects on attitudes towards 
abortion and attitudes towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons
Wave 3Wave 1 Wave 2
I Form 1
Women's rights items 
Attitude to abortion
| Form 4
Threat of Soviet domination 
Attitude to nuclear-free North
Form 3
Threat of nuclear war 
Attitude to nuclear-free
Form 2
Traditional values items 
Attitude to abortion
All forms 
Attitude to nuclear- 
free North 
Strength of attitude
All forms 
Attitude to abortion 
Strength of attitude 
Ambivalence
The analysis of the experiment on attitudes towards abortion included the following 
variables: 1) target item (attitude, forms 1 and 2 in Wave 3); 2) base-rate data 
(attitude, Wave 1); 3) context items (pro or anti); 4) strength of attitude; 5) 
ambivalence of attitude.
What is of major interest here is to see whether responses to the attitude question 
shift as a result of different contexts. The hypothesis is that respondents presented 
with the pro questions (i.e., concerning women’s rights) will give responses more in 
favour of unrestricted legal abortions than will respondents given the anti items (i.e., 
concerning traditional values). To analyse the effects of the context, strength of 
attitude and demographic variables (gender, age and education) general log-linear 
and logit analysis was used.
The design and hypotheses of the experiment concerning attitudes towards declaring 
the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons were the same as for the attitudes
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towards abortion, but the base-rate data and evaluation of strength of attitude were 
collected in Wave 2 in this case. Hence, the analysis was identical.
Think-aloud experiments
In an attempt to identify the major steps involved in answering survey questions and 
to help interpret the results from the split-ballot experiments a few qualitative 
interviews were carried out. The protocol technique is a method that has been used to 
learn about cognitive strategies. Cognitive psychologists have found this method 
useful for understanding how people solve intellectual problems (Ericsson and 
Simon, 1980; 1984) and what kind of strategies people use to retrieve personal 
information such as number of visits to the doctor in the past twelve months (Loftus, 
1984). Bishop (1986; 1992) has employed this method to try to explain why the 
failure to answer political knowledge questions decreases the probability of 
respondents saying that they follow what is going on in government and public 
affairs ‘most of the time’. In the protocol method, subjects are interviewed face-to- 
face and asked to think aloud while they answer the survey questions. The 
verbalizations produced in such interviews, the protocols, are then transcribed and 
content analysed. Bishop (1986; 1992) not only asked respondents to think aloud 
while answering the questions but also asked them to give a retrospective report of 
what had been going through their mind at the time of answering. This after-the-fact 
method has been criticized by researchers such as Ericsson and Simon, (1984), 
Loftus, (1984), and Nisbett and Ross, (1980) on the grounds that when asked to 
describe how they arrived at a particular answer people do not give the ‘true’ reasons 
for their behaviour but provide rationalizations that they believe should have been 
appropriate. However, people are not used to thinking aloud while answering 
questions and may find it both difficult and awkward. Hence, Bishop’s example was 
followed and respondents asked to give a retrospective account of what they had 
been thinking about.
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Seventeen first year students in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Iceland, 
were divided into four different groups. All respondents were asked the general 
question about their interest in politics and about their attitude towards abortion on 
demand. Conditions within the four groups were varied with respect to whether or 
not the two political knowledge questions were placed before or after the interest 
question and whether the abortion question was preceded by two context items 
concerning women’s rights or traditional values. The questions were the following:
A. Do you know who is the Speaker of the plenary session of both houses 
of Parliament?
B. Do you know which minister is responsible for the administration of 
the Statistical Bureau of Iceland?
C. Some people seem to follow what is going on in government and 
public affairs most of the time, whether there is an election going on or 
not. Would you say that you follow what is going on in government 
and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and 
then or hardly at all?
D. The trouble with modem society is that it is too easy not to take 
responsibility for your actions.
E. It is wrong for a married person to have sex with someone other than 
the marriage partner.
F. Do you favour or oppose abortion on demand?
G. Women should stay at home and leave running the country up to men.
H. Even for such jobs as police officers, women should be evaluated on 
the basis of their individual qualifications rather than their sex.
The order of the questions in the four groups is shown in table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Design of think-aloud experiments
Group 1.1. Group 1.2. Group 2.1. Group 2.2.
A A C C
B B A A
C C B B
What do you remember from answering these three questions?
D G D G
E H E H
F F F F
What do you remember from answering these three questions?
All respondents got the same instructions. They were instructed to think aloud while 
they answered the six questions. To practice they were asked to think of twenty 
different animals and to say how many windows there were/are in their parents’ 
house. After the subjects had answered the three questions concerning politics they 
were asked to give a retrospective account of what they had been thinking while they 
answered the questions. Again, after answering the abortion question and the 
relevant context items, subjects were asked what they remembered from answering 
these questions. The instructions were adapted from Bishop (1986), but he based 
them on suggestions by Ericsson and Simon (1984). The instructions were as 
follows:
In this interview we are interested in what you think about when you 
answer some questions that I am going to ask you. In order to do this, I 
am going to ask you to think aloud as you answer the question. What I 
mean by think aloud is that I want you to tell me everything you are 
thinking from the time you first hear the question until you give me an 
answer. I would like you to talk aloud constantly from the time I ask the 
question until you have given your answer to the question. I don’t want 
you to try to plan out what you say or try to explain to me what you are 
saying. Just act as if you are alone in the room speaking to yourself. It is 
important that you keep talking. If you are silent for any long period of 
time I will ask you to talk. Do you understand what I want you to do?
I l l
Good, now we will begin with some practice questions: ‘How many 
windows are/were there in your parents’ house?’.
Good, now I want to see how much you can remember about what you 
were thinking from the time I asked you the question until you gave the 
answer. We are interested in what you actually can remember rather than 
what you think you must have thought. If possible, I would like you to 
tell me about your memories in the sequence in which they occurred 
while you were answering the question. Please tell me if you are 
uncertain about any of your memories. I don’t want you to work on 
counting the windows again, just report all that you can remember about 
your thinking. Any questions? Here is the next practice question:
‘Name 20 animals’. Now tell me all that you can remember about your 
thinking. Good, now keep thinking out loud as I ask you some more 
questions.
The protocols were content analysed to search for possible explanations of why 
answers to the political interest question and attitudes towards abortion were so 
heavily influenced by the preceding questions. A traditional method of content 
analysis was used (cf. Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Miles and Huberman, 1984; Strauss, 
1987). First the data set is searched for themes, analytical categories developed and 
the data indexed accordingly. Counts and examples from the protocols are used to 
display the results.
3.3 Sample and response rate
The sample consisted of 1500 people randomly selected from the National Register 
of Iceland. These 1500 people were then randomly assigned to three subsamples. 
Trained interviewers from the Social Science Research Institute, University of 
Iceland, carried out the telephone interviews.
Wave 1 was carried out in 8 days, 27th of March through the 3rd of April, 1987. A 
total of 1042 people answered the questionnaire, or 69.5% of the sample; 13.4% of
112
the sample refused to answer (201). The remaining 17.1% were abroad, deceased, 
absent from home (i.e., not expected before the 3rd of April and could not be 
contacted where they were), ill, or could not be found. A total of 1010 people were 
willing to participate in Wave 2, but a few of these later refused to answer or were 
absent from home on the three days when the interviews took place, i.e., 18th, 20th 
and 21st of April. A total of 892 responses were collected in Wave 2, that is 86% of 
respondents in Wave 1 answered, or 59.5% of the original sample. A total of 873 
were willing to take part in the third and final wave but 834, or only 55.6% of the 
sample completed all the three parts (93.5% of respondents in Wave 2 answered the 
questionnaire in Wave 3).
3.4 Method o f analysis
The form, order, or context of the questions was the experimental factor and was 
treated as the independent variable. Responses to the question provide the categories 
of the dependent variable. Most of the comparisons between different experimental 
conditions were done by cross-classifying the data, that is by presenting the data in 
simple bivariate tables. These tables were tested for statistical significance using 
Pearson’s chi-square with probabilities evaluated as two-tailed. A probability of less 
than .10 was ordinarily regarded as borderline, p<.05 as significant, and p<.01 as 
highly significant.
Since context and order effects are not necessarily the same for all parts of the 
population, methods for testing for associations in two or more tables were also 
required. Cross-tabulating the data and computing a chi-square test of independence 
for each subtable does not usually result in a systematic evaluation of the relationship 
among the variables. The classical chi-square approach also does not provide
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estimates of the effects of the variables on each other and its application to tables 
with more than two variables is complicated.
A special class of statistical techniques, called log-linear models, has been 
formulated for the analysis of categorical data (cf. Knoke and Burke, 1980; 
Goodman and Magidson, 1978; O’Muircheartaigh and Payne, 1977; Bishop, 
Fienberg and Holland, 1975; Fingleton, 1984; Gilbert, 1994). These models are 
useful for uncovering the potentially complex relationships among the variables in a 
multiway cross-tabulation. In the general log-linear model all variables that are used 
for classification are independent variables and the number of cases in a cell of the 
cross-tabulation is the dependent variable. This method will be employed to unravel 
the associations among more than two variables.
The SPSS computer programme was used for all analyses. In some instances the 
target variable was treated as a dependent variable and a special case of the log-linear 
model, the logit model was employed. In the logit model the analysis is not focussed 
on the expected cell frequencies, but rather on the odds of the expected cell 
frequencies for the dependent variable. This analysis is similar to regression analysis 
and the variable of interest is taken conceptually as dependent upon variation 
induced by the other variables (Goodman and Magidson, 1978).
The background variables used in the analyses were sex, education and age. Data 
from the experiments on political interest and attitudes towards abortion and nuclear 
weapons were analysed by using logit modelling. Hence, the target variables were 
dichotomised. In order to find the model that best described the data, a hierarchy of 
the following four models was fitted and the results shown in tables:
1) A model of independence, i.e., answers to the target question are independent 
of experimental condition, age, education, and sex.
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2) A model with all main effects, that is, all the independent variables affect 
answers to the target question, but their effect is not such that it depends on 
the level of any of the other explanatory variables.
3) All two-way interactions, i.e., the effect of every explanatory variable depends 
on the level of the other variables.
4) All three-way interactions, i.e., the effect of every pair of independent 
variables depends on the level of the third variable.
In addition significance tests for two and three-way interactions are displayed in 
tables. Statistics shown for the final (best) model are: observed and expected 
frequencies, standardized residuals, parameter estimates, log odds, odds, predicted 
and observed probability. The parameter estimates in the tables are deviations from 
the overall effect. The log-odds parameter for the target variable indicates the 
partition of respondents between the two categories (for example favour - oppose). 
The other log odd parameters show the increase or decrease in the log-odds ratio 
associated with each category of the relevant variable. The odds, on the other hand, 
do not show an increase or decrease, but are the actual odds that a respondent in a 
particular category of an independent variable gave a particular response to the target 
question, for example the odds that a woman would favour abortion on demand.
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4The effect of knowledge questions on political 
interest
4.1 Introduction
Bishop, Oldendick and Tuchfarber (1982b) found that when respondents were asked 
about how closely they follow what is going on in government and public affairs 
immediately after, rather than just before, a difficult pair of questions about what 
they knew about their congressman, they were much less likely to say that they 
followed what was going on most of the time. The general question they employed 
has been used in the American National Election Studies as an indicator of the 
electorate’s interest in public affairs, and thus it is important that the context in 
which this question is asked is not confounded with true changes in interest. Bishop, 
Oldendick and Tuchfarber (1984b) found that this context effect could not be 
eliminated by interposing a buffer of unrelated questions.
Bishop (1987) claims that these results support the view of Wyer and Hartwick 
(1980) that the answers people give to survey questions are in large part the product 
of a ‘conditional inference process’. The respondent ‘searches only until he 
encounters a piece of information (i.e., another proposition) that he considers 
relevant, and bases his judgement primarily on a) the implications of it being true, 
and b) the implications of it being false, without taking into account other 
information that may also bear on the validity of the target proposition’ (pp. 244- 
245). Hence, it is more the perceived relevance of the information that comes to 
mind that will determine the inferences a respondent will make in giving an answer, 
rather than the recency of the information. However, recency may also play a
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significant role through its effect on the salience of the proposition. On the basis of 
this reasoning Bishop (1987, p. 182) suggests that the effects of the knowledge 
questions ‘will last until the respondent has an experience that changes his or her 
self-perception, either during the interview or afterwards.’ With reference to Bern’s 
(1978) self-perception theory, Bishop claims that in the process of measuring 
people’s self-perceptions, we change those very same perceptions, ‘and perhaps their 
behaviour too, in some enduring manner’ (Bishop, 1987, p. 192).
4.2 Effect o f question order on responses to a general question 
concerning interest in politics
Table 4.2.1 shows the relation between responses to the general question : ‘Some 
people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the 
time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. 
Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of 
the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?’; and the order of this 
question and the two knowledge questions: ‘Do you happen to know who is the 
Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament? (IF yes): What is his 
name?’; and ‘Do you happen to know which minister is responsible for the 
administration of the Statistical Bureau of Iceland? (IF yes): Which minister is it?’.
Table 4.2.1. Political interest by order of questions
interest
knowledge
Order o f questions 
knowledge interest 
interest only
total
most of the time 56.1% 45.9% 55.5% 52.4%
some of the time 31.9 31.3 31.0 31.4
only now and then 9.7 17.1 10.9 12.6
never 2.3 5.7 2.7 3.6
Total (n) 351 351 339 1041
%2=20.12; df=6; p=.01 Size of effect (most of the time): (56.1+55.5)72-45.9=9.9%
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As predicted, there were no apparent differences between the group that answered 
the interest question before the knowledge questions and the control group in table 
4.2.1, but respondents in the group that answered the knowledge questions before the 
interest question reported following politics less frequently than did respondents in 
the other two groups. The order of the knowledge questions and the public affairs 
question had a significant effect on responses to the public affairs question (%2=20.12 
p=.01 n=1041). Although a large proportion of the respondents who were asked the 
knowledge questions before the interest question were obviously affected by the 
context in such a way that they reported following what was going on in government 
and public affairs less frequently, than they would have done if they had not been 
asked the knowledge questions, there was still a larger proportion that was not
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affected by the context. Bishop (1987) has suggested that answers to the interest 
question may depend more upon the perceived relevance of the information that 
comes to mind, than its recency. He claims that some respondents disregard the 
information (in this case that they did not know who the Speaker of the plenary 
session of both houses of Parliament was and which minister was responsible for the 
Statistical Bureau) because ‘they know from previous experience that they do follow 
what’s going on “most of the time’” (p. 181). Hence, it is interesting to try to 
identify how respondents who perceived this context as relevant differ from those 
who disregarded it as irrelevant. Table 4.2.2 shows the context effect for men and 
women separately. As can be seen in the table, women generally did not follow 
politics as often as men. Both men and women appeared to have been influenced by 
the context, although the effect was, unlike that anticipated, substantially larger for 
men than women, or 13.65% and 7.6%, respectively.
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Table 4.2.2 Effect of question order on political interest by sex
Male Female
interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
interest
only
total interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
interest
only
total
most of the time 
some of the time 
only now and then
65.2%
23.8
11.0
54.3%
25.5
20.2
70.7%
22.0
7.3
63.0%
23.8
13.1
46.5%
40.6
12.9
36.2%
38.0
25.8
41.1%
39.4
19.4
41.3%
39.4
19.3
Total (n) 181 188 164 533 170 163 175 508
X2= 16.442; df=4; p=.01 X2=9.36; df=4; p=.05
Size of effect (65.2+70.7)72-54.3=13.65% (46.5+41.1)72-36.2=7.6%
Age and education of respondents have often been believed to be associated with 
attitude stability although there is no full agreement about the direction of the 
relationship between age and attitude stability or education and attitude 
stability(cf.Glenn, 1980; Sears, 1981, 1986). These variables might be more likely to 
help in distinguishing between those respondents who are affected by the context 
and those who are not. Table 4.2.3 depicts the effect of the question order within 
three different age groups (18-30, 31-50, and 51-70).
Table 4.2.3 Effect of question order on political interest by age
Order o f questions
interest knowledge interest total
knowledge interest only
18-30 years
most of the time 42.7% 31.1% 45.0% 40.0%
some of the time 39.3 39.8 32.5 37.1
only now and then/never 17.9 29.1 22.5 22.9
Total (n) 117 103 120 340
X2=7.07; df=4; p=.13; Size of effect (most of the time): (42.7+45.0)/2-31.1=12.75%
table continued on next page
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Table 4.2.3 Effect of question order on political interest by age -
continued
Order o f questions
interest knowledge interest total
knowledge interest only
31-50years
most of the time 60.6 49.4 61.2 56.7
some of the time 30.6 27.7 31.3 29.8
only now and then/never 8.8 22.9 7.5 13.5
Total (n) 160 166 134 460
X2=20.02; df=4; p=.001; Size of effect (most of the time): (60.6+61.2)/2-49.4=l 1.5%
51-70years
most of the time 67.6 57.3 61.2 61.8
some of the time 23.0 28.0 28.2 26.6
only now and then/never 9.5 14.6 10.6 11.6
Total (n) 74 82 85 241
X2=2.20; df=4; p=.70; Size of effect (most of the time): (67.6+61.2)72-57.3=7.1 %
Table 4.2.3 reveals interesting differences between the age groups. The only 
respondents that seemed to be significantly affected by the context were those aged 
31-50. This is rather surprising, since one would expect the youngest respondents to 
be the most susceptible to the different contexts. An explanation for this might be 
that the youngest respondents were generally less interested in politics than the older 
respondents. Hence, collapsing the two response categories ‘never’ and ‘only now 
and then’ for the youngest respondents leads to a loss in statistical significance. The 
effect was found to be significant when these categories were not collapsed (%2=12.5 
df=6 p=.0517 n=340). Thus, although the order effect is more statistically significant 
for respondents between 31 and 50 years of age, it was also significant for the 
youngest respondents. Despite the greater statistical significance of the context effect 
for respondents aged 31 to 50 than for those 18-30 years old, the size of the effect
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was greater for the younger respondents, i.e., 12.75% vs. 11.5%. Respondents aged 
51-70 show a trend in the predicted direction, but this trend did not reach statistical 
significance, and the size of the effect was only 7.1%.
The conditioning effects of education of respondents are presented in table 4.2.4.
Table 4.2.4 Effect of question order on political interest by education
Compulsory education More than compulsory
education
interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
interest
only
total interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
interest
only
total
most of the time 
some of the time 
only now and then
48.9%
36.5
14.6
34.1%
33.3
32.6
54.9%
27.5
17.6
46.2%
32.4
21.4
60.6%
29.1
10.3
53.5%
30.2
16.3
56.4%
33.3
10.3
56.8%
30.8
12.4
Total (n) 137 132 142 411 213 215 195 623
5C2=20.17; df=4; p=. 01 X2=5.66; df=4; p=.23
Size of effect (48.9+54.9)/2-34.1=17.8% (60.6+56.4)/2-53.5=5.0%
As table 4.2.4 shows, the order effect was large (17.8%) and highly significant for 
respondents with only compulsory education, but was small (5%) and not significant 
for respondents with more than compulsory education.
4.3 Logit analysis of political interest in Wave 1
To facilitate interpretation of the logit models the political question was coded into 
only two categories. Because the majority of respondents reported following what 
goes on in government and public affairs ‘most of the time’, responses to the 
political question were coded into the two categories ‘some of the time or less’, and 
‘most of the time’.
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In order to find the model that best describes the data, a hierarchy of the following 
four models was fitted:
1) A model of independence, i.e., answers to the political question are 
independent of the levels of the variables order of questions, age, education, 
and sex.
2) A model with all main effects, that is, all the independent variables affect 
answers to the political question, but their effect is not such that it depends 
on the level of any of the other explanatory variables.
3) All two-way interactions, i.e., the effect of every explanatory variable 
depends on the level of the other variables.
4) All three-way interactions, i.e., the effect of every pair of independent 
variables depends on the level of the third variable.
Table 4.3.1 shows the models that were fitted, the lambda parameters included in 
every model, the likelihood ratio chi-square, the degrees of freedom and the 
probability of the models.
Table 4.3.1 Models for political interest with order, sex, age and
education as explanatory variables
Model Lambda parameters included 
in the model*
Chi-square DF P
1.Independence (P) 142.05346 35 .000
2. Main effects
3. Two-way interactions
(P )(PO)(PA)(P E)(PS) 
(P)(PO)(PA)(PE)(PS) 
(POA)(POE)(POS)(PAE)
33.87219 29 .244
4. Three-way interactions
(PAS)(PES)
(P)(PO)(PA)(PEXPS)
(POA)(POE)(POS)(PAE)
(PAS)(PES)(POAE)(POAS)
13.79058 16 .614
(POESXPAES) 2.94292 4 .567
* P=political question
E=education of respondent
0=order of questions 
S=sex of respondent
A=age o f respondent
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Since adding the three-way interactions to model 3 does not substantially improve 
the fit and both models 2 and 3 are statistically significant, the final model was 
searched for between these two. First, in order to test whether all the main effects 
were statistically significant, one effect at a time was deleted from model 2, the main 
effects model. The results, which imply that all the explanatory variables have a 
significant effect on answers to the political question, are displayed in table 4.3.2.
Table 4.3.2 Test for main effects of sex, education, age, and question
order on political interest
Effect deleted from 
main effects model 
in table 4.3.1.
Lambda parameters 
included in the model
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF P
Sex (P)(PO)(PA)(PE) 77.52711 30 .000 43.65492 1 .000
Education (P)(PO)(PA)(PS) 44.77452 30 .041 10.90233 1 .001
Age (P)(PO)(PE)(PS) 75.88729 31 .000 42.01510 2 .000
Order (P)(PA)(PE)(PS) 47.75592 31 .028 13.88373 2 .001
Table 4.3.2 shows the conditional chi-square obtained by comparing the models 
with model 2 in table 4.3.1.
In order to test whether all of the two-way interactions were statistically significant, 
one interaction at a time was added to model 2 in table 4.3.1 (the main effects 
model). The contribution of each of the two-way interactions can be seen in table 
4.3.3.
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Table 4.3.3 Test for two-way interactions between order, age, sex, and
education
Parameters included in the 
model - Two way interaction
Chi-square DF P Conditional
chi-square
DF P
(P )(PO)(P A)(PE)(PS) 
(POA) - order x age 32.58614 25 .142 1.28605 4 .863
(P)(PO)(PA)(PE)(PS) 
(POE) - order x education 27.76045 27 .423 6.11174 2 .047
(P)(PO)(PA)(PE)(PS) 
(POS) - order x sex 31.39909 27 .255 2.47310 2 .291
(P)(PO)(P A)(PE)(PS) 
(PAE) - age x education 30.89152 27 .276 2.98067 2 .225
(P)(PO)(PA)(PE)(PS) 
(PAS) - age x sex 29.02379 27 .360 4.84840 2 .088
(P )(PO)(P A)(P E)(PS) 
(PES) - education x sex 33.44127 28 .220 0.43092 1 .512
Only one of the two-way interactions had a significant effect on responses to the 
political question, i.e., the interaction between order and education. The interaction 
between age and sex also reached borderline significance. Hence the best model has 
the following parameters: expected log odds for = 2(X+^°+Xja+A.jce+
?4S+^ik0E+AjlAS), or the main effects of order, age, education, sex, and the 
interactions between order and education; and age and sex (Goodness-of-fit: %2 
=23.58, df=25, p=.544).
Table 4.3.4 shows the observed, the expected frequencies and the standardized 
residuals for the best model. None of the standardized residuals in the table is larger 
than 1.96 in absolute value, which suggests that there were no important deviations 
from the model.
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Table 4.3.4 Observed, (expected) frequencies and standardized
residuals for the model with main effects of background 
variables and order and interactions between order and 
education; and age and sex
ORDER AGE EDUCATION SEX
Some of 
the time
Political interest
Standardized Most of 
residuals the time
Standardized
Residuals
I K 18-30 compulsory male 11(11.99) -.0639 11(10.79) .0651
I - » K 18-30 compulsory female 14(15.59) -.4038 6(4.41) .7597
I -> K 18-30 m. th. comp. male 18(16.14) .4629 23(24.86) -.3730
I -> K 18-30 m. th. comp. female 24(23.41) .1220 10(10.59) -.1813
I - » K 31-50 compulsory male 10(8.32) .5815 13(14.68) -.4379
I - » K 31-50 compulsory female 24(22.33) .3543 16(17.67) -.3982
I -> K 31-50 m. th. comp. male 14(14.12) -.0321 40(39.88) .0191
I -> K 31-50 m. th. comp. female 15(18.96) -.9099 28(24.04) .8082
I -> K 51-70 compulsory male 4(5.33) -.5759 12(10.67) .4070
I K 51-70 compulsory female 7(7.21) -.0795 9(8.79) .0721
I - » K 51-70 m. th. comp. male 6(5.94) .0230 19(19.06) -.0129
I -> K 51-70 m. th. comp. female 7(5.42) .6772 9(10.58) -.4849
K-> I 18-30 compulsoiy male 7(6.88) .0448 3(3.12) -.0665
K-> I 18-30 compulsory female 12(11.47) .1554 1(1.53) -.4261
K-> I 18-30 m. th. comp. male 24(21.03) .6481 20(22.97) -.6201
K-» I 18-30 m. th. comp. female 27(26.50) .0975 8(8.50) -.1722
K-> I 31-50 compulsory male 16(13.11) .7979 8(10.89) -.8755
K-> I 31-50 compulsory female 31(29.87) .2075 10(11.13) -.3398
K-> I 31-50 m. th. comp. male 19(21.98) -.6351 47(44.02) .4487
K-> I 31-50 comp.plus female 17(17.90) -.2134 17(16.10) .2251
K-» I 51-70 compulsory male 9(9.78) -.2493 10(9.22) .2567
I 51-70 compulsory female 12(15.89) -.9753 13(9.11) 1.2877
K-> I 51-70 m. th. comp. male 9(6.72) .8797 13(15.28) -.5833
I 51-70 m. th. comp. female 4(5.87) -.7732 10(8.13) .6574
control 18-30 compulsory male 10(8.90) .3680 10(11.10) -.3296
control 18-30 compulsory female 13(13.91) -.2434 6(5.09) .4022
control 18-30 m. th. comp. male 8(13.83) -1.5684 25(19.17) 1.3324
control 18-30 m. th. comp. female 35(34.12) .1513 13(13.88) -.2371
control 31-50 compulsory male 2(3.65) -.8644 10(8.35) .5717
control 31-50 compulsory female 20(20.73) -.1603 22(21.27) .1582
control 31-50 m. th. comp. male 16(15.82) .0461 40(40.18) -.0289
control 31-50 m. th. comp. female 14(11.21) .8323 10(12.79) -.7794
control 51-70 compulsory male 4(5.56) -.6628 16(14.44) .4114
control 51-70 compulsory female 15(11.25) 1.1195 14(17.75) -.8910
control 51-70 m. th. comp. male 7(5.66) .5613 15(16.34) -.3305
control 51-70 m. th. comp. female 5(4.36) .3084 7(7.64) -.2328
By inspecting the parameters in table 4.3.5, one can see how answers to the political 
question about how closely people follow what is going on in government and public 
affairs were affected by the explanatory variables, order of questions, age, education, 
sex and the interactions between order and education, and age and sex.
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Table 4.3.5 Parameter estimates for the best model, odds, and
proportion saying they follow what is going on in 
government and public affairs, ‘some of the time or less’
A,-para- Log-odds Odds Predicted Observed
EFFECT
LEVEL
meters proportion proportion
Political interest
l.Some of the time/never -.033 -0.065 0.937 0.484 0.474
Political interest by order
1 .Interest->knowledge -.079 -0.157 0.801 0.445 0.440
2 .Knowledge->interest .196 0.391 1.385 0.581 0.539
3.Control- interest only -.117 -0.234 0.741 0.426 0.442
Political interest by age
1.18-30 .319 0.639 1.774 0.640 0.599
2.31-50 -.090 -0.180 0.783 0.439 0.431
3.51-70 -.229 -0.459 0.592 0.372 0.377
Political interest by education
1 .Compulsory only .121 0.243 1.194 0.544 0.538
2.More than compulsory -.121 -0.243 0.734 0.424 0.432
Political interest by sex
1 .Male -.210 -0.421 0.615 0.381 0.367
2.Female .210 0.421 1.427 0.588 0.586
Political interest by order by education
1.1. Interest - Compulsory -.004 -0.007 1.013 0.503 0.511
1.2. Interest -More than compulsory .004 0.007 0.633 0.387 0.394
2.1. Knowledge - Compulsory .099 0.197 2.151 0.683 0.659
2.2. Knowledge - More than comp. -.099 -0.197 0.892 0.471 0.465
3.1. Control - Compulsory -.095 -0.190 0.782 0.439 0.451
3.2. Control - More than comp. .095 0.190 0.703 0.413 0.436
Political interest by age by sex
1.1. 18-30-M ale -.096 -0.192 0.961 0.490 0.459
1.2. 18-30 - Female .096 0.192 3.273 0.766 0.740
2.1. 31-50-M ale .010 0.020 0.524 0.344 0.328
2.2. 31-50 - Female -.010 -0.020 1.168 0.539 0.540
3.1. 51-70-M ale .086 0.172 0.526 0.345 0.322
3.2. 51-70-Female -.086 -0.172 0.759 0.432 0.446
The parameter estimates in table 4.3.5 are deviations from the overall effect. The 
negative log-odds parameter for political interest indicates that overall there were 
fewer people who said they followed what goes on in politics never/some of the 
time, than most of the time, although the parameter was very close to zero, i.e., the 
two cells are almost equal, the proportion choosing responses never or some of the
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time being .48. The other log odd parameters show the increase or decrease in the 
log-odds ratio associated with each category of the relevant variable. The odds, on 
the other hand do not show an increase or decrease but are the actual odds that a 
respondent in a particular category of an independent variable (across levels of the 
other independent variables) will have given that response (never or some of the 
time) to the political question, for example the odds that a respondent in category 1 
(Interest->knowledge) of the order variable will have responded never or some of the 
time to the political question are 2(-.033-.079)=-0.222, e-0-222 =0.801. The 
proportions displayed are the expected proportions of every category of the 
independent variables with response 1 to the political question 
(proportion=odds/l+odds), and the observed proportions. The odds and the 
proportions for the interacting effect of order and education on political interest are 
the odds and the proportions for all possible combinations of the order and education 
categories.
Although it is obvious from table 4.3.5 that the male respondents were, generally 
speaking, more interested in following what goes on in government and public 
affairs, than were the female respondents, this depended, to a certain extent on the 
age of the respondents. The relationship between age and interest in politics was 
much more stable for men, than it was for women. The proportion of men saying 
they follow what goes on in government and public affairs ‘some of the time, or less’ 
changed from .46 (for ages 18-30) to .33 (for 31-50), and finally to .32 for 
respondents aged 51-70. The comparable figures for women were.74 (18-30), .54 
(31-50), and .45 (51-70). Hence, although the male respondents were generally more 
interested in politics than were the female respondents, the oldest women reported 
following what goes on in government and public affairs as often as the youngest 
men.
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Finally, respondents with compulsory education only were much more likely to be 
affected by the order of the questions than respondents with more than compulsory 
education; the proportion of respondents with compulsory education only and 
knowledge questions before the interest question who said they follow what goes on 
never/some of the time was .68 as opposed to .5 for respondents who answered the 
interest question before the knowledge questions, and .44 for the control group. The 
comparable figures for respondents with more than compulsory education were .47, 
.39, and .41.
Table 4.3.6 shows the expected log-odds, odds and proportions giving response 1, 
for every combination of the explanatory variables.
Table 4.3.6 Expected log-odds, odds, and proportion of respondents
saying they follow what is going on in government and 
public affairs ‘some of the time or less9 for every 
combination of the explanatory variables
ORDER AGE EDUCATION SEX
Political interest:
Some o f the time or less
Predicted
Log-odds Odds Proportion
Observed
Proportion
I ->K 18-30 compulsory male 0.180 1.198 0.545 0.500
l-> K 18-30 compulsory female 1.264 3.540 0.780 0.700
I-> K 18-30 m. th. comp. male -0.432 0.649 0.394 0.439
1 ^  K 18-30 m. th. comp. female 0.793 2.211 0.689 0.706
I-> K 31-50 compulsory male -0.567 0.567 0.362 0.435
I-> K 31-50 compulsory female 0.234 1.263 0.558 0.600
I ^ K 31-50 m. th. comp. male -1.038 0.354 0.261 0.259
1 ^  K 31-50 m. th. comp. female -0.237 0.789 0.441 0.349
I - » K 51-70 compulsory male -0.694 0.499 0.333 0.250
I-» K 51-70 compulsory female -0.197 0.821 0.451 0.438
I - » K 51-70 m. th. comp. male -1.165 0.312 0.238 0.240
I ->K 51-70 m. th. comp. female -0.668 0.513 0.339 0.438
K-» I 18-30 compulsory male 0.792 2.208 0.688 0.700
K- »I 18-30 compulsory female 2.017 7.517 0.883 0.923
K -M 18-30 m. th. comp. male -0.088 0.915 0.478 0.545
K-> I 18-30 m. th. comp. female 1.137 3.117 0.757 0.771
K->I 31-50 compulsory male 0.186 1.204 0.546 0.667
K-> I 31-50 compulsory female 0.987 2.682 0.728 0.756
K-» I 31-50 m. th. comp. male -0.694 0.499 0.333 0.288
K-» I 31-50 comp.plus female 0.106 1.112 0.527 0.500
table continued on next page
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Table 4.3.6 Expected log-odds, odds, and proportion of respondents
saying they follow what is going on in government and 
public affairs ‘some of the time or less’ for every 
combination of the explanatory variables - continued
ORDER AGE EDUCATION SEX
Political interest:
Some o f the time or less
Predicted
Log-odds Odds Proportion
Observed
Proportion
K-> I 51-70 compulsory male 0.059 1.061 0.515 0.474
K- >I 51-70 compulsory female 0.556 1.743 0.635 0.480
K-> I 51-70 m. th. comp. male -0.822 0.440 0.305 0.409
K-> I 51-70 m. th. comp. female -0.325 0.723 0.420 0.286
control 18-30 compulsory male -0.220 0.802 0.445 0.500
control 18-30 compulsory female 1.005 2.731 0.732 0.684
control 18-30 m. th. comp. male -0.326 0.722 0.419 0.242
control 18-30 m. th. comp. female 0.899 2.457 0.711 0.729
control 31-50 compulsory male -0.827 0.437 0.304 0.167
control 31-50 compulsory female -0.026 0.975 0.494 0.476
control 31-50 m. th. comp. male -0.932 0.394 0.282 0.286
control 31-50 m. th. comp. female -0.131 0.877 0.467 0.583
control 51-70 compulsory male -0.954 0.385 0.278 0.200
control 51-70 compulsory female -0.457 0.633 0.388 0.517
control 51-70 m. th. comp. male -1.059 0.347 0.257 0.318
control 51-70 m. th. comp. female -0.562 0.570 0.363 0.417
4.4 Logit analysis o f effect of knowledge questions on political interest 
in Wave 1
The above analysis shows that the effect of the order of the questions depended on 
the education of respondents, but it is quite conceivable that those results are 
misleading, because, in order to compare the control group with the two 
experimental groups, a very important variable was left out of this analysis, namely 
responses to the knowledge questions. Looking at the relation between answers to 
the knowledge questions and education does not rule out the possibility that the 
interaction found between order of questions and education was due to different 
levels of knowledge (table 4.4.1).
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Table 4.4.1 Education and answers to the knowledge questions
Compulsory
education
Education
More than 
compulsory 
education
Total
Both answers correct 8.9% 15.0% 12.6%
Either answer correct 33.7 40.9 38.1
Both answers wrong or DK 57.4 44.2 49.3
Total (n) 270 428 698
X2=12.97; df=2;p=.01
If the interaction that was found between order of questions and education was due 
to more educated respondents not being affected by not knowing the answers to the 
knowledge questions (as opposed to the fact that the more educated respondents 
were more likely to know the answers to the questions), one would expect to find an 
interaction between education and order when controlling for knowledge. In other 
words, if the interaction was genuine it would not disappear by introducing the 
knowledge variable into the analysis.
In order to test this, three different models were fitted to the variables political 
interest in Wave 1, knowledge (coded into three categories, both answers correct, 
either answer correct, and both answers wrong/don’t know), order of the questions, 
and education. The variables sex and age were left out of the analysis in order to 
avoid the problem of empty cells. The following three models were fitted to the data:
1) A model of independence
2) A model including all main effects
3) A model with all two-way interactions
Table 4.4.2 shows the goodness-of-fit for the three models.
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Table 4.4.2 Models for political interest with knowledge, order, and,
education as explanatory variables
Model Lambda parameters included 
in the model*
Chi-square DF P
1 .Independence (P) 98.79917 11 .000
2. Main effects (P)(PK)(PO)(PE) 7.29867 7 .398
3. Two-way interactions (P)(PK)(PO)(PE)(PKO)
(PKE)(POE) 3.99573 2 .136
* P=political question 0=order of questions
K=knowledge questions E=education of respondent
Since the fit of the model with all two-way interactions is not substantially better 
than the fit of the model with main effects only, it is not likely that any of the two- 
way interactions was significant, as can in fact be seen in table 4.4.3.
Table 4.4.3 Test for two-way interactions between knowledge, order of
questions, and education
Two-way inter- Lambda parameters Chi-square DF p Conditional DF p 
action added to included in the model Chi-square
main effects model 
in table 4.4.2.
Knowledge x order (P)(PK)(PO)(PE)(PKO) 6.14076 5 .293 1.15791 2 .560
Knowledge x educ. (P)(PK)(PO)(PE)(PKE) 5.68276 5 .338 1.61591 2 .445
Order x education (P)(PK)(PO)(PE)(POE) 6.43679 6 .376 0.86188 1 .354
These findings suggest that the interaction between education and order of questions 
can be explained by the simple fact that respondents with more than compulsory 
education were more likely to know the answers to the knowledge questions. Table 
4.4.4 shows what happens when the main effects of knowledge, order, and education 
are deleted from model 2 in table 4.4.2, that is, all the variables had a significant
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effect on political interest and models without any one of the main effects being 
unsatisfactory.
Table 4.4.4 Test for main effects of knowledge, order, and education on
political interest
Effect deleted from 
main effects model 
in table 4.4.2.
Lambda parameters 
included in the model
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF P
Education (P)(PK)(PO) 16.72105 8 .033 9.42238 1 .002
Order (P)(PK)(PE) 17.62912 8 .024 10.33045 1 .001
Knowledge (P)(PO)(PE) 75.88458 9 .000 68.58591 2 .000
Hence the best model to describe the relations between the dependent variable 
(political interest) and the three explanatory variables (knowledge, order and 
education) is the model with the main effects only. Table 4.4.5. shows the parameter 
estimates for the best model. As the parameters show, there was a strong correlation 
between political interest and political knowledge. Just over 80% of respondents who 
knew the answers to both of the knowledge questions could be expected to follow 
what goes on in government and public affairs ‘most of the time’ (predicted 
proportion 0.19 for ‘some of the time’ or less), 58% of respondents who knew either 
answer, and 35% of respondents who did not know the answers. The order of the 
questions seems to have had a similar effect on respondents whether or not they 
knew the answers, i.e., approximately 14% fewer respondents said they followed 
what goes on most of the time if the knowledge questions preceded the question on 
political interest (34.3% of respondents who answered the interest question first were 
expected to say they followed what goes on ‘some of the time or less’ vs. 46.8% of 
respondents who answered the knowledge questions first).
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Table 4.4.5 X- Parameters, log-odds, odds, predicted, and actual
proportion of respondents saying they follow what is going 
on in government and public affairs ‘some of the time or 
less’, based on a model with main effects of knowledge, 
order, and education on political interest
EFFECT
LEVEL
^-para­
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Political interest
l.Some of the time -.195 -.389 0.678 0.404 0.489
Political interest by knowledge
1. Both answers correct -.532 -1.063 0.234 0.190 0.182
2. Either answer correct .038 .075 0.731 0.422 0.406
3. Both answers wrong/DK .494 .989 1.821 0.646 0.633
Political interest by order
1. Interest -> knowledge -.130 -.261 0.522 0.343 0.440
2. Knowledge -> interest .130 .261 0.879 0.468 0.539
Political interest by education
1. Compulsory education only .128 .255 0.875 0.467 0.583
2. More than compulsory -.128 -.255 0.525 0.344 0.437
It has been suggested that the magnitude of the context effect would be smaller if 
less difficult knowledge questions were used, but Bishop et al. (1984, footnote 10, p. 
516) predict that varying the level of difficulty of the knowledge questions will not 
change the underlying process, that is, that respondents would still answer the 
question about their interest in government and public affairs with respect to their 
most recent experience rather than the most representative instances of their political 
knowledge.
Bishop (1987) found that not knowing the answer to either of the knowledge 
questions significantly reduced the likelihood of respondents saying that they 
followed what was going on in government and public affairs ‘most of the time’. 
Furthermore he found that being able to answer the knowledge questions had no 
effect on respondents’ self-perceptions (p. 194). Although Bishop did not find a 
significant order effect for those respondents who knew both of the answers, he does
133
not mention whether or not there was a significant interaction between the order of 
questions and knowledge.
In the present study, much easier knowledge questions were asked: 50.5% of the 
respondents who were asked the knowledge questions knew one or both of the 
answers, which gave us the opportunity to examine the effects of knowing or not 
knowing the answers to the knowledge questions more closely. Without controlling 
for the knowledge questions (simple cross-tabulation), the context effect due to 
different sequence of the questions was highly significant (x2=20.12 p=.01). When 
we controlled for answers to the knowledge questions we found that the order effect 
lost significance for respondents who knew either of the answers (x2=1.82, p=.40, 
n=267). At first glance, this seems to support the view that the context effect is less 
profound when easier knowledge questions are asked. On the other hand, the fact 
that the order effect was very close to being significant for respondents who knew 
both of the answers (x2=5.37, p=.0681 n=88) suggests that something peculiar was 
going on. Table 4.4.6 shows the observed and expected frequencies and the 
standardized residuals for the main effects model.
Table 4.4.6 Observed, (expected) frequencies, and standardized
residuals for the model with main effects of order, 
knowledge and education on political interest
Political interest
Some of Standardized Most of Standardized
ORDER KNOWLEDGE EDUCATION the time residuals the time residuals
interest both correct compulsory 1(1.70) -.536 8(7.30) .259
interest both correct more than comp. 4(3.80) .104 27(27.20) -.039
interest either correct compulsory 24(21.46) .547 27(29.54) -.467
interest either correct more than comp. 25(24.30) .143 55(55.70) -.094
interest both wrong compulsory 45(49.61) -.655 32(27.39) .881
interest both wrong more than comp. 55(53.13) .256 47(48.87) -.267
knowledge both correct compulsory 7(4.22) 1.352 8(10.78) -.846
knowledge both correct more than comp. 4(6.28) -.913 29(26.72) .441
knowledge either correct compulsory 19(22.01) -.642 21(17.99) .710
knowledge either correct more than comp. 40(40.23) -.036 55(54.77) .031
knowledge both wrong compulsory 61(57.99) .395 16(19.01) -.690
knowledge both wrong more than comp. 56(56.27) -.036 31(30.73) .048
134
Although none of the residuals in table 4.4.6 is larger than + 1.96, thus suggesting 
that there were no important deviations from the model, it is interesting to see which 
of the cells has the largest residual. The respondents that were furthest away from the 
prediction were the respondents in the knowledge-dnterest condition, who knew the 
answers to both of the knowledge questions, and had only compulsory education. 
The predicted proportion for this cell was .28, but the observed proportion is .47 (see 
table 4.4.7).
Table 4.4.7 Log-odds, odds, predicted proportion, and observed
proportion saying they follow what is going on in 
government and public affairs, ‘some of the time’ or less, for 
the model with main effects of order, knowledge, and 
education on political interest
ORDER KNOWLEDGE EDUCATION
Political interest:
Some o f the time or less
Predicted
Log-odds Odds proportion
Observed
proportion
interest both correct compulsory -1.458 0.233 0.189 0.111
interest both correct more than comp. -1.969 0.140 0.123 0.129
interest either correct compulsory -0.319 0.727 0.421 0.471
interest either correct more than comp. -0.830 0.436 0.304 0.313
interest both wrong compulsory 0.594 1.812 0.644 0.584
interest both wrong more than comp. 0.084 1.087 0.521 0.539
knowledge both correct compulsory -0.937 0.392 0.281 0.467
knowledge both correct more than comp. -1.448 0.235 0.190 0.121
knowledge either correct compulsory 0.202 1.224 0.550 0.475
knowledge either correct more than comp. -0.309 0.734 0.423 0.421
knowledge both wrong compulsory 1.115 3.050 0.753 0.792
knowledge both wrong more than comp. 0.605 1.831 0.647 0.644
The results from the logit analysis above suggest that the order of the questions does 
affect responses to the political question irrespective of other factors, including 
knowledge. The interaction between order and knowledge was not found to be 
significant (%2=1.16, p>.50), and order was found to have a significant effect 
(p<.005) independent of knowledge, which seems to imply that respondents were 
affected by the order of the questions, whether or not they knew the answers to the
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knowledge questions. For example, only 12.3% of respondents who knew both 
answers and had more than compulsory education were expected to say they follow 
what goes on in government and public affairs some of the time or less if they got the 
public affairs question before the knowledge question as opposed to 19% if the 
public affairs question is placed after the knowledge questions. Although these 
results lead to the conclusion that order of questions affects responses independently 
of both knowledge and education, it is worth noting that the interaction between 
order, knowledge and education approached significance (%2=4.00, df=2, p=. 136).
These di vergent results give us ample reason to take a closer look at the effects of the 
two knowledge questions.
4.5 The effect o f the two knowledge questions
The distribution of responses to the two knowledge questions suggests that there are 
some important differences between the two questions (see table 4.5.1).
Table 4.5.1 Responses to the knowledge questions
1) Do you happen to know who is the Speaker of the plenary session for both houses of Parliament?
N %
correct answer 249 35.4
wrong answer 62 8.8
don’t know 392 55.8
2) Do you happen to know which minister is responsible for the administration of the Statistical 
Bureau?
N %
correct answer 194 27.6
wrong answer 205 29.2
don’t know 304 43.2
To the first question, 8.8% of respondents gave the wrong answer, as opposed to 
29.2% to the second, which suggests that respondents were more ready to guess the
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answer to the second question, where in fact there were only 11 possible answers, 
and respondents were not asked to name the minister. Obviously, it is much more 
difficult to guess the answer to the first question where any one of 63 MPs could in 
principle have been the Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament. 
Being or not being able to answer these questions can hardly be argued to tell us very 
much about how closely respondents followed what goes on in government and 
public affairs. The first question may be regarded as the easier of the two, simply 
because the name of the Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament 
is often mentioned in news reports. The relevance of the second question, with 
respect to political knowledge, is more debatable. More or less, the only time when 
the media mention which minister is responsible for the Statistical Bureau is when a 
new government takes over (usually every four years). Hence, because of more 
obvious relevance, one would expect the first question to have a greater effect on 
responses to the public affairs question than the second knowledge question. Table 
4.5.2 shows the effects of the order of the questions on responses to the public affairs 
question controlling for the first knowledge question.
Table 4.5.2 Political interest by order of questions, controlling for
responses to the question: ‘Do you happen to know who is 
the Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of 
Parliament?’
Correct answer Wrong answer/ 
don’t know
interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
total interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
total
most of the time 
some of the time 
only now and then
72.8%
20.8
6.4
71.0%
21.8
7.3
71.9%
21.3
6.8
46.9%
38.1
15.0
32.2%
36.6
31.3
39.5%
37.3
23.2
Total (n) 125 124 249 226 227 453
X2=0.12; df=2; p=.94 X2=19.17; df=2; p=.001
Size of effect 72.8-71.0=1.8% 46.9-32.2=14.7%
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As can be seen in table 4.5.2 there was no order effect for those respondents who 
knew the answer to the question about the Speaker of the plenary session of both 
houses of Parliament (x2=0.12 p=.94 n=249), but the effect was highly significant for 
respondents who did not know or gave the wrong answer to the question (x2=19.17, 
p=001 n=453). This result does indeed support Bern’s (1967) self-perception theory, 
i.e., that respondents who fail to give the correct answer to the knowledge question, 
will from that failure infer that perhaps they do not follow what is going on in 
government and public affairs that often, and hence they are less likely to say that 
they follow what is going on ‘most of the time’ than are respondents who get the 
interest question before the knowledge questions.
This result also gives support to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), i.e., 
not being able to answer the knowledge question leads to a heightened tension state 
or cognitive dissonance, and in order to reduce this tension the respondent rearranges 
her/his cognitive world, and, hence reports following what is going on in government 
and public affairs less frequently than (s)he otherwise would have.
Interestingly enough, the pattern for the second knowledge question was totally 
different, and would suggest somewhat different interpretations. Table 4.5.3. shows 
the effects of the order of the questions on the public affairs question, controlling for 
the second knowledge question about the minister for the Statistical Bureau. There, 
we can see that the order effect was significant, whether or not respondents knew the 
answer to the question about the minister for the Statistical Bureau. Self-perception 
theory does not seem to be a plausible explanation for the effect found here, since the 
effect was significant although respondents gave the correct answer (the effect was 
larger for respondents who answered the question correctly, i.e., 13.5% vs. 10.6%). 
Cognitive dissonance theory, on the other hand, is more difficult to rule out, since the 
tension might have been caused by the anticipation of more knowledge questions 
along the same lines, and thus the reduction in reported interest might have been the
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result of some sort of a self-protection mechanism (cf. McGuire and Millman, 1965 
on forewarning). Bearing in mind how many respondents gave the wrong answer to 
this question, it is not unlikely that many of the respondents who got the answer 
right, just guessed, which makes it more likely that a self-protection mechanism is at 
work. Another explanation might be that most of the respondents who gave the 
correct answer to the second knowledge question had already failed to answer the 
first question (106 of the 194 respondents who answered the second question 
correctly had already failed to answer the first one), or that, in some way or other the 
effects of the second question were dependent on answers to the first knowledge 
question.
Table 4.5.3 Political interest by order of questions, controlling for
responses to the question: ‘Do you happen to know which 
minister is responsible for the administration of the 
Statistical Bureau?’
Correct answer Wrong answer/ 
don 7 know
interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
total interest
knowl.
knowl.
interest
total
most o f the time 
some o f the time 
only now and then
70.9%
26.7
2.3
57.4%
25.0
17.6
63.4%
25.8
10.8
51.3%
33.6
15.1
40.7%
34.2
25.1
46.3%
33.9
19.9
Total (n) 86 108 194 265 243 508
X2=11.75; df=2; p=.01 
Size o f effect 70.9-57.4= 13.5%
X2=9.47; df=2; p=.01 
51.3-40.7=10.6%
Table 4.5.4 shows the proportion of respondents who said they followed what goes 
on in government and public affairs ‘most of the time’ and answers to the knowledge 
questions. As can be seen, respondents who could answer the first knowledge 
question (Speaker of plenary session...), but not the second one (minister for 
Statistical Bureau) did not seem to be affected by the order of the questions (the size 
of the effect was -1.2%, i.e., not in the predicted direction). What makes this finding
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rather puzzling is the much larger effect (10.4%) among respondents who answered 
both knowledge questions correctly (%2=5.37, p= 068 n=88).
Table 4.5.4 Effect of knowledge questions on the probability of
respondents’ saying they follow what is going on ‘most of 
the time’
Answers to knowledge questions
jfc A i k
Both First Second Both Total
correct question
correct
question
correct
wrong (n)
Interest—^ Knowledge 87.5% 65.9% 56.5% 44.4% 197
Knowledge—^ Interest 77.1 67.1 41.7 28.7 161
Size of effect 10.4 -1.2 14.8 15.7
* Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament 
** Minister for the Statistical Bureau
4.6 Logit analysis o f the effects o f the two knowledge questions
It was suggested above that an interaction between the two knowledge qustions 
could be an explanation for the seemingly different relationship between the 
knowledge questions, the order of questions and political interest. For some reason, 
the second knowledge question (about the minister for the Statistical Bureau) placed 
before the interest question reduced the likelihood of respondents’ saying that they 
follow what goes on in government and public affairs, regardless of whether they 
could answer the question or not. The first question, on the other hand, conditioned 
the effects of the order of the questions. It is difficult to tell why this was the case but 
of course, it is possible that responses to the public affairs question were affected by 
the order of the knowledge questions themselves. The question about the minister for 
the Statistical Bureau was placed after the question about the Speaker of the plenary 
session of both houses of Parliament and respondents may have expected more 
similar questions. In other words, respondents were affected by the order of the 
questions, whether or not they knew the answer to the question about the minister for
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the Statistical Bureau, not because that question was fundamentally different from 
the question about the Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament 
but because they were asked two questions of that type. Another possibility is that, 
because the second question (Statistical Bureau) was found to be more difficult, 
respondents were affected, regardless of whether or not they knew the answer. It is 
not possible to distinguish between the alternative explanations without designing 
new experiments, and in fact these explanations do not clarify why there was one 
group that was not affected by the order, i.e., respondents who knew the answer to 
the first but not to the second knowledge question. A simpler and more probable 
explanation is that respondents who only knew the answer to the first knowledge 
question differed from other respondents in some important respect, such as age, but 
it was shown above that the older respondents were less likely to be affected by the 
order of the questions. As table 4.6.1 shows, respondents who knew the name of the 
Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament but not who the minister 
for the Statistical Bureau was, are significantly older than other respondents.
Table 4.6.1 Mean age of 
questions
respondents and answers to knowledge
Mean Std. dev. Total (n)
Both answers correct 41.8 13.4 88
Men 41.1 14.0 68
Women 44.2 11.2 20
Speaker o f ... Parliam ent correct 45.2 12.4 161
Men 44.1 12.7 103
Women 47.1 11.7 58
M inister for Statistical Bureau correct 35.8 12.6 106
Men 35.8 12.5 56
Women 35.8 12.9 50
Both wrong 36.5 13.4 348
Men 36.5 13.5 142
Women 36.6 13.3 206
f3,699=19-6; p=.001
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Education was found to influence the effect of order of questions on political 
interest, and as table 4.6.2 shows there was a strong relation between education and 
political knowledge.
Table 4.6.2 Education and answers to knowledge questions
Comp.
education
More than 
comp, 
education
Total
(n)
Both answers correct 27.3% 72.7% 88
Speaker o f ... Parliament correct 36.3 63.8 161
Minister for Statistical Bureau correct 31.1 68.9 106
Both wrong 45.1 54.9 348
X2= 13.67, df=3, p= 003
Since there was a negative correlation between age and education it is important to 
include both these variables in the logit analysis. Although it would be interesting to 
include gender as well it is not possible to include all these variables because there 
would be a number of empty cells. It is not as important to include sex as the other 
two variables since it did not mediate the effect of order of questions (see table 4.3.3) 
although there was a strong relationship between knowledge and sex (x2=49.3, df=3, 
p=.000). Hence the variables included in the analysis were the dependent variable 
interest in government and public affairs, order of the knowledge and interest 
questions, the two knowledge questions about the Speaker of the plenary session of 
both houses of Parliament and the minister for the Statistical Bureau, education of 
respondents, and finally age (coded into three categories: 18-30, 31-50, 51-70). The 
five initial models that were fitted are shown in table 4.6.3 (model of independence, 
model with all main effects, a model with all two-way interactions, a model with all 
three-way interactions, and a model with all four-way interactions).
The models in tables 4.6.3 do not fit the data well, and the model with all four way 
interactions shows that there was a significant five-way interaction, that is, the 
effects of order of questions depended on answers to the two knowledge questions,
142
education and age of respondents. Hence the saturated model was needed to describe 
the data adequately.
Table 4.6.3 Models for political interest with order, knowledge
questions, education and age as explanatory variables
Model Lambda parameters included 
in the model*
Chi-square DF P
1 .Independence (P) 166.74 47 .000
2. Main effects (PXPOXPK^PK^CPEXPA) 50.37 41 .150
3. Two-way interactions (PXPOXPK1 )(PK2)(PE)(PA)(POK1) 
(POK2)(POE)(POA)(PK1K2)(PK1E)
(p k U x pk^ ex pk ^ a ) 33.34 27 .186
4. Three-way interactions (PXPOXPK1 )(PK2)(PE)(PA)(POK1) 
(POK2)(POE)(POA)(PK1 K2)(PK1E)
(p k U x p k ^ x p ^ a x p o k 1^ )
(POK1 E)(POK1 A)(POK2E)(POK2A)
(POAE) 20.82 13 .077
5. Four-way interactions (PXPOXPK1 )(PK2)(PE)(PA)(POK1) 
(POK2)(POE)(POA)(PK1K2)(PK1E) 
(PK1A)(PK2E)(PK2A)(POK1K2) 
(POK1 E)(POK1 A)(POK2E)(POK2A) 
(POAE)(POK1K2E)(POK1K2A)
(POK1 EA)(POK2EA)(PK1 K2EA) 8.82 1 .003
* P=political question 0=order of questions K 1=first knowledge question
K2=second knowledge question E=education of respondent A=age of respondents
Table 4.6.4 shows the odds and the proportion of respondents who said they 
followed what goes on in government and public affairs ‘some of the time or less*. 
The table also shows the size of the effect for each cell, found by comparing cells in 
the interest-»knowledge group and the knowledge—^interest group. For example the 
effect for 18-30 year olds with compulsory education who knew the answers to both 
knowledge questions was .501-.250=.250, i.e., 25% more of these respondents said 
they follow what goes on ‘most of the time’ when the interest question was preceded 
by the knowledge questions.
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A highly complex attitude structure composed of arguments supporting and 
counterarguments opposing one’s predominant position may be ‘naturally inconsist­
ent’, depending on which of the arguments will be the most salient at any one time 
(see Linville, 1982; Millar and Tesser, 1986; Tetlock, 1981, 1986). Tourangeau 
(1992) argues that attitudes can be perceived of as enduring structures in long-term 
memory and that they are organised by the same principles as other material in 
memory. If attitudes can be regarded as a network of propositions, one should be 
able to hold conflicting beliefs about an issue. If only a small number of the 
propositions is taken into account when an overall judgement is made (for example 
when responding to a survey question), one can expect a great deal of instability in 
attitude responses. A response to a general attitude question (such as support for 
abortion) may depend on which part of a network, such as the one depicted in figure 
1.6, is activated, but the network includes three clusters of ideas: 1) a pro-choice 
cluster of abstraction (e.g. freedom), facilitating a positive response; 2) a pro-life 
cluster of abstraction (Catholic church), facilitating a negative response; and 3) a 
cluster of more concrete ideas relevant to the procedure of an abortion. As Fazio 
(1989) argues, ‘not all attitudes are equal’ (p. 159), but he suggests that it may be 
fruitful to conceptualise the attitude-non-attitude, not as a dichotomy, but as a 
continuum that focuses upon the accessibility of the attitude from memory. 
According to Wyer and Hartwick (1980) the accessibility of beliefs is moderated by 
factors such as the recency (Collins and Loftus, 1975; Wyer and Srull, 1980) and 
amount of processing (Craik and Lockhart, 1972).
This type of account accommodates conflicting ideas about an issue, which the 
unidimensional approach is not capable of. That is, one can not have both a positive 
and a negative attitude at the same time if one assumes that attitudes are 
unidimensional. Theories like Sherif and Hovland’s latitudes of acceptance, 
oscillation theory and other such theories that see the attitude not as a single point on
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the dimension but rather as a range of acceptable positions can assume conflicting 
ideas, given that the neutral point is included in the range.
Nowak, Vallacher, and Lewenstein (1994) stress the importance of using a 
dynamical approach to the study of attitudes. Such an approach has a fundamentally 
different view of attitude stability from the view of the traditional approach. A 
dynamical systems approach focuses on the analysis of equilibrium behaviour. A 
system may rest in either a stable or unstable equilibrium. Even a slight external 
influence may lead to a dramatic change in the behaviour of an unstable equlibrium 
system, whereas a relatively strong external influence will not significantly influence 
a stable equilibrium system.
Eiser (1994) postulates one such dynamical systems theory. He attempts to 
accommodate the ‘different kinds’ of attitudes within one theory. He proposes that 
attitudes should be viewed as attractors in a phase-space. ‘Thought is a flow through 
a particular kind of phase space, and the contours of that space undoubtedly 
influence that flow. The question is whether that flow must be entirely deterministic 
or whether we can direct it consciously to some extent. If we are to do so, it may be 
that we require some representation of the structure of our thoughts and memories if 
we are to loosen the pull they have on us. Perhaps this is what insight or self- 
awareness means. The effect of this would not be to change the landscape of the part 
of the attitude space in which we find ourselves but to take us to a different part. 
Maps can help us to climb mountains, not of course because they make them any 
flatter, but because they help us find a way up from the valley. It is time for attitude 
theory to get some new maps’ (pp. 216-217). It is not clear which measures are 
necessary to map an individual’s attitude phase-space, nor which factors or variables 
(moderating variables) make an attitude stable. But Eiser (1994) argues that the 
difference between his theory and the traditional theories lies in ‘what we can expect 
a theory of attitude to do. Any picture of attitude space can never be more than a
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snapshot of a moving thing. As William James (1890) put it, thought is in constant 
change. Attitudes are a special subclass of thought, and although previous research 
has treated them as static, they also show fluctuation and movement. The more often 
a viewpoint is expressed, the more likely it will be to be expressed again. The more 
often aspects of an issue are seen as related to each other (e.g. through argument), 
the more closely tied they will be to each other thereafter’ (p. 216).
As has been shown above, there are many attitude theories that postulate consider­
able attitude complexity. Nevertheless, attitude measurement in surveys has 
generally relied on simple unidimensional measures, often based on only one 
question. The original attitude scales, such as Thurstone’s and Likert’s, are based on 
a number of items, where the attitude can be characterized as the breaking point 
between rejected and accepted items, and the items are tested for their validity. Such 
methods are surely too laborious for use in large scale surveys, but it may be argued 
that the emphasis on parsimony in theory and measurement has led survey 
researchers (and perhaps some attitude theorists) to neglect the complexity of the 
attitude construct.
Drawing together the different types of attitudes and factors believed to mediate 
resistance to change discussed in the theories above, one can divide the attitude 
concept into four different levels reflecting attitude organisation, ego-involvement 
and salience. Attitudes at the lowest level are the most susceptible to context, 
persuasive messages, and are also more likely to show random fluctuations. The 
higher the level of attitudes, the more resistant to change they are, and the greater 
their stability in general, but a number of attributes have been proposed to explain 
which attitudes are consequential and the variable susceptibility of attitudes to 
persuasive messages. Raden (1985) reviewed a family of such variables, which 
include the following: polarization or extremity (Fazio and Zanna, 1978; Abelson, 
1995; Judd and Brauer, 1995), intensity (Schuman and Presser, 1981), importance
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(Krosnick, 1988), certainty (Davidson, Yantis, Norwood and Montano, 1985; 
Pelham, 1991); direct experience (Regan and Fazio, 1977; Davidson et al, 1985; 
Abelson, 1986), personal relevance (Howard-Pitney, Borgida, and Omoto, 1986; 
Petty and Cacioppo, 1986b), interest (Kendall, 1954; Bradbum and Caplovitz, 1965) 
vested interest (Crano, 1995), knowledge (Wood, 1982; Wilson, Kraft, and Dunn, 
1989; Davidson, 1995), and accessibility (Fazio and Williams, 1986; Bassili and 
Fletcher, 1991), size of latitudes of rejection and noncommitment (Sherif, Sherif, 
and Nebergall, 1965), and affective-cognitive consistency (Norman, 1975; Chaiken 
and Baldwin, 1981). These attributes or measures have often been treated as 
interchangeable with one another. Abelson (1988) uses the term conviction to denote 
attitude importance. He, and his students, factor analysed a large number of items on 
attitude conviction and found that conviction was multidimensional. They identified 
three dimensions as Emotional Commitment, Ego Preoccupation, and Cognitive 
Elaboration. Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent and Carnot (1993) came to a 
similar conclusion when they factor analysed 10 of the above attitude attributes and 
concluded that these dimensions can not be regarded as ‘multiple manifestations of a 
smaller set of underlying attributes’ (p. 1132). Although these attributes are believed 
to regulate the stability of attitudes, not all of these attributes have been found to 
regulate the magnitude of context effects. Bishop (1990) and Krosnick and Schuman 
(1988) did not find a relationship between the size of context effects and attitude 
importance, intensity, and certainty, but affective-cognitive consistency (Chaiken 
and Baldwin, 1981) and extremity (Hippier and Schwarz, 1986) seem to exert such 
regulatory influences. Tourangeau et al. (1989a) and Tourangeau, Rasinski, 
Bradbum, and D’Andrade (1989b) found an interaction between attitude 
ambivalence and personal importance, i.e., people holding ambivalent beliefs and 
who consider the attitude to be highly important are more likely to be influenced by 
the context.
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The four different levels or categories that commonly used attitude terms can be 
classified into, reflecting differences in proposed stability are:
1) Attitudinal responses that are generated on the spot on the basis of 
accessible salient beliefs, i.e., non-attitudes (Converse, 1970). One can 
hardly talk about attitude change at this level, but rather attitude response 
formation based on the most salient information. Hence such attitudes are 
likely to be greatly influenced by variables such as different contexts in a 
survey questionnaire.
2) Attitudes that have some temporal continuity, such as peripheral attitude 
components (N.H. Anderson, 1959; Lazarsfeld, 1959; Kelman, 1980; Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986a; 1986b), or distal attitudes (Abelson, 1986) character­
ized by low participation or relevance. Attitude change on this level is 
likely to depend on peripheral cues such as source credibility, 
attractiveness, and other factors unrelated to the content of the persuasive 
message.
3) A greater stability is assumed for attitudes at this level, including such 
terms as basal attitudes (N.H. Anderson, 1959; Lazarsfeld, 1959; Kelman,
1980), central attitudes (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a; 1986b), or accessible 
attitudes (Fazio, 1989). This increase in (assumed) stability is explained by 
such factors as the use of participant scripts, greater personal involvement, 
more knowledge, social rehearsal, social networking, temporal continuity, 
and direct experiences (Fazio, Chen, McDonel, and Sherman, 1982; Fazio, 
Herr, and Olney, 1984). Attitude change is likely to depend on the cogency 
of the persuasive message (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986b) or on cues that 
increase the accessibility of a particular aspect.
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4) Attitudes that can be classified at the highest level are believed to be 
relatively immune to external influences. They are often emotional and 
based on a religious element or an ideology. Terms such as values, 
emotional attitudes, ideological attitudes, and categorical attitudes are most 
often used to describe this type of attitude. These attitudes are so strongly 
held that attitude changes are catastrophic in the sense that when a change is 
brought about, generally by a large amount of consistent information, it is a 
drastic change from one extreme view to the completely opposite one 
(Latane and Nowak, 1994).
The process by which an attitude changes from being a non-attitude to a peripheral 
one and so on, or whether an attitude has to go through the three lower levels to 
reach the fourth one to become a categorical attitude or an ideology is by no means 
clear, but presumably, with increase in involvement, knowledge, etc., an attitude can 
move up the levels and hence become more resistant to change. If context effects are 
in fact due to a change in people’s attitudes, brought about by the questioning, as has 
often been suggested, one would expect a decrease in susceptibility to context as one 
moves up the levels.
1.4 The social nature o f context effects
‘All human communication, not only survey responses, is subject to 
ffame-of-reference effects; and therefore all conclusions drawn from 
such communications are “biased” in some fashion’ (Singer, 1988, p.
576).
Two different approaches to context effects in social surveys can be seen in the 
literature. The first one, that was the most popular in the 1970s and early ‘80s, was to 
view context effects as artifacts or due to imperfections in measurement (cf. Achen, 
1975; Davis, 1976; Schuman, 1982). The second approach, that became increasingly
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popular in the 1990s is to regard context effects as an integral part of the process of 
answering questions. These two different perspectives have radically different 
implications. The artifact perspective regards context effects as errors in 
measurement, hence ways to avoid context effects should be the focus of research. 
Several methods have been suggested to control or minimize context effects, for 
example separating related questions by interposing questions dealing with unrelated 
issues as buffers, or even randomizing question order (Perreault, 1975). The most 
common recommendation is that general summary type questions on a particular 
issue should precede the more specific questions on the same issue (McFarland,
1981). If the researcher wants respondents to bear in mind certain specific aspects of 
an issue, they are advised to place the specific questions before the general question 
(see McClendon and O’Brien, 1988).
Attempts to circumvent context effects, instead of trying to shed light on when and 
how they occur, imply that they are conceived of as artifacts. But, they can only be 
considered to be artifacts if one ignores the social nature of the interview situation. 
As Farr (1978) points out, the purely natural science model of experimenting may 
not be the most appropriate model to apply to human behaviour (cf. Harre and 
Secord, 1972). What first and foremost characterizes human behaviour and 
distinguishes it from the objects that are of interest to the natural scientist is the 
reactivity of the human behaviour. Duval and Wicklund (1972) claim that: 
‘Reactivity is the basic human response to the knowledge that one is the object of 
investigation by others. An individual with this knowledge is likely to be in a state of 
objective self-awareness’ (Farr, 1978, p. 301). Most of the artifacts that have been 
identified in experimental settings can be argued to be a consequence of basic human 
reactions to the knowledge of being the object of observation (i.e., experimenter 
effect, demand characteristics, etc.). These artifacts are artifactual only ‘if what are 
inherently social relations, such as those that exist between experimenters and the 
subjects who participate in their research, are construed by psychologists as being in
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fact relations of a non-social kind (because in that situation experimenters think of 
themselves as guided by a natural scientific model of experimentation), [and] then it 
is scarcely surprising if unforeseen side-effects, artifacts, of a social nature emerge; 
only experimenters, conceptualizing the situation as non-social when it is in fact 
social, will be surprised’ (Farr, 1978, p. 300). Or, as Martin (1984, p. 279) puts it 
‘survey artifacts represent systematic psychological phenomena that do not exist 
only in surveys.’
Only by maintaining a purely natural science model can one possibly think of 
questions in a questionnaire as totally isolated from one another. In an interview we 
use language to obtain the information we require, and although standardization of 
particular questions is a useful method to achieve reliability, it, for purely practical 
reasons can seldom be applied to the questionnaire as a whole. Thus, when asking 
the same questions in different questionnaires, for the purpose of comparison, one 
has to be aware of the characteristics that are peculiar to the interview itself. The 
survey-interview ‘is a scientific enterprise on the one hand, and a social encounter on 
the other’ (Dijkstra and van der Zouwen, 1987, p. 200).
Although Bingham and Moore as early as 1924 described the interview as a 
‘conversation with a purpose’ (cited in Cannell and Kahn, 1968), survey researchers 
have largely ignored the inherently social and co-operative characteristics of the 
interview situation that the word conversation implies. This neglect can at least in 
part be blamed on the behaviourists who early in the twentieth century rejected the 
interview as an appraisal device because of its unreliability. At that time, 
psychologists were adopting a scientific perspective: ‘that of being the detached 
observer of others’ (Farr, 1982, p. 157). Or, as Watson said: ‘the behaviorists 
reached the conclusion that they could no longer be content to work with intangibles 
and unapproachables. They decided either to give up psychology or else make it a 
natural science’ (Watson, 1924-1925, p. 6). Later on, the behaviourists admitted that 
a person can observe her/his behaviour to some extent. As they realized that verbal
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reports could not be completely avoided in psychological research, they gradually 
relaxed their original requirement that everything in psychology should be actually 
observable and retreated to the philosophical demand that everything must be 
potentially observable (Woodworth, 1931). Hence, the interview was back in use as 
a research instrument, but emphasis was laid on standardizing the interviewing 
•conditions in order to achieve higher reliability. This is particularly enhanced by 
specifying the exact wording of the questions to be asked in the interview, specifying 
the forms and range of behaviour, which may be used to elicit responses, and by 
using multiple questions for measurement of each concept. In behaviouristic terms, 
the actual process of interviewing, the speaking of questions and answers, can be 
thought of as the act of evoking (stimulus) the verbal representations of events, or 
more exactly eliciting the verbal responses which are really the target of the 
measurement. The task of the interviewer is merely to get a good verbal ‘print’ of the 
respondent’s information and to do so ‘without getting his own interviewing 
thumbprints all over it’ (Cannell and Kahn, 1968, p. 572). Thus, each question in a 
questionnaire or an interview was conceived of as a separate stimulus that required a 
response from the interviewee. In view of this conception of the interviewing 
process, it is not surprising that most of the methodological research on survey 
questionnaires that was carried out in the 1940s focussed on one question at a time as 
an isolated measure of an attitude or some other entity. Although the behavioural 
approach has led to greater precision and reliability, it has failed to take into account 
the social characteristics of the interview, the interaction between the interviewer 
and the interviewee, different states of awareness, or what Mead (1934) calls 
‘awareness of self as object’, and last but not least the conversational or 
communicational characteristics of the interview, i.e., that the questions are not 
isolated measures of a particular attribute but are a part of a sequence of questions, 
the questionnaire as a whole.
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When asking the same questions in different questionnaires, for the purpose of 
comparison, one has to be aware of the characteristics that are peculiar to thef 
interview itself. Having defined the interview as a ‘conversation with a purpose’ 
although more formalized than an everyday conversation, one would expect the 
same basic principles to be operating. In an informal conversation we expect a 
person to show consistency in her/his speech, and the meaning of any particular 
sentence can, at least in part, be defined either by the situational context within 
which the conversation takes place, or by the preceding parts of the person’s 
utterance. The difference between a normal conversation and the survey interview 
lies mainly in the fact that ‘the conversational interaction requires an adequate 
understanding of the contribution without allowing the contributor to tune his or her 
question to the particular needs of the respondent’ (Strack, Schwarz and Wanke, 
1991, p. 112). Thus, if one appreciates the social nature of the interview, one is 
hardly surprised if answers to a particular question are conditioned by answers to 
previous questions. As Lund (1925) claimed in another context: ‘Once we have 
committed ourselves, we frequently dare not change our position lest we be 
challenged with our former statements.’
Bearing in mind the definition of the interview as a ‘conversation with a purpose’, 
although more formalized than an everyday conversation, one would expect the 
same basic principle to be in operation. In his article on the conditions governing 
conversation, Grice (1975) argues that for a conversation to be rational, the 
participants need to observe a general principle, called the ‘Co-operative Principle’. 
Four major categories fall under this general principle, i.e., Quantity, which requires 
speakers to be informative although not more informative than the situation requires; 
Quality, which enjoins speakers to say nothing untruthful; Relation, stressing that the 
speaker’s contribution should be relevant to the ongoing conversation, and Manner. 
The first three categories relate to what is said, but the last one relates to ‘how what 
is said is to be said’ (p. 46). Under this category Grice includes four specific
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maxims: 1) avoid obscurity of expression; 2) avoid ambiguity; 3) be brief (avoid 
unnecessary prolixity); and 4) be orderly -  maxims that are not so unlike the general 
recommendations for writing a survey questionnaire, as they usually stress the need 
for simplicity, clarity, intelligibility and keeping questions short (Babbie, 1973; 
Bradbum, 1983; Bradbum and Sudman, 1979; Converse and Presser, 1986; 
Hoinville and Jowell, 1978; Kahn and Cannell, 1957; Komhauser and Sheatsley, 
1976; Maccoby and Maccoby, 1954; Payne, 1951; Sheatsley, 1983; Sudman and 
Bradbum, 1982). Given that a questionnaire is an instrument based on language, one 
would expect people to have similar expectations when they take part in an interview 
as for any other conversation. Thus in order to make an interview seem sensible and 
coherent the organisation of a questionnaire requires placing similar items together, 
and thus the design of questionnaires is at a cross-purpose with the avoidance of 
context effects, which, as described above, is generally achieved by interposing a 
buffer of unrelated questions between related ones. Not only would the 
conversational view require a coherent and logical order of related questions, but it 
would also impose numerous demands on the interviewer as a participant in a 
conversation. However, this role of the interviewer went largely ignored until recent 
years.
In explaining various biases and shortcomings in human judgement Schwarz (1994) 
makes extensive use of Grice’s theory of the logic of conversation. He emphasizes 
the opinion of Clark and Schober (1992, p. 15) that it is a ‘common misperception 
that language use has primarily to do with words and what they mean. It doesn’t. It 
has primarily to do with people and what they mean. It is essentially about speaker s 
intentions.’ In determining what the speaker’s intentions are, people rely on ‘rules of 
the communication game’, which require the communicator (in this case the 
interviewer) to follow tacit rules which include taking the recipient’s characteristics 
into account, trying to be coherent and comprehensible, giving the necessary amount 
of information, being relevant, producing a message appropriate to the context,
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producing a message appropriate to their communicative intent or purpose, 
conveying the truth as seen by the communicator, and assuming that the recipient is 
trying to follow the rules of the communication game. (Schwarz, 1994, p. 126; see 
also McCann and Higgins, 1992). Schwarz argues that when answering a survey 
question, respondents work on the assumption that not only they themselves are 
following the rules of the communication game, but also the interviewer. Schwarz, 
Groves and Schuman (1998) discuss various research findings that illustrate that 
‘question comprehension is not primarily an issue of understanding the literal 
meaning of utterances. Rather, question comprehension involves exstensive 
inferences about the speaker’s intentions to determine the pragmatic meaning of the 
question. To make these inferences, respondents draw on the nature of the preceding 
questions as well as the response alternatives’ (p. 152).
1.5 Summary
It has been argued that context effects on attitude questions are not artifacts due to 
crudity of measurement. Rather, they should be perceived as an integral part of the 
process of expressing one’s attitude. Attitudes must always depend on the context in 
which they are expressed. Although attitude theories do not agree on the nature of 
attitudes, whether they should be viewed as a construct that varies on a single 
dimension or as a more complex multidimensional belief structure, few of them 
seem to postulate perfect attitude stability across different conditions. However, 
some of the theories (cf. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) assume that poeple do in theory 
hold stable attitudes, but due to their limited mental capacity draw on different 
beliefs on different occasions, thus leading to considerable instability. Such a view 
also seems to imply that people will never know their ‘true’ attitude, simply because 
they cannot process all the necessary information at the same time.
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This does not mean that preceding questions must always have a great influence on 
responses to a subsequent question because, as has been shown, there are various 
factors that mediate attitude persuasibility or changeability, and in addition surely 
the wording of the question must be the most important factor in determining the 
context. This view is reflected in Bradbum’s (1992) simple question asking rule: 
‘Ask about what you want to know, not something else’ (p. 316). The clearer the 
question, the less likely it is that respondents need to guess what the questioner 
means and the less likely they are to use previous questions to clarify the meaning.
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2Pilot study
2.1 Introduction
In order to test the susceptibility of various questions to context effects a small pilot 
study was carried out. Although the pilot questionnaire had to be kept as short as 
possible, because of limited time and resources, an attempt was made to include 
questions that would produce different types of context and order effects. Four 
different types of context and order effects are described on pages 33-34 in chapter 
1. Experiments were set up to test three different effect types: 1) Effects of political 
knowledge questions on responses to a question on interest in government and public 
affairs, as Bishop et al. (1984a, 1984b; Bishop, 1986, 1987) had found that not 
knowing the answers to political knowledge questions immediately before the 
general question substantially reduced reported political interest. Hence, this effect is 
related to the content of the preceding questions and to the way in which they were 
answered. 2) Effects of giving examples (prompts) in the preamble to a question 
asking which issues of national importance respondents are most concerned about, 
an experiment reminiscent of Schuman and Presser’s (1981) experiment on open vs. 
closed questions. This effect, thus, is unrelated to the content of previous questions, 
but related to the content of the target question itself. 3) Finally, the position of the 
question about the most important issues was varied to test for sequence effects 
(rapport effects). The fourth type of effects discussed in chapter 1, i.e., related to the 
content of prior questions but not to the way in which they were answered, was not 
pre-tested in the pilot study, but was included in the main study (see methodology 
and chapter 6).
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2.2 Design
A nested design was applied and eight different versions of the questionnaire were 
prepared. In half of the questionnaires the general question: ‘Some people seem to 
follow what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether 
there is an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would you say that 
you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some 
of the time, only now and then or hardly at all?’ was asked first. In the other half the 
two knowledge questions: ‘Do you know how many Members of Parliament will be 
elected in your constituency in the next election?’ and ‘Which minister do you think 
is responsible for administration of sport?’ preceded the general question. Secondly, 
the wording of the question: ‘Which issues of national importance are you most 
concerned about these days?’ was altered to see the effects of giving examples of 
issues of national importance, i.e., ‘Issues such as the sale of the City Hospital, 
introduction of VAT, new income tax legislation, freeing the price of fish from 
government constraints and housing are prominent these days. Which issues of 
national importance are you most concerned about?’ Thirdly, this question was 
placed fourth in half of the questionnaires and seventeenth in the other half. These 
three variations give he following eight conditions:
1) General question first, concern question placed fourth, not prompted.
2) General question first, concern question placed seventeenth, not prompted.
3) General question first, concern question placed fourth, prompted.
4) General question first, concern question placed seventeenth, prompted.
5) Knowledge questions first, concern question placed fourth, not prompted.
6) Knowledge questions first, concern question placed seventeenth, not prompted.
7) Knowledge questions first, concern question placed fourth, prompted.
8) Knowledge questions first, concern question placed seventeenth, prompted.
(See figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1 Structure of pilot study
231123E.l
E.2 promptno prompt promptno prompt
c 4th c 17th c 4th c 17th c4th c 17th c4th c 17th
(No A) (No.2) (No.3) (No.4) (No.5) (No.6) (No.7) (No.8)E.3
1 = political interest
2 = political knowledge
3 = political knowledge 
c = concern about issues 
E = experiment
2.3 Sample and response rate
The overall sample was composed of 200 individuals, aged 18-70, all living in 
Reykjavik, the capital and largest city in Iceland. The sample was a simple random 
sample drawn from the National Registry of Iceland. The 200 individuals selected 
were then randomly assigned to eight subsamples by mixing 200 numbers in a bowl 
and drawing out 25 numbers for each of the eight conditions. However, due to 
interviewer mistakes, four of the subjects were given the ‘wrong’ questionnaire, 
making the numbers in the different conditions unequal. Table 2.1 shows the number 
of subjects and the response rate in the eight conditions.
Table 2.1 Number of subjects in each condition, and response rate
Questionnaire
number
Number of 
respondents 
in condition
Number of 
respondents 
interviewed
%
completed
interviews
1 22 16 72.7
2 25 20 80.0
3 24 15 62.5
4 25 18 72.0
5 27 20 74.1
6 26 19 73.1
7 26 19 73.1
8 25 21 84.0
Total 200 148 74.0
The overall response rate was 74%; 13% refused to answer, 3.5% were ill or not at 
home and 9.5% could not be found. Information about sex and age of the people who 
did not answer the questionnaire is available. Tables 2.2 shows response rate and 
gender.
Table 2.2 Response rate and gender
male female total
% % %
answer 94.8 69.8 74.0
refuse to answer 6.4 18.9 13.0
ill/not at home 4.3 2.8 3.5
not found 10.6 8.5 9.5
total (n) 94 106 200
As depicted in table 2.2, women were much more likely than men to refuse to answer 
the questionnaire, possibly because the survey was carried out only three days before 
Christmas and Icelandic women are traditionally very busy, baking and cleaning on 
the last days before Christmas.
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around 6% with an easy knowledge question (approximately 70% of respondents 
knew the answer) and around 13% with the difficult knowledge questions (around 
15% of respondents knew the answers) (see tables 1 and 2 in Bishop, 1987). The size 
of the effect shown in table 2.3 is very close to that found by Bishop for the difficult 
knowledge questions, or 14.7%, although the marginal distribution was substantially 
different. Almost 50% of the Icelandic respondents reported that they followed what 
was going on in government and public affairs ‘most of the time’, but only around 
30% of the American respondents reported by Bishop.
Table 2.3 The effect of political knowledge questions on reports of
interest in government and public affairs
interest
question
first
knowledge
questions
first
total
most of the time 55.1 41.8 48.0
some of the time 33.3 34.2 33.8
only now and then 11.6 24.1 18.2
Total (%) 46.6 53.4 100.0
Total (n) 69 79 148
X2=4.50; df=2; p=. 106
Despite the size of the context effect in table 2.3, the chi-square statistic only reaches 
borderline significance. Treating the scale (from 1, most of the time, to 4, hardly at 
all) as an interval scale, however shows a statistical difference in the mean response 
(ti44=-2.35; p= 020).
The figures in table 2.3 do not take into account whether people actually knew the 
answers to the knowledge questions or not, but respondents were expected to be less 
likely to say that they followed what was going on ‘most of the time’ if they did not 
know the answers to the knowledge questions. The number of respondents who knew
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2,4 Method
Most of the interviews (telephone interviews), or 115, were carried out by five 
interviewers on the 21st of December 1986 (two LSE students and three interviewers 
from the Social Science Research Institute, University of Iceland). The remainder of 
the interviews (33) were done in the first two weeks of January 1987. The 
interviewers were not controlled for, and this might have introduced some bias into 
the study.
The introduction was as follows:
Good afternoon/evening.
My name i s  We are two students of London University who are conducting a
survey concerning people’s attitudes towards political discussion in the media. We 
seek the opinion of 200 individuals in Reykjavik and you are one of the people who 
were randomly selected from the National Registry. Would you be so kind as to 
participate in our study?
2,5 Results and discussion
Experiment 1 - The effect o f  knowledge questions on reported  interest in 
politics
The first experiment dealt with the effects of political knowledge questions on 
reported interest in government and public affairs. Bishop (1987) found that between 
ten and twenty percent fewer respondents reported that they followed what was 
going on in government and public affairs ‘most of the time’ when the knowledge 
questions were asked before the interest question. This effect was moderated by the 
level of difficulty of the knowledge questions. On average, the size of the effect was
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the answers to the knowledge questions shows that, according to Bishop’s (1987) 
criteria, the questions were rather difficult, although they were not equally difficult 
(see table 2.4). Obviously, the first knowledge question about the number of MPs in 
the respondent’s constituency was extremely difficult. Although the second question 
was easier, it was unlikely that it would reduce or eliminate the context effect created 
by the first question, but Bishop (1987) found that adding an easy item (two-thirds 
knew the answer) did not reduce the effects of the hard items.
Table 2.4 Answers to knowledge questions about number of MPs in
constituency and name of Minister of sSport
Both
correct
Number 
of MPs 
correct
Minister 
of Sport 
correct
Both
wrong
Total
(n)
Interest - knowledge 4.3 1.4 34.8 59.4 69
Knowledge - interest 7.6 2.5 24.1 65.8 79
Total (%) 6.1 2.0 29.1 62.8 148 (100%)
3C2=2.55; df=36; p=.470
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the relationship between respondents’ political knowledge 
(as measured by these two rather superficial questions) and reports on how often they 
followed what was going on in government and public affairs. The first table shows 
that there was no significant relation between these variables in the group where 
respondents were asked about their interest before being asked the knowledge 
questions. The second table (table 2.6), however, shows a significant context effect. 
Respondents who were not able to answer the knowledge questions correctly were 
less likely to say that they followed what was going on in government and public 
affairs ‘most of the time’.
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Table 2.5 Relation between political interest and political knowledge
where interest question preceded knowledge questions
Both
correct
Number 
of MPs 
correct
Minister 
o f Sport 
correct
Both
wrong
Total
(%)
most of the time 66.7 100.0 62.5 48.8 55.1
some of the time 33.3 0.0 33.3 34.1 33.3
only now and then 0.0 0.0 4.2 17.1 11.6
Total (%) 4.3 1.4 34.8 59.4 100%
Total (n) 3 1 24 41 69
X^=3.98; df=6; p= 679 (66.7% of cells with expected frequency less than 5)
Table 2.6 Relation between political interest and political knowledge where 
interest question followed knowledge questions
Both
correct
Number 
of MPs 
correct
Minister 
of Sport 
correct
Both
wrong
Total
(%)
most of the time 100.0 50.0 42.1 34.6 41.8
some of the time 0.0 0.0 47.4 34.6 34.2
only now and then 0.0 50.0 10.5 30.8 24.1
Total (%) 7.6 2.5 24.1 65.8 100%
Total (n) 6 2 19 52 79
X^=13.67; df=6; p=.034 (58.3% of cells with expected frequency less than 5)
Although the sample was far to small to give a reliable estimate of the context effect, 
the results were similiar to Bishop’s. However, many respondents tried to guess the 
answer to the knowledge questions, whereas others offered a ‘don’t know’ response. 
Unfortunately, the interviewers did not write down the answers, but only ticked right 
or wrong, without making a distinction between don’t knows and wrong answers, so 
that it was not possible to distinguish between these groups. It is however 
conceivable that the effect of giving the wrong answer was greater than saying ‘don’t 
know’.
A full 34.6% of the people who got the knowledge questions first and could not 
answer them still said they followed what was going on most of the time. This was
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somewhat higher than Bishop’s results, who found this figure to be between 20 and 
25%. Apart from the possibility that Icelanders are more interested in politics than 
are Americans (as pointed out above), this difference might have been due to two 
main causes, i.e., not all of the respondents who gave the wrong answer to the 
knowledge questions were actually told that they gave an incorrect answer, and 
secondly, there was a very strong relation between how frequently people read a 
particular newspaper or watched television news and how frequently they said they 
followed what was going on in politics (see table 2.7).
Table 2.7 Relation between political interest and news consumption3-
All respondents
Watch TV- 
news and 
read papers 
daily
Read
papers
daily/
TV-news
occasion­
ally
TV-news
daily/
read
papers
occasion­
ally
TV-news 
and papers 
occasion­
ally
Total
(%)
most of the time 60.5 42.1 25.0 22.2 50.4
some of the time 31.6 31.6 37.5 33.3 32.1
only now and then 7.9 26.3 37.5 44.4 17.6
Total (%) 58.0 29.0 6.1 6.9 100%
Total (n) 76 38 8 9 131
%2=15.81; df=6; p=015 (50.0% of cells with expected frequency less than 5) Spearman’s rho=0.32 
p=.001; Kendall’s tau-c=0.26; Gamma=0.45
It is possible that respondents who followed the news daily were less likely to be 
influenced by a failure to answer these questions than respondents who only 
occasionally followed the news. A comparison between tables 2.8 and 2.9 suggests 
that this was the case, i.e., the context effect seems to have been a little smaller 
(10%) for respondents who watched television news and read a newspaper daily.
3 News consumption was based on three questions: how often people read a newspaper, how often 
they watched the news on the state channel, and how often they watched the news on Channel 2. 
There was only one news programme a day on each channel at the time of the study.
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Table 2.8 Relation between political interest and news consumption -
Interest question preceded knowledge questions
Watch TV- 
news and 
read papers 
daily
Read
papers
daily/
TV-news
occasion­
ally
TV-news
daily/
read
papers
occasion­
ally
TV-news 
and papers 
occasion­
ally
Total
(%)
most of the time 65.7 56.3 33.3 33.3 58.3
some of the time 25.7 31.3 33.3 66.7 30.0
only now and then 8.6 12.5 33.3 0.0 11.7
Total (%) 58.3 26.7 10.0 5.0 100%
Total (n) 35 16 6 3 60
%2=5.95; df=6; p=.428 (75.0% of cells with expected frequency less than 5) Spearman’s rho=0.21 
p=.106; Kendall’s tau-c=0.16; Gamma=0.32
Table 2.9 Relation between political interest and news consumption -
Knowledge questions preceded interest question
Watch TV- 
news and 
read papers 
daily
Read
papers
daily/
TV-news
occasion­
ally
TV-news
daily/
read
papers
occasion­
ally
TV-news 
and papers 
occasion­
ally
Total
(%)
most of the time 56.1 31.8 0.0 16.7 43.7
some of the time 36.6 31.8 50.0 16.7 33.8
only now and then 7.3 36.4 50.0 66.7 22.5
Total (%) 57.7 31.0 2.8 8.5 100%
Total (n) 41 22 2 6 71
%2=16.76; df=6; p= 010 (58.3% of cells with expected frequency less than 5) Spearman’s rho=0.42 
p=.001; Kendall’s tau-c=0.35; Gamma=0.59
However, this comparison between tables 2.8 and 2.9 not only shows that 
respondents who followed the news daily were less likely to be influenced by the 
knowledge questions, but it also suggests that the relationship between political 
interest and news consumption was enhanced by asking the knowledge questions 
before the political interest questions, Spearman’s rho goes from 0.21 (n.s.) to 0.42 
(p=.001). However, the sample was too small for detailed and reliable analysis.
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Experiment 2 - The most important issues and prompting
With respect to the question about what people are most concerned about, the effects 
of providing people with examples of issues can easily be demonstrated with a 
simple crosstable, but statistics can hardly be used without recoding the variable in 
some intelligible way. Table 2.10 shows this variable broken down by experimental 
condition, that is, whether people were given examples or not, ignoring the actual
th thposition of the variable in the questionnaires (i.e., whether it was the 4 or the 17 
question). It is interesting to see that only 6.8% of the people who were prompted 
said they were not concerned about anything specific or did not know what 
concerned them most, but 12.3% said they were concerned about all the examples, 
which might suggest that the effects of providing examples of important issues was 
similar to the acquiescence effect (Kalton and Schuman, 1982).
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Table 2.10 The most important issues by experimental condition
no examples examples
The sale of the City Hospital* 2 (2.7%) 15 (20.5%)
Introduction of V.A.T.* 0 (0.0%) 9 (12.3%)
Income tax legislation* 1 (1.3%) 9 (12.3%)
Freeing the price of fish from government constraints* 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.7%)
Housing/Mortgages * 5 (6.7%) 6 (8.2%)
Salaries/Wages 15 (20.0%) 1 (1.4%)
Inflation 3 (4.0%) 1 (1.4%)
Economic Situation 8 (10.7%) 0 (0.0%)
Industrial disputes/unions 6 (8.0%) 3 (4.1%)
Fishing/Export 1 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%)
The Budget 4 (5.3%) 1 (1.4%)
Education/The Loan Fund 3 (4.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Nuclear disarmament 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.4%)
Health Services 1 (1.3%) 1 (1.4%)
Social Services 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.4%)
Industrial development 1 (1.3%) 1 (1.4%)
New building for the Parliament 1 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%)
Financial fraud 1 (1.3%) 2 (2.7%)
Tax/Customs 0 (0.0%) 2 (2.7%)
Voting legislation 1 (1.3%) 2 (2.7%)
Sporting facilities 1 (1.3%) 1 (1.4%)
Aviation 1 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%)
Agriculture 4 (5.3%) 1 (1.4%)
Independent broadcasting 1 (1.3%) 0 (0.0%)
All five prompts* 0 (0.0%) 9 (12.3%)
Don’t know (nothing) 15 (20.0%) 5 (6.8%)
Total 75 (50.7%) 73 (49.3%)
Issues marked with * were used as examples.
Respondents were asked to mention the three issues of national importance that they 
were the most concerned about. Table 2.10 shows only the first mentioned issue. The 
difference between the two experimental conditions becomes even clearer when all 
the three most important issues are taken into account (see table 2.11). However, 
there were only minimal changes in the pattern of responses when all three most 
important issues are taken together, but respondents who were prompted mentioned 
more issues than respondents who were not prompted, 1.37 and 1.23 issues, 
respectively. Hence, only the first-mentioned issue will be included in further 
analysis.
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Table 2.11 The three most important issues by experimental condition
no examples examples
The sale of the City Hospital* 2 (3.3%) 18 (26.5%)
Introduction of V.A.T.* 0 (0.0%) 13 (19.1%)
Income tax legislation* 2 (3.3%) 16 (23.5%)
Freeing the price of fish from government constraints* 0 (0.0%) 4 (5.9%)
Housing/Mortgages* 5 (8.3%) 6 (8.8%)
Salaries/Wages 18 (30.0%) 2 (2.9%)
Inflation 3 (5.0%) 1 (1.5%)
Economic Situation 8 (13.3%) 0 (0.0%)
Industrial disputes/unions 7 (11.7%) 3 (4.4%)
Fishing/Export 1 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%)
The Budget 7 (11.7%) 1 (1.5%)
Education/the Loan Fund 5 (8.3%) 1 (1-5%)
Nuclear disarmament 1 (1.7%) 1 (1.5%)
Health Services 1 (1.7%) 1 (1.5%)
Social Services (3.3%) 1 (1.5%)
Industrial development 1 (1.7%) 1 (1.5%)
New building for the Parliament 1 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%)
Financial fraud 1 (1.7%) 3 (4.4%)
Tax/Customs (0.0%) 5 (7.4%)
Voting legislation 1 (1.7%) 5 (7.4%)
Sporting facilities 1 (1.7%) 1 (1.5%)
Charity 1 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%)
Aviation 1 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%)
Agriculture 4 (6.7%) 1 (1.5%)
Independent broadcasting 1 (1.7%) 0 (0.0%)
All five prompts* 0 (0.0%) 9 (13.2%)
Total (number of respondents) 60 68
Total (number o f responses) 74 93
Percentages are based on number of respondents. - Issues marked with * were used as examples.
An easy way to see how prompting affects responses to the question ‘Which issues 
of national importance are you most concerned about these days?’ is to code 
responses into three categories, i.e., nothing, the examples (marked with * in tables 
2.10 and 2.11), and other issues. Table 2.12 shows that although the issues that were 
used as examples were all much talked about in the media in the weeks leading up to 
the survey, respondents were not very likely to mention them if they were not 
prompted.
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Table 2.12 The most important issues
No prompt Prompt Total
Nothing 14.3 6.9 10.6
The examples 11.4 70.8 41.5
Other issues 74.3 22.2 47.9
Total (%) 49.3 50.7 100.0
Total (n) 70 72 142
X2=52.05; d ^ 2 ; p<.001
The results in table 2.12 show clearly the effects of giving examples of important 
issues. Not only were respondents who were given examples likely to say that they 
were most concerned about those issues, but also less likely to say that they did not 
know, or that they were not concerned about anything in particular.
Schuman and Presser (1981) found that respondents’ education mediates the effects 
of question wording. One can hypothesize that less educated people are more 
susceptible to the examples given. Table 2.13 shows the relationship between the 
most important issues and the experimental condition, controlling for education of 
respondents.
Table 2.13 The most important issues, experimental condition, and
education
Compulsory More than
education compulsory education
No prompt Prompt No prompt Prompt
Nothing 14.3% 12.0% 14.3% 4.3%
The examples 4.8 72.0 14.3 70.2
Other issues 81.0 16.0 71.4 25.5
Total (n) 21 25 49 47
Compulsory education: x^=23.08; df=2; p<.001; More than compulsory: x2=30.90; df=2; p<.001; 
interaction between experimental condition, education and response: L.R.%2=2.15; df=l; p=.143.
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Education did not significantly condition the effects of prompting (%^=2.15; df=l; 
p=. 143). The only difference between respondents who had only compulsory 
education and more educated respondents seems to be that prompting reduced the 
likelihood of more educated respondents giving a ‘don’t know’ or ‘nothing’ 
response. However, the sample was clearly far too small to give any reliable picture 
of the effects of different educational levels.
Experiment 3 - Sequence effects, the m ost important issues
In the last experiment, the position of the question about the most important national 
issues was varied. In half of the questionnaires it came before the questions about the 
media, and in the other half it was placed after the media questions, to test whether 
the media questions increased the accessibility of particular issues. It was 
hypothesized that placing this question towards the end of the questionnaire would 
reduce ‘don’t know’ and ‘nothing’ responses and that it would increase the 
likelihood of respondents remembering issues other than the ones used as examples 
in the preamble to the question. In the event, whether the question was 4th or 17th in 
the questionnaire did not produce statistically significant results on responses (see 
table 2.14).
Table 2.14 The most important issues and the position of the question
No prompt 
Beginning End
Prompt
Beginning End
Nothing 19.4% 8.8% 6.1% 7.7%
The examples 13.9 8.8 78.8 64.1
Other issues 66.7 82.4 15.2 28.2
Total (n) 36 34 33 39
No prompt y}=2.35\ df=2; p=.308; Prompt: %^=1.98; df=2; p=.371; interaction between experimental 
condition, position and response: L.R. x^=0.333; df=2; p=.847.
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A closer examination of table 2.14 reveals that although there was no significant 
relationship between position of the question about the most important issues and 
responses to that question, there was a higher proportion of respondents in the ‘no- 
prompt-beginning’ group that did not name any issues (19.4 vs 8.8% in the ‘no- 
prompt-end group). The effect of prompting also seemed to be less severe (although 
there was no significant difference) when the question came towards the end of the 
questionnaire, i.e., 64% of respondents who were prompted and asked about the most 
important issues towards the end of the interview named one of the examples as the 
most important issues as against 79% of respondents who were prompted in the 
beginning of the interview.
2.6 Conclusion
Of the three experiments in the pilot study, only two produced significant results. 
The first experiment on the effects of knowledge questions on reported interest in 
politics showed that respondents who were unable to answer the questions were less 
likely to say that they followed what was going on ‘most of the time’. Respondents 
who read newspapers and watched television news daily were slightly less likely to 
be affected by their failure to answer the knowledge questions than other 
respondents, but more importantly the order of the questions seemed to affect the 
relationship between the political interest question and the news consumption 
questions. That is, there was a significant relationship between news consumption 
and political interest, but only for those respondents who answered the knowledge 
questions before the interest question. Respondents in this experiment, however, 
were not always aware of having given an incorrect answer to the knowledge 
questions, which may have diminished the effect. Another factor that may have 
reduced the value of this experiment was the difficulty of the knowledge questions. 
Only 8% of respondents knew how many members of Parliament were to be elected
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in their constituency in the next general election. This makes it difficult to examine 
the effects of different levels of political knowledge. Hence the knowledge questions 
were replaced by easier questions in the main study.
Prompting respondents with specific issues when asking them which issues of 
national importance they were most concerned about had a profound effect on the 
marginal distribution of answers to the question. More than two thirds of respondents 
who were prompted said that one of the examples or prompts was the issue they 
were most concerned about. The examples were all very specific either concerning 
bills pending before the parliament or the issue of privatization. The answers given 
by the respondents who were not prompted were of a different nature, being much 
more general. The most frequently mentioned issues in this group were 
salaries/wages, the economic situation, industrial disputes, and the Budget. This was 
taken into account in the main study, and different examples given. The sample was 
split into three groups, a group that was not prompted, a group prompted with 
specific issues, and a group prompted with general issues.
The experiment on sequence effects did not provide any convincing results, and 
being of another nature than the other two experiments (not related to the content of 
the previous questions or the target question itself) it was decided to omit it from the 
main study. This experiment was replaced with an experiment testing the fourth type 
(see pp. 33-34 in chapter 1 where different types of context and order effects are 
described) of context effects, i.e., effects that were related to the content of preceding 
questions but not to the way in which they were answered.
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3Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The pilot study that was carried out in December 1986 was concerned with two 
major topics: a) the effects of focusing people’s attention on particular issues by 
asking two knowledge questions related to politics, immediately before asking them 
about how well they generally follow what is going on in government and public 
affairs, and b) the effects of providing people with examples when asking about 
what, in their opinion are, the most important national issues. The results for a) 
showed that people tended to report they followed politics less frequently if asked 
the knowledge questions before the general question. With respect to b) the analysis 
showed highly significant differences between the group that was given examples of 
important national issues, and the group that was not given such examples. Although 
these were the general trends, the pilot study sample had been too small for any 
detailed analysis. Thus, it is important to replicate these experiments with a larger 
sample. In addition to replicating these two experiments with a larger sample it was 
decided to add the third experiment dealing with a different type of context effects to 
the main study.
3.2 Design
Split-ballot experiments have been used since the 1930s to investigate the effects of 
question wording or question order. Such experiments have demonstrated that asking 
people questions about their attitudes or opinions in a particular way may lead to a
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change in these very same attitudes and opinions (cf. discussion of 10 different 
consequences of being asked a question by Knowles et al., 1992). An explanation 
frequently proposed is that prior items in a questionnaire will increase the 
accessibility of particular beliefs, and hence affect the way in which following 
questions are interpreted or lead to an oversampling of particular beliefs (Bargh and 
Pratto, 1986; Fazio, Powell, and Herr, 1983; Higgins, King, and Mavin, 1982). 
Changes that are due to increased accessibility produced by prior items are generally 
assumed to wear off over time (e.g. Posner, 1978). However, there are very few 
studies that have been designed to test the endurance of such effects. This study was 
therefore designed as a three-wave panel survey to test the effects of different types 
of context items and the endurance of some of these effects, i.e., to test whether the 
effects would still be detectable two to six weeks after the initial interview or 
whether they would fade or disappear over time.
The research consisted of three main experiments with three different types of 
context, i.e., neutral context, neutral context involving self-presentation, and 
normative context. In the experiment on context effects unrelated to prior items but 
related to the content of the question itself, neutral context was set. That is, examples 
were given of issues that might be of national importance and respondents were 
asked to state their preference. In the experiment on context effects related to the 
content of prior questions and to the way in which these questions are answered, 
another dimension was added. Although the context is in principle neutral, i.e., 
political knowledge questions presented before a question asking about frequency or 
magnitude of attending to political events, a self-presentation dimension is involved. 
That is, it is assumed that having to answer knowledge questions in a survey is 
anxiety provoking. In the experiment on context effects related to the content of prior 
questions but not to the way in which they are answered, normative context was set, 
i.e., the items leading up to general attitude questions towards abortion or nuclear 
weapons reflect either a favourable or an unfavourable attitude.
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The order of the experiments in the questionnaire was such that the questionnaire 
started with the questions on political interest and knowledge, followed by the 
question about the most important issues. The questions about attitudes towards 
abortion and nuclear weapons were the last questions in the questionnaires (see 
appendices 1, 2, and 3). The form of the question, different order or context was 
assigned randomly to respondents. However, the random assignment in the main 
study only applied to the first experiment, i.e., the effects of the knowledge questions 
on the general question about politics. This was done by randomly drawing three 
equally large subsamples from the overall simple random sample and nesting all the 
other experiments within the three conditions of the first experiment. This resulted in 
12 different versions of the questionnaire within each subsample. These 
questionnaires were then mixed in a pile and haphazardly assigned to respondents. 
The randomization did not operate over the interviewers for two major reasons: 1) it 
was not possible to plan in advance the work of the interviewers, because of other 
commitments they had, and 2) because of time pressure and because of how difficult 
it was to find many of the respondents at home, it was necessary to constantly 
circulate the telephone numbers among the interviewers.
Experiment 1 - The effect o f  knowledge questions on responses to a  
question about po litica l interest
The evidence indicates that people respond largely with the first thing that comes to 
mind from their most relevant recent experience, and this depends heavily on the 
context in which the question is asked (cf. Collins and Loftus, 1975; Wyer and 
Hartwick, 1984). In the same vein, one could assume that asking difficult knowledge 
questions immediately before a general question about how well people follow what 
is going on in government and public affairs would lead to a shift in the marginals, 
i.e., those who do not know the answers will report following what is going on less 
frequently than do those who know the answers (cf. Bishop et al., 1984; Bishop,
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1987). To demonstrate these effects the sample was randomly divided into three 
groups: a) the general question leading to the knowledge questions, b) the knowledge 
questions leading to the general question, and c) the general question without the 
knowledge questions, or the control group. One would expect to get the same results 
for groups a) and c). The question of interest in this experiment was the following: 
Does preceding a general question about interest in politics with knowledge 
questions affect responses to the general question: ‘Some people seem to follow 
what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there is 
an election going on or not, others aren’t that interested. Would you say that you 
follow what is going on in government and public affairs, hardly at all, only now and 
then, some of the time, or most of the time?’
The knowledge questions were the following:
a) Do you know which minister is responsible for the administration of the 
Statistical Bureau of Iceland?
b) Do you know who is the Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of 
Parliament?
Form 1
The questionnaire started with the political interest question, followed by 
the two knowledge questions.
Form 2
The questionnaire started with the knowledge questions immediately 
before the question about how closely respondents follow what is going 
on in government and public affairs.
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Form 3
In this condition respondents were only asked the general interest 
question, and no knowledge questions, to provide a control group to 
detect changes that might take place from Wave 1 to Wave 2 of the 
survey.
In the second interview, which took place two to three weeks after the first one, all 
respondents were asked the general interest question only, (see figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Design of experiment on effect of knowledge questions on
reported political interest
Wave 1 Wave 2
Form 1
Interest in politics 
2 knowledge questions
Form 2
2 knowledge questions 
Interest in politics
All forms
Interest in politics
Form 3 
Interest in politics
The original idea was to ask the knowledge questions again in Wave 2 and divide 
each of the three groups into three subgroups. Because of the very limited time we 
had to carry out the second wave, and because we did not want to risk losing more of 
the sample on account of the knowledge questions, they were excluded. According to 
the interviewers, in many cases, it turned out to be a difficult task to start the 
interview with the knowledge questions. These questions appeared to be an obstacle
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Table 4.6.4 Odds, and predicted proportion of respondents saying ‘some
of the time or less9, based on a saturated model
EFFECT
LEVEL
Odds Predicted
proportion
Size 
of effect
Political interest by order by knowledge 1 by knowledge 2 by education by age
1.1.1.1.1.1—»K - correct - correct - comp. -18-30 1.004 .501
1.1.1.1.2.1—>K - correct - correct - comp. - 31-50 .111 .100
1.1.1.1.3.1—>K - correct - correct - comp. - 51-70 .143 .125
1.1.1.2.1.I—>K - correct - correct - m.th.c -18-30 .273 .214
1.1.1.2.2.1—»K - correct - correct - m.th.c - 31 -50 .226 .185
1.1.1.2.3.1—>K - correct - correct - m.th.c - 51-70 .067 .062
1.1.2.1.1.1—>K - correct - wrong- comp. -18-30 1.000 .500
1.1.2.1.2.1—»K - correct - wrong- comp. - 31-50 1.166 .538
1.1.2.1.3.1—>K - correct - wrong- comp. - 51-70 .476 .323
1.1.2.2.1.1—>K - correct - wrong - m.th.c -18-30 1.000 .500
1.1.2.2.2.1—>K - correct - wrong - m.th.c - 31-50 .319 .242
1.1.2.2.3.1—>K - correct - wrong - m.th.c - 51-70 .305 .234
1.2.1.1.1.1—>K - wrong - correct - comp. -18-30 .717 .418
1.2.1.1.2.1—»K - wrong - correct - comp. - 31-50 3.010 .751
1.2.1.1.3.1—>K - wrong - correct - comp. - 51-70 .200 .167
1.2.1.2.1.1—>K - wrong - correct - m.th.c -18-30 1.266 .559
1.2.1.2.2.1—>K - wrong - correct - m.th.c - 31-50 .305 .234
1.2.1.2.3.1—>K - wrong - correct - m.th.c - 51-70 1.002 .500
1.2.2.1.1.1—>K - wrong - wrong - comp. -18-30 1.709 .631
1.2.2.1.2.1—>K - wrong - wrong - comp. - 31-50 1.289 .563
1.2.2.1.3.1—»K - wrong - wrong - comp. - 51-70 1.002 .500
1.2.2.2.1. I—>K - wrong - wrong - m.th.c - 18-30 1.528 .604
I.2.2.2.2.1—»K - wrong - wrong - m.th.c - 31-50 .844 .458
1.2.2.2.3. I-»K - wrong - wrong - m.th.c - 51-70 .998 .500
2.1.1.1.1. K—»I - correct - correct - comp. - 18-30 .333 .250 .250
2.1.1.1.2. K—>1 - correct - correct - comp. - 31 -50 4.983 .833 -.733
2.1.1.1.3. K—»I - correct - correct - comp. - 51-70 .077 .071 .054
2.1.1.2.1. K—>1 - correct - correct - m.th.c - 18-30 .262 .208 .006
2.1.1.2.2. K—»I - correct - correct - m.th.c - 31-50 .097 .088 .096
2.1.1.2.3. K—>1 - correct - correct - m.th.c - 51-70 .272 .214 -.151
2.1.2.1.1. K—>1 - correct - wrong- comp. -18-30 .332 .249 .250
2.1.2.1.2. K—»I - correct - wrong- comp. - 31-50 .552 .356 .183
2.1.2.1.3. K—»I - correct - wrong- comp. - 51-70 .728 .421 -.102
2.1.2.2.1. K—»I - correct - wrong - m.th.c - 18-30 1.183 .542 -.042
2.1.2.2.2. K—»I - correct - wrong - m.th.c - 31-50 .320 .243 0
2.1.2.2.3. K—>1 - correct - wrong - m.th.c - 51-70 .391 .281 -.048
2.2.1.1.1. K—>1 - wrong - correct - comp. -18-30 1.675 .626 -.208
2.2.1.1.2. K—>1 - wrong - correct - comp. - 31-50 1.157 .536 .214
2.2.1.1.3. K—>1 - wrong - correct - comp. - 51-70 1.397 .583 -.416
2.2.1.2.1. K—»I - wrong - correct - m.th.c -18-30 2.234 .691 -.131
2.2.1.2.2. K—>1 - wrong - correct - m.th.c - 31-50 .763 .433 -.200
2.2.1.2.3. K—>1 - wrong - correct - m.th.c - 51-70 1.391 .582 -.083
2.2.2.1.1. K—>1 - wrong - wrong - comp. -18-30 11.658 .921 -.289
2.2.2.1.2. K—>1 - wrong - wrong - comp. - 31-50 4.195 .808 -.243
2.2.2.1.3. K-»I - wrong - wrong - comp. - 51-70 1.594 .614 -.114
2.2.2.2.I. K—>1 - wrong - wrong - m.th.c -18-30 3.483 .777 -.170
2.22.2.2. K—>1 - wrong - wrong - m.th.c - 31-50 1.214 .548 -.091
2.2.2.2.3. K—>1 - wrong - wrong - m.th.c - 51-70 .998 .500 0
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The pattern of the relationship between the size of the context effect and answers to 
the knowledge questions for respondents between 18 and 30 years of age, especially 
those who only have compulsory education, seemed to comply with self-perception 
theory. That is, if they answered both knowledge questions correctly, they were more 
likely to say they follow what goes on most of the time than respondents who 
answered the interest question first. If, however, they failed to answer the first or 
both knowledge questions they were less likely to say they follow what goes on most 
of the time. The effect was similar, although much smaller, for respondents who had 
more than compulsory education (see figure 4.6.1).
Figure 4.6.1 Relation between size of context effect, political knowledge
and education for the age group 18-30
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More deviations from the expected pattern can be seen in the responses of 31-50 
years old respondents. A very large context effect was found for respondents who 
only had compulsory education but answered both the knowledge questions 
correctly, but respondents in this group who could answer one of the questions were 
more likely to say they follow what goes on most of the time. Respondents 31-50 
years old with more than compulsory education showed a pattern similar to that of 
the younger respondents, i.e., a context effect only occurred when respondents failed 
to answer the first or both the knowledge questions (see figure 4.6.2).
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Figure 4.6.2 Relation between size of context effect, political knowledge
and education for the age group 31-50
Answers to knowledge questions
------ ■— Compulsory
------ o ---- More than
compulsory
A significant context effect was not found for respondents aged 51 to 70. A possible 
explanation can be seen in figure 4.6.3. The effect for respondents with compulsory 
education only was not very different from the effect found for the younger 
respondents, but for respondents with more than compulsory education the 
relationship was reversed. There was no effect for respondents who did not know the 
answer to either of the questions, but a 15% effect for respondents who knew both 
answers.
Figure 4.6.3 Relation between size of context effect, political knowledge
and education for the age group 51-70
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Although there were statistically significant differences between age groups and 
respondents with different education with respect to their susceptibility to the 
context, it is important to remember that there were very few observations per cell 
when the sample was broken down as here, and this may well have affected the 
reliability of the results.
4.7 Effect o f question order in Wave 1 on political interest in Wave 2
In his protocol analysis, Bishop found evidence not only of the cognitions involved 
in answering the question, but also of affect. The inability of respondents to answer 
the knowledge questions activated feelings of embarrassment (Bishop, 1986).
These results give us reason to suspect that the knowledge questions will give rise to 
the same affect within the group that was asked the interest question first as it did 
within the group that answered the knowledge questions before the interest question. 
The main difference between these two experimental conditions in Wave 1 was that 
only one of the groups was given the opportunity to convey that embarrassment by 
reporting that they followed politics less frequently than they otherwise would have. 
This opportunity was provided in Wave 2, where all respondents were presented with 
the general question, and no knowledge questions.
Thus it was predicted that the difference between the two groups would become 
smaller in Wave 2, when both groups were confronted with the same general 
question as in Wave 1, but this time without knowledge questions. In other words, 
the hypothesis was that the effects of asking respondents the political interest 
question before the knowledge question in Wave 1 could be detected in responses to 
the interest question three weeks later in Wave 2, since respondents may well have 
expected being put in the same embarrassing situation for the second time. On the 
other hand, one expected the effects of the knowledge questions, presented before
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the general question in Wave 1, to remain the same, or to have been somewhat 
attenuated between the two studies as the embarrassment may wear off. Table 4.7.1 
shows the relation between the experimental conditions in Wave 1 and responses to 
the general question in Wave 2. It was also predicted that in Wave 2, the control 
group, those who were never confronted with the knowledge questions, would report 
themselves as more interested in politics than the two groups that received the 
knowledge questions in Wave 1.
Table 4.7.1 Political interest (Wave 2) by order of questions (Wave 1)
interest
knowledge
Order o f questions in Wave 1 
knowledge interest 
interest only
total
most of the time 43.1% 45.0% 50.5% 46.2%
some of the time 43.1 42.1 31.7 39.1
only now and then 12.4 10.3 14.3 12.3
never 1.3 2.6 3.5 2.5
Total (n) 299 302 287 888
%2=i2.51; df=6; p=.05 Size of effect (most of the time): for interest—>know ledge: 50.5-43.1=7.4%; 
for knowledge—^ interest: 50.5-45.0=5.5%.
The results in table 4.7.1 seem to confirm the above hypotheses, at least if one looks 
only at the probability of respondents saying ‘most of the time’. The experimental 
conditions in Wave 1 do seem to affect responses to the political question in Wave 2 
(three weeks later). The difference between the two groups that were presented with 
the knowledge questions in Wave 1, had then disappeared. Thus, the major 
differences between tables 4.7.1 and 4.2.1 above is that in table 4.2.1 the knowledge 
-> interest group reported significantly less interest in government and public affairs, 
than the interest -> knowledge, and the control groups. In table 4.7.1 this was not the 
case, but the difference was now between the control group, on the one hand, and the 
interest -» knowledge, and knowledge -> interest, on the other. But can it be argued 
that the knowledge questions, which were placed after the political interest question
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in Wave 1 affected responses to the interest questins in Wave 2? Table 4.7.2 shows 
the x2 statistics for pairwise comparisons for political interest (in Wave 2) of the 
three groups in table 4.7.1 (the distribution of responses can be seen in that table).
Table 4.7.2 Chi-square statistics for pairwise comparisons of political
interest in Wave 2
3C2 df sig- n
Interest-* knowledge vs. Knowledge—* interest 2.05 3 .562 601
Interest—knowledge vs. Control group 10.03 3 .018 586
Knowledge—»interest vs. Control group 7.47 3 .058 589
As can be seen in table 4.7.1, there was both a higher proportion of respondents who 
said they follow what goes on most of the time and who said they hardly ever or only 
now and then follow what goes on politically in the control group than the other two 
groups. Hence it is important to take a closer look at the changes from one time to 
the other. The changes in political interest, between the two studies, can be seen 
more clearly in tables 4.7.3 and 4.7.4
Table 4.7.3 Political interest in Wave 2, by political interest in Wave 1,
controlling for experimental condition
Political interest in Wave 1 
most of some of only now total
Political interest in Wave 2
the time the time and then/ 
never
(n)
Interest—^ knowledge
most of the time 66.9% 10.5% 17.1% 129
some of the time 30.2 70.5 31.4 129
only now and then/never 3.0 18.9 51.4 41
Total (n) 169 95 35 299
X2= 127.62; df=4; p= 001; Stability: 66.2%; negative change: 24.7%; positive change: 9%;
Spearman’s rho: .57
table continued on next page
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Table 4.7.3 Political interest in Wave 2, by political interest in Wave 1,
controlling for experimental condition - continued
Political interest in Wave 1 
most of some of only now total
Political interest in Wave 2
the time the time and then/ 
never
(n)
Knowledge—^ interest
most of the time 68.7 28.9 13.8 136
some of the time 26.5 63.3 47.7 127
only now and then/never 4.8 7.8 38.5 39
Total (n) 147 90 65 302
%2=98.40; df=4; p=.001; Stability: 60.6%; negative change: 17.5%; positive change: 21.9% 
Spearman’s rho: .50
Control group (no knowledge questions)
most of the time 74.7 24.7 11.1 145
some of the time 20.9 51.6 27.8 91
only now and then/never 4.4 23.7 61.1 51
Total (n) 158 93 36 287
%2=i 14.89; df=4; p=.001; Stability: 65.5%; negative change: 21.6%; positive change: 12.9% 
Spearman’s rho: .58
Table 4.7.3 shows the comparison of responses to the political interest question in 
Wave 1 and Wave 2, controlling for experimental conditions in Wave 1. Just over 
60% of respondents gave the same response in waves 1 and 2. Almost a quarter of 
the respondents who answered the knowledge questions after the interest question in 
Wave 1 changed their response in a negative fashion, i.e., reported less interest in 
politics. Whether this can be regarded as an effect of the knowledge questions is by 
no means clear, since more than 20% of the control group also gave a more negative 
response in Wave 2. More than 20% of respondents who were confronted with the 
knowledge questions before the interest question in Wave 1 changed their response 
in a positive direction, a substantially larger proportion than in the other two groups,
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suggesting that the effect wore off over time, although it did not disappear. Table 
4.7.4 shows the differences in the marginals of the subtables in table 4.7.3.
Table 4.7.4 Comparison of marginals for political interest in Waves 1
and 2
Changes in political interest: 
Wave 2 - Wave 1
Inter est-^knowledge
never/only now and then 13.7 - 12.0 = 1.7%
some of the time 43.1 - 31.9 = 11.2%
most of the time 43.1 - 56.1 = -13.0%
Know I edge-^ interest
never/only now and then 12.9 - 22.8 = -9.9%
some of the time 42.1 - 31.3 = 10.8%
most of the time 45.0 - 45.9 = -0.9%
Control group (no knowledge questions)
never/only now and then 17.8 - 13.6 = 4.2%
some of the time 31.7 - 31.0 = 0.7%
most of the time 50.5 - 55.5 -5.0%
The results from the control group (never presented with knowledge questions) 
suggest that there had been a general decline in political interest from Wave 1 to 
Wave 2, but comparison of the patterns of shift within the three groups revealed 
some interesting differences.
According to the hypothesis that the knowledge questions in Wave 1 (group 1) 
would affect responses in Wave 2, in such a way that respondents would convey less 
general interest in politics than they did in Wave 1 when confronted with the general 
question before they were asked to answer the knowledge question, one would 
expect to find a more pronounced, or at least more general decrease in interest in 
group 1, than in the control group (group 3). As can be seen in tables 4.7.3 and 4.7.4
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this is not very clear. If one looks only at the proportion of respondents who said 
they followed what was going on ‘most of the time’ in Wave 1, the hypothesis seems 
to have been supported (see table 4.7.4). In fact, 13.0% fewer respondents in the 
group that answered the interest question before the knowledge questions in Wave 1 
reported following what is going on in government and public affairs ‘most of the 
time’, as opposed to 5.0% in the control group. This difference, i.e., between 13 and 
5% was statistically significant (z-3>33 p=.001 ). The measures of response stability 
in table 4.7.3, however, do not show any significant differences between the control 
group and the group that answered the question about political interest before the 
knowledge questions.
The hypothesis concerning the knowledge-finterest group was in the opposite 
direction, i.e., respondents were predicted to show the same or more interest in 
government and public affairs when they were asked the general question in Wave 2 
without the knowledge questions. Comparison between the change in marginals from 
Wave 1 to Wave 2 in the control group and the knowledge-finterest group confirms 
this hypothesis. An overall decline in interest can be seen in the control group, i.e., 
5.0% fewer people in that group reported following what is going on in government 
and public affairs most of the time but no such effect can be seen in the 
knowledge-finterest group (0.9%), though the predicted differences in the shift 
pattern come clear in the categories ‘never/only now and then’ and ‘some of the 
time’. In the control group in Wave 2, 4.2% more people said they follow what goes 
on in government and public affairs only now and then or never than in Wave 1. In 
the group that answered the knowledge questions before the interest question the 
shift was in the opposite direction. In Wave 2, 9.9% fewer people said they 
never/only now and then followed politics than in Wave 1. Although there had been 
a clear decline in interest in politics in the control group and some increase in 
reported political interest in the knowledge-finterest group, there was still a 
significant difference between these two groups in Wave 2. For some reason, the
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responses in the control group were more polarized than in the other two groups, i.e., 
there was a higher porportion of respondents who said they follow what goes on 
‘most of the time’, but there was also a higher proportion of respondents in the 
control group who said they never or only now and then follow what goes on. Hence 
if the scale is treated as a four-point interval scale and the mean calculated for each 
group, there was no difference between the three groups (means: I->K=3.36; 
K-*I=3.38; control=3.39; F2,885=*0274, p=.973) in Wave 2. There was a significant 
decrease in the mean response in the interest-*knowledge group, as predicted. 
However, it is difficult to give an affirmative answer to the question whether the 
knowledge questions presented after the interest question in Wave 1 affected 
responses in Wave 2 because there were also negative changes in the control group 
(see table 4.7.5 for mean responses in Wave 1 and 2).
Table 4.7.5 Mean response to political interest question in Wave 1 and
Wave 2 by order
Wave 1 
Mean Std.dev
Wave 2 
Mean Std.dev Diff. t df P
Interest—»knowledge 3.43 .749 3.28 .729 .15 3.59 298 .000
Knowledge—* interest 3.23 .890 3.29 .758 -.07 -1.41 301 .160
Control group 3.40 .760 3.29 .839 .11 2.55 286 .011
Although the negative changes were greater in the interest-»knowledge group than in 
the control group (on average 1.5 and 1.1 points, respectively) there was no 
statistically significant difference between the changes in these two groups, making 
it impossible to draw a definite conclusion.
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4.8 Changes in political interest between waves
Whether one would conclude that there had been an increase, decrease, or no change 
at all, in political interest between the two waves, depends on which of the groups 
one examined. Although two of the groups (interest-dcnowledge and the control 
group) showed a significant decline in political interest, the magnitude of the change 
was not the same. In the interest->knowledge group, 13% fewer respondents said 
they follow what is going on ‘most of the time’ in Wave 2 than in Wave 1. The 
comparable figure for the control group was only 5%. If, on the other hand, one 
looks at the knowledge->interest group, the conclusion would be different. Although 
the increase in political interest was not significant (the mean went from 3.22 to 3.29, 
t3oi=1.41, p=.16) within this group, the changes were different from the changes in
the other two groups. In the interest-dmowledge and the control groups there was a 
decline in interest down the whole scale, i.e., from ‘most of the time’ to ‘never’, but 
in the knowledge interest group, the changes were more in the direction of 
centralizing responses, i.e., 0.9% fewer respondents said they follow what is going 
on ‘most of the time’, but there are 9.9% fewer respondents that said they follow 
what is going on ‘never/only now and then’; thus the changes were towards the 
centre of the scale (10.8% more respondents said they follow what is going on ‘some 
of the time’ in Wave 2 than in Wave 1; see table 4.7.4) Although the changes in 
reported interest as found by subtracting the score on the political question in the 
first wave from the score in the second wave ranged from a score of -3 to 3, the 
variable is coded into five categories only in table 4.8.1, i.e., a one or two point 
negative change, no change, and a one or two point positive change, since there were 
only 8 respondents who changed their response by three points. Table 4.8.1 shows 
the effect of the order of the questions in Wave 1 on changes in political interest 
between Waves 1 and 2.
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Table 4.8.1 Changes in political interest between waves by order of
questions (in Wave 1)
interest
knowledge
Order o f questions in Wave 1 
knowledge interest 
interest only
total
negative change 2 points 2.0 3.0 3.8 2.9
negative change 1 point 23.4 15.2 19.2 19.3
no change 65.2 59.3 63.8 62.7
positive change 1 point 6.7 17.2 11.1 11.7
positive change 2 points 2.7 5.3 2.1 3.4
Total (n) 299 302 287 888
%2=27.19; df=8; p=001 - This table shows slightly more changes than table 4.7.3, because the 
categories ‘never’ and ‘only now and then’ were collapsed before stability was measured in table 
4.7.3. The pairwise comparisons are: I-*K vs. K-»I: df=4, p=.000; I—»K vs. control:
%2=6.46} df=4, p=.167; K—»I vs. control: x^=9.98, df=4, p=.041.
In order to test whether any other variables had an effect on the changes in political 
interest between the two studies and to see whether the effects of the order of 
questions in Wave 1 were conditioned by any of the background variables, logit 
models for the variables: change (in the logit analysis this variable is coded into three 
categories, i.e., negative cange, no change and positive change), order, age, sex, and 
education were fitted. Goodness-of-fit statistics for the independence model, the 
main effects model, and the model with all two-way interactions are presented in 
table 4.8.2.
Table 4.8.2 Models for change in political interest with order, sex, and
education as explanatory variables
Model Lambda parameters included 
in the model*
Chi-square DF P
1. Independence (C) 39.74431 22 .012
2. Main effects (C)(CO)(CS)(CE) 13.83909 14 .462
3. Two-way interactions (C)(CO)(CS)(CE)(COS)
(COE)(CSE) 3.90313 4 .419
* C=change in political interest 0=order of questions 
E=education of respondent S=sex of respondent
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The fit of the main effects model is reasonably good (%2=13.84, df=14, p= 462). 
Adding all possible two-way interactions did not substantially improve the fit 
(conditional %2=9.94, df=10, p<.50), which suggests that none of the two-way 
interactions made an important contribution to the model. Table 4.8.3. shows the 
significance test for the main effects.
Table 4.8.3 Test for main effects of sex, education, and order on change
in political interest
Effect added to 
the independence 
model in table 4.8.2.
Lambda parameters 
included in the model
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF p
Order (C)(CO) 17.74908 18 .472 21.99523 4 .000
Sex (C)(CS) 36.86408 20 .012 2.88023 2 .237
Education (C)(CE) 38.27610 20 .008 1.46821 2 .480
Table 4.8.3 shows that the only variable that has a significant effect on changes in 
political interest is order of questions, or rather the experimental condition in Wave 
1. Table 4.8.4 shows that none of the two-way interactions was significant.
Table 4.8.4 Test for two-way interactions between order, sex, and
education
Effect added to 
the main effects 
model in table 4.8.2.
Lambda parameters 
included in the model
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF p
Order x sex (C)(CO)(CS)(CE)
(COS) 10.26810 10 .417 3.57099 4 .467
Order x education (C)(CO)(CS)(CE)
(COE) 9.43013 10 .492 4.40896 4 .353
Sex x education (C)(CO)(CS)(CE)
(CSE) 13.21290 12 .354 0.62619 2 .730
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Since 45% of the cells have an expected frequency of less than 5, if age (3 
categories) is included in the model as a categorical variable, age is included as a 
covariate, to see if age of respondents conditioned the effect of any of the 
independent variables. As table 4.8.5 shows, age did not condition the effects of any 
of the variables, order, sex, or education.
Table 4.8.5 Test for conditioning effects of age on order, sex, and
education
Effect added to 
the main effects 
model in table 4.8.2.
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF P
Order x age 8.82224 10 .549 5.01685 4 .285
Sex x age 13.62798 12 .325 0.21111 2 .900
Education x age 13.26359 12 .350 0.57550 2 .748
Hence, the only effect that is in the best model is the main effect of order (x2=22.0, 
df=4, p=.000). The parameters in table 4.8.6 show how the order of questions in 
Wave 1 affected the changes that took place between the waves. Since logit models 
are designed for dichotomous variables, it is often helpful to use a special contrast to 
make the desired comparisons among the categories of the dependent variable when 
the variable is multinomial. Thus the first parameter for change contrasts those who 
changed their response versus those who did not, and the second parameter contrasts 
negative vs. positive changes.
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Table 4.8.6 Parameter estimates for the best model, odds, and
proportion 1) changing the response, or 2) if changing, 
changing in a negative direction
EFFECT
LEVEL
A,-para-
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Change
1 .change/no change (ch/no ch) -.440 -0.881 0.415 0.293 0.359
2. negative/positive (neg/pos) .216 0.431 1.539 0.606 0.592
Change by order
1.1. ch/no ch - interest->knowledge -.053 -0.106 0.373 0.272 0.338
1.2. ch/no ch - knowledge->interest .066 0.132 0.473 0.321 0.394
1.3. ch/no ch - control .013 0.026 0.426 0.299 0.345
2.1. neg/pos - interest->knowledge .284 0.568 2.715 0.731 0.733
2.2. neg/pos - knowledge->interest -.324 -0.648 0.805 0.446 0.445
2.3. neg/pos - control .040 0.080 1.668 0.625 0.626
Approximately 30% of respondents were expected to change their response from one 
wave to the next (the observed proportion was 6% higher than expected). This 
proportion did not vary much between conditions, although those who answered the 
knowledge questions before the general question in Wave 1 were slightly more likely 
to change their response than were respondents in the interest->knowledge group and 
the control group. More interesting differences become apparent when one looks at 
the parameters where the negative changes are compared with the positive changes. 
Thus, 73% of respondents who changed their response in the interest-»knowledge 
group, were expected to do so in the negative direction. However, this proportion 
dropped to 63% for the control group and 45% for the knowledge-dnterest group, 
that is, more than half of the respondents that changed their response in the 
knowledge->interest group were expected to do so in a positive direction.
Table 4.8.7 shows the observed and expected frequencies and the standardized 
residuals for the best model (i.e., main effects of order)
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Table 4.8.7 Observed, (expected) frequencies and standardized
residuals for the model with main effects of order on change 
in political interest
ORDER SEX EDUCATION Negative Standard, 
change residuals
Change 
No change Standard.
residuals
Positive Standard, 
change residuals
I—>K male compulsory 13(12.87) .036 33(34.43) -.245 6(4.70) .602
I—>K male m. th. comp. 22(26.73) -.915 75(71.52) .412 11(9.75) .400
I—»K female compulsory 19(15.59) .863 39(41.72) -.421 5(5.09) -.289
I— female m. th. comp. 20(18.81) .275 51(50.33) .095 5(6.86) -.711
K—>1 male compulsory 9(8.07) .326 21(27.87) -1.302 16(10.05) 1.876
K—>1 male m. th. comp. 18(20.18) -.486 75(69.69) .637 22(25.13) -.625
K—>1 female compulsory 12(11.76) .071 41(40.60) .063 14(14.64) -.168
K—»I female m. th. comp. 14(12.99) .281 46(44.84) .173 14(16.17) -.540
control male compulsory 6(8.86) -.960 33(26.86) 1.185 2(5.29) -1.429
control male m. th. comp. 20(21.60) -.345 67(65.51) .185 13(12.89) .030
control female compulsory 20(15.77) 1.065 44(47.82) -.552 9(9.41) -.134
control female m. th. comp. 16(15.77) .058 44(47.82) -.552 13(9.41) 1.170
4.9 The effect o f knowledge on changes between waves
As discussed above, whether knowledge mediates the effects of order depends on a 
combination of age and education and it is not very clear how knowledge affects the 
relationship between order and political interest. The following analysis investigates 
the effects of knowledge on changes in political interest between the waves.
In order to avoid problems of small frequencies in the cells, responses to the 
knowledge questions were coded into two categories only, i.e., both/either answer 
correct, and both wrong/or don’t know. For the same reason age was not included as 
a categorical variable but as a covariate.
Table 4.9.1 shows the goodness-of-fit statistics for the independence model, the main 
effects model, and the model with all two-way interactions.
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Table 4.9.1 Models for change in political interest with order,
knowledge, sex, and education as explanatory variables
Model Lambda parameters included 
in the model*
Chi-square DF P
1 .Independence (C) 41.89147 30 .073
2. Main effects (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)(CE) 12.22864 22 .952
3. Two-way interactions (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)(CE)(COK)
(COS)(COE)(CKS)(CKE)(CSE) 4.16465 10 .940
* C=change in political interest 0=order of questions K=knowledge
E=education of respondent S=sex o f respondent
The fit of the main effects model is very good, p= 952. The significance test for 
individual main effects is presented in table 4.9.2. The only variable that has a 
significant effect on changes between waves was the order of the questions in Wave 
1.
Table 4.9.2 Test for main effects of sex, education, knowledge, and
order on change in political interest
Effect added to 
the independence 
model in table 4.9.1.
Lambda parameters 
included in the model
Chi-square DF p Conditional
Chi-square
DF P
Order (C)(CO) 20.95582 28 .827 20.93565 2 .000
Knowledge (C)(CK) 40.63094 28 .058 1.26053 2 .533
Sex (C)(CS) 39.59972 28 .072 2.29175 2 .318
Education (C)(CE) 38.40588 28 .091 3.48559 2 .175
Table 4.9.3 shows that none of the effects in table 4.9.2 were conditioned by the age 
of the respondents.
Table 4.9.3 Test for conditioning effects of age on order, knowledge, sex,
and education
Effect added to 
models in table 4.9.2
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF P
Order x age 20.84003 26 .750 0.11579 2 .942
Knowledge x age 39.04547 26 .048 1.58547 2 .452
Sex x age 36.64555 26 .080 2.95417 2 .229
Education x age 35.80807 26 .095 2.59781 2 .273
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Significance tests for all possible two-way interactions are presented in table 4.9.4.
Table 4.9.4 Test for two-way interactions between order, knowledge,
sex, and education
Effect added to 
the main effects 
model in table 4.9.2
Lambda parameters 
included in the model
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF P
Order x knowledge (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)
(CE)(COK) 11.45937 20 .933 0.76927 2 .680
Order x sex (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)
(CE)(COS) 11.79885 20 .923 0.42979 2 .807
Order x education (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)
(CE)(COE) 11.86748 20 .921 0.36116 2 .835
Knowledge x sex (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)
(CE)(CKS) 6.88104 20 .997 5.34760 2 .069
Knowl. x educ. (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)
(CE)(CKE) 12.13646 20 .911 0.09218 2 .956
Sex x education (C)(CO)(CK)(CS)
(CE)(CSE) 11.03575 20 .945 1.19289 2 .552
Tables 4.9.2, and 4.9.4 show that changes in responses to the question about how 
frequently respondents followed what is going on in government and public affairs 
depended on the order of questions in the first wave, and on a combination of the 
variables knowledge and sex. The effect of these variables is depicted in table 4.9.5.
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Table 4.9.5 Parameter estimates for the best model, odds, and
proportion 1) changing the response, or 2) if changing, 
changing in a negative direction
EFFECT
LEVEL
^-para­
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Change
1. change/no change (ch/no ch)
2. negative/positive (neg/pos)
-.447
.168
-0.893
0.336
0.409
1.400
0.290
0.583
0.366
0.577
Change by order
1.1. ch/no ch - interest->knowledge
1.2. ch/no ch - knowledge->interest
-.061
.061
-0.122
0.122
0.363
0.463
0.266
0.316
0.338
0.394
2.1. neg/pos - interest->knowledge
2.2. neg/pos - knowledge->interest
.320
-.320
0.639
-0.639
2.653
0.739
0.726
0.425
0.733
0.445
Change by knowledge
1.1. ch/no ch - both/either correct
1.2. ch/no ch - both wrong/DK
-.018
.018
-0.036
0.036
0.395
0.424
0.283
0.298
0.355
0.391
2.1. neg/pos - both/either correct
2.2. neg/pos - both wrong/DK
.099
-.099
0.199
-0.199
1.708
1.147
0.631
0.534
0.609
0.545
Change by sex
1.1. ch/no ch - male
1.2. ch/no ch - female
.004
-.004
0.009
-0.009
0.413
0.406
0.292
0.289
0.364
0.368
2.1. neg/pos - male
2.2. neg/pos - female
-.132
.132
-0.264
0.264
1.075
1.823
0.518
0.646
0.530
0.631
Change by knowledge by sex
1.1.1. ch/no ch - correct - male
1.1.2. ch/no ch - correct- female
1.2.1. ch/no ch - wrong - male
1.2.2. ch/no ch - wrong - female
.010
-.010
-.010
.010
0.021
-0.021
-0.021
0.021
0.407
0.383
0.419
0.430
0.289
0.277
0.295
0.301
0.363
0.294
0.367
0.386
2.1.1. neg/pos - correct - male
2.1.2. neg/pos - correct - female
2.2.1. neg/pos - wrong - male
2.2.2. neg/pos - wrong - female
.161
-.161
-.161
.161
0.322
-0.322
-0.322
0.322
1.809
1.612
0.639
2.062
0.644
0.617
0.390
0.673
0.616
0.595
0.386
0.652
The parameters in table 4.9.5 show that respondents in the knowledge-finterest 
group were first of all more likely to change their response (31.6% in the 
knowledge-finterest group and 26.6% in the interest->knowledge group) than were 
respondents in the interest->knowledge group and were, in addition, much more 
likely to change their response in a positive direction (57.5% vs. 27.4%,
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respectively), i.e., saying that they followed what is going on in government and 
public affairs more often in Wave 2 than they did in Wave 1. The other parameters 
demonstrate the unexpected interaction between knowledge and sex. These effects 
were such that both men and women who knew the answer to at least one of the 
knowledge questions were expected to be slightly less likely to change their response 
than those who did not know the answers (the difference was not statistically 
significant). The most surprising differences become apparent when one looks at the 
comparison between negative and positive changes. The female respondents who 
knew one or both of the answers to the knowledge questions were sligthly less likely 
to show a negative change than were female respondents who knew neither of the 
answers (61% and 67%, respectively). This pattern was reversed for male 
respondents, the proportion being 64% for men who knew one or both of the 
answers, but only 39% for those who knew neither of the answers. Table 4.9.6 shows 
the observed and expected frequencies and standardized residuals for this model.
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Table 4.9.6 Observed, (expected) frequencies and standardized
residuals for the model with main effects of order, and an 
interacting effect of knowledge and sex on change in 
political interest
Change
ORDER KNOWL. SEX EDUC. Negative Standard. No change Standard. Positive Standard.
change residuals residuals change residuals
interest correct male comp. 8(7.12) .3285 17(17.80) -.1895 2(2.08) -.0538
interest correct male m.th. c. 16(18.20) -.5165 46(45.49) .0760 7(5.31) .7338
interest correct female comp. 7(6.88) .0473 20(19.87) .0282 2(2.25) -.1666
interest correct female m.th. c. 5(5.93) -.3810 19(17.13) .4511 1(1.94) -.6746
interest wrong male comp. 5(4.28) .3493 16(17.19) -.2867 4(3.53) .2479
interest wrong male m.th. c. 6(6.67) -.2606 29(26.81) .4222 4(5.51) -.6443
interest wrong female comp. 12(9.97) .6437 19(21.48) -.5354 3(2.55) .2812
interest wrong female m.th. c. 15(14.95) .0126 32(32.22) -.0392 4(3.83) .0888
knowl. correct male comp. 6(4.50) .7089 11(14.79) -.9859 7(4.71) 1.0543
knowl. correct male m.th. c. 15(15.18) -.0453 54(49.92) .5772 12(15.90) -.9784
knowl. correct female comp. 5(3.85) .5885 13(14.63) -.4270 5(4.52) .2254
knowl. correct female m.th. c. 5(5.35) -.1516 20(20.36) -.0797 7(6.29) .2832
knowl. wrong male comp. 3(2.38) .4045 10(12.57) -.7250 9(7.05) .7331
knowl. wrong male m.th. c. 3(3.67) -.3510 21(19.43) .3569 10(10.90) -.2727
knowl. wrong female comp. 7(9.25) -.7400 28(26.24) .3427 9(8.50) .1698
knowl. wrong female m.th. c. 9(8.83) .0571 26(25.05) .1895 7(8.12) -.3924
4.10 News consumption and the effect o f question order on political 
interest
Bishop (1986) found that respondents who were asked the question about how well 
they followed what is going on in government and public affairs before they were 
asked two knowledge questions answered the question with respect to how closely 
they generally followed the news. On the other hand, asking the knowledge 
questions (concerning respondents’ U.S. Representative) first, was found to focus 
respondents’ attention on their lack of knowledge about their U.S. Representative 
rather than on the contents of their long-term memory, based on how much they 
followed the news about government and public affairs by watching television, 
reading the newspapers, or listening to the radio. Furthermore, he suggests that those 
respondents who were unable to answer the knowledge questions and still said they
164
follow what is going on ‘most of the time’ did so ‘because of the weight of evidence 
from their own experience, they are able to discount, or even ignore as trivial, the 
fact that they cannot momentarily think of what their congressman has done’ 
(Bishop, 1986, p.14).
Bishop’s (1986) interpretation of why this context effect occurs (i.e., by focusing 
respondents’ attention on their lack of knowledge) is based on his analysis of think- 
aloud protocols. Should his interpretation be generalizable to other populations, i.e., 
that people who are not asked the knowledge questions before the general question 
usually answer the question with respect to how closely they follow the news, and 
that people who follow the news closely, are less likely to base their answer on their 
success or failure to answer the knowledge questions, this could be detected in the 
research described here by comparing responses to the question concerning 
government and public affairs to responses to questions about how often people 
watch news on television, listen to radio and read newspapers. If the interpretation is 
correct, one would expect respondents who are heavy news consumers to be less 
influenced by the order of the questions than respondents who do not generally 
follow what is going on. As table 4.10.1 shows, there is no evidence for Bishop’s 
(1986) interpretation that respondents who follow the news closely are less likely to 
be influenced by being asked the knowledge questions before the general question.
165
Table 4.10.1 Political interest (Wave 1) by order of questions, controlling
for news consumption
Follow news daily on TV, Do not follow news on TV,
radio and in at least one radio and in a newspaper,
newspaper every day
interest knowl. interest total interest knowl. interest total
knowl. interest only knowl. interest only
most of the time 71.6% 55.3% 66.9% 64.2% 45.5% 37.9% 46.4% 43.4%
some of the time 23.4 29.8 28.8 27.4 37.8 32.6 33.2 34.6
only now and then 5.0 14.9 4.3 8.4 16.7 29.5 20.4 22.0
Total (n) 141 161 139 441 209 190 196 595
X2=17.50; df=4; p= 01 %2=10.56; df=4; p= 05
Size of effect (71.6+66.9)72-55.3=13.95% (45.5+46.4)/2-37.9=8.05%
Table 4.10.1 shows that although respondents showed a great deal of consistency in 
the sense that respondents who followed the news on all of the media every day were 
much more likely to say they followed what is going on in government and public 
affairs ‘most of the time’, they were no less likely to be affected by the order of the 
questions than respondents who followed the news less frequently, and in fact the 
size of the effect was much larger for the respondents who followed the news daily 
(13.95% vs. 8.05%).
4.11 Think-aloud and political interest
In an attempt to aid interpreting and explaining the context effects described above, 
17 students at the University of Iceland were asked to think-aloud while answering 
these questions. Of these 17 subjects 15 knew the name of the Speaker of the plenary 
session for both houses of Parliament - a question that may well have been much 
easier at the time of the think-aloud experiments than it was at the time of the survey. 
At the time of the think-alouds a new president had been elected, a woman author 
well known for her children’s books (only 35% of respondents in the survey knew 
the answer when they were interviewed).
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Only two subjects knew which minister was responsible for the administration of the 
Statistical Bureau. Despite the fact that almost as many respondents in the survey 
were able to answer correctly the question about the minister for the Statistical 
Bureau (27.6%) as the question about who was the Speaker of the plenary session for 
both houses of Parliament (35.4%) it appeared to be the case that only one of the 
questions, i.e., the question about the Speaker of the plenary session for both houses 
of Parliament, conditioned the effect of order on responses to the interest question. It 
was suggested that this was due to the nature of the questions, i.e., that more 
respondents were able to guess who of 11 ministers was responsible for the 
Statistical Bureau. The name of the minister was not required, but subjects had to 
know the name of the Speaker of the plenary session for both houses of Parliament, 
who could be any of 63 members of Parliament, making it very difficult to guess 
who s(he) was. Hence, those respondents who managed to guess which minister was 
responsible for the Statistical Bureau were aware of the fact that they had not known 
the answer although they gave the correct response, and thus they were affected in 
the same way as respondents who did not know (or give) the right answer. If this is a 
correct interpretation of the seemingly ‘different* effects of the knowledge questions, 
it is more consistent with the reinterpretation hypothesis (framing hypothesis), or 
possibly a self-protection mechanism than it is with self-perception theory. If self­
perception theory applied, one would expect those respondents who gave a correct 
response to infer that they followed what was going on more often than respondents 
who did not answer correctly. This is not necessarily true of cognitive dissonance 
theory, i.e., if the respondent is aware of the fact that he did not know the answer but 
was merely lucky in his guessing, this will most likely give rise to dissonant thoughts 
and, hence the dissonance is resolved when the respondent reports following what is 
going on less frequently than he would have had he truly known the answer.
Taken together, 2 subjects (both in the condition where the knowledge questions 
preceded the interest question) answered both questions correctly, 13 respondents
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answered one question correctly, and only 2, one from each condition, knew neither 
answer, (see table 4.11.1)
Table 4.11.1 Political knowledge and interest in think-aloud protocols
Interest—^ knowledge Knowledge—^ interest
Both
correct
Either
correct
Neither
correct
Total Both
correct
Either
correct
Neither
correct
Total
never/hardly at all 0 2 0 2 0 0 1 1
only now and then 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
some of the time 0 4 0 4 1 4 0 5
most of the time 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 2
Total (n) 0 7 1 8 2 6 1 9
The protocols from the two subjects who were not able to answer the knowledge 
questions show clear evidence of embarrassment over not being able to answer these 
questions and also how this affects responses to the interest question.
Respondent no. 12, a 29 year old female
This subject was presented with the knowledge questions, to which she did not know 
the answers, before the political interest question. In response to the interest question 
she said she hardly ever followed what was going on in government and political 
affairs. When asked about what she remembered from answering these questions she 
said:
‘Yes, I thought I was awfully stupid not to know this. This was 
something I felt I ought to know and I found it embarrassing. I thought 
the question was, so to speak, disturbing. About the minister, I thought I
had to I haven’t been attentive enough about politics to answer that, so
I tried to think of some responsible men whom I knew were politicians or 
whom I believed in. (And the last question?) Since I could not answer the 
knowledge questions I thought: NO, I’d better try to excuse myself by 
saying that I never follow what is going on.’
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Respondent no. 11, a 25 year old female
She was asked about her interest in politics before she was asked the knowledge 
questions. Her answers were the following:
‘I usually follow what is going on in politics ‘most of the time’. I am 
really into politics, so I try to be knowledgeable about most issues. But I 
haven’t ‘dived deep’ into everything I have wanted to dive into. I would 
like to know a lot more about the EC and the ‘EEA’, the fishing quotas 
and fishing policies, so I would really like to be well informed about all 
these issues, but I don’t give myself time for that. But I try to learn 
something about all of them.’
‘Spekaer of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament? Oh my 
God - Gudmundur Einarsson. (It is Gudrun Helgadottir) Gudrun 
Helgadottir, of course, what am I thinking. You know that, you always 
see her in that chair - God!! You don’t even get the name’.
‘The Statistical Bureau, hm, hm. Hang on. The Statistical Bureau.... Huh, 
shall I think aloud, oh my God. I’m just trying to allocate the Statistical 
Bureau some place in the system. Of course the Statistical Bureau takes
care of the National Registry. The Statistical Bureau one must have
heard that at some point. Ummmm, it’s not the Industrial Ministry, and it
is not the Ministry of Fisheries, it’s n o t no, it can’t be the Ministry of
Trade and Commerce, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not the 
Ministry of Education. Can it be the Ministry of Education?’
When asked about what she remembered thinking she said:
‘Well, first you ask very generally, and I think I can answer ... of course I 
answer as I think I am, but of course I panic when you ask me two 
questions that I cannot answer after I have told you that I follow rather 
closely what is going on in government and public affairs. So, I feel 
ashamed of myself for having said that and not being able to answer the 
questions as I would have liked.’
Both of the above subjects refer to some kind of cognitive dissonance, but it is also 
obvious that only the first subject is able to resolve this dissonance by saying that she 
hardly ever follows what is going on in politics. However, the retrospective account 
given by the latter subject (number 11) also lends some support to the framing 
hypothesis, i.e., that the knowledge questions have an effect on respondents’ 
interpretation of what it means to follow what is going on in politics ‘most of the 
time’. The subject says that she ‘answers as she thinks she is’, but after having
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exposed her ignorance she feels ashamed of herself for having said that she follows 
what is going on most of the time. Despite this, it is difficult to argue that the 
framing hypothesis has gained much support unless some evidence can be found for 
re-interpretation among the subjects who knew at least one of the answers. 
Unfortunately, this is not obvious in any of the protocols.
4.12 Conclusion
It might seem to be a straightforward conclusion from the above analysis that merely 
by asking the two knowledge questions we change people’s self-perception of how 
frequently they follow what is going on in government and public affairs, as has 
indeed been suggested by Bishop (1987). Both Bern’s (1967, 1978) self-perception 
theory and Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory would predict that a 
respondent who is unable to answer knowledge questions concerning political 
knowledge before being asked a question about how often he ‘follows what is going 
on in government and public affairs’ would be less likely to say he follows what is 
going on ‘most of the time’. According to Bern’s self-perception theory, the person 
who cannot answer the knowledge questions infers that since (s)he does not know 
the answers, (s)he probably does not follow what is going on ‘most of the time’. 
Cognitive dissonance theory, on the other hand, would explain the lowered 
probability of a respondent reporting that (s)he follows what is going on ‘most of the 
time’ with reference to a tension state or dissonance. Having been unable to answer 
the knowledge questions, and to the extent that the option ‘most of the time’ has 
positive qualities and the options ‘some of the time’ or less have negative qualities, 
the respondent experiences cognitive dissonance that (s)he is motivated to resolve, in 
one way or the other. This cognitive dissonance could be resolved, for example, by 
discarding the knowledge questions as having no relevance to the question about 
how closely they ‘..follow what is going on in government and public affairs’, or by
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re-evaluating their perception of how closely they think they follow what is going 
on. In other words, the respondent may well (but not necessarily) change his self­
perception of how closely he follows politics as a consequence of having been made 
aware of dissonant cognitions.
The major factor that casts doubt on this interpretation, that people’s self-perceptions 
are being changed in the process of being ‘measured’ is the fact that respondents 
(except 18-30 year olds with compulsory education only) are affected by the order of 
the questions whether or not they knew the answers to the knowledge questions. 
Should respondents who correctly answer the knowledge questions before answering 
the interest question be less likely to say that they follow what is going on ‘most of 
the time’ than respondents who answer the knowledge questions after the interest 
question? On the contrary, according to most consistency theories, these respondents 
should be more likely to say that they follow what is going on ‘most of the time’. If, 
as Bern (1967, 1978) claims, people infer from their own overt behaviour what their 
attitudes, opinions, and other internal states are, the respondent who is able to answer 
both of the knowledge questions should infer from that, that he follows what is going 
on ‘most of the time’. Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory also seems to 
fail to explain why a respondent who knows the answers to both the knowledge 
questions should be less likely to say that (s)he follows what is going on ‘most of the 
time’ if the knowledge questions are placed before the interest question rather than 
after. It is not at all obvious why answering both of the knowledge questions 
correctly and responding ‘most of the time’ to the interest question should lead to a 
state of cognitive dissonance or reduce the likelihood of respondents saying they 
follow what is going on most of the time.
The finding (although not well established) that respondents who were presented 
with the knowledge question after the interest question in Wave 1 changed their 
responses to reduce inconsistency when they were asked the interest question in
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Wave 2 supports the claim made by Henninger and Wyer (1976) and Wyer and 
Hartwick (1980) that the Socratic effect, which predicts an increase in consistency 
between related beliefs over repeated administrations of a questionnnaire, depends 
on the type of propositions. That is, whether or not the inconsistency is eliminated in 
the initial session depends on whether potential premises (in this case the knowledge 
questions) are before or after the potential conclusion (the interest question). This 
finding also demonstrates that it is not the recency of the information (the answers to 
the knowledge questions) that is the crucial factor in setting off the context effect, 
but more so the perceived relevance of the information. Then why do respondents 
perceive the answers to the knowledge questions as the most relevant basis for their 
answer to the political interest question? As has been repeatedly emphasized, people 
typically base their judgements on only a few pieces of information that are 
accessible in memory at the time (cf. Wyer and Hartwick, 1980; Wyer and Srull, 
1980), and thus the similarity between the concepts that these questions are dealing 
with, and the reported embarrassment caused by not being able to answer the 
knowledge questions (Bishop, 1986), may well be the major determinant of the 
perceived relevance. Given that the principle of co-operation (see Grice, 1975) is 
operating in the interview situation, one would hardly be surprised to find that 
answers to the general question are influenced by the knowledge questions, i.e., there 
is hardly any point, the respondent may think, in including the knowledge questions 
in the questionnaire if they are irrelevant to all other questions. It is not at all obvious 
what the researcher means when he asks a person if (s)he follows what is going on in 
government and public affairs most of the time. As Bradbum et al. (1987) point out, 
respondents will ‘use any information they have to generate a reasonable answer’ 
(p. 160), and it seems to be quite reasonable to infer that the researcher defines ‘most 
of the time’ as knowing the answers to knowledge questions such as those included 
in the questionnaire. On the other hand, as Wyer and Hartwick (1984) point out, it is 
very likely that the effects found are confined to the particular situational context, 
that is, that the variables may lose some, or all, of their effect, when the two
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situational contexts are physically and psychologically different. This, in addition to 
the finding that respondents were affected by the order of the questions more or less 
independently of their level of knowledge, suggests that we as researchers are not 
changing people’s self-perceptions of how frequently they think they follow what is 
going on in government and public affairs, but rather that we are providing the 
definition of what we mean by following government and public affairs ‘most of the 
time’. That is, asking respondents about their ‘political knowledge’ in the same 
questionnaire as the question about how well they follow what is going on in 
government and public affairs implies that a person who follows what is going on 
‘most of the time’ knows the answers to these and similar questions. Thus, the 
respondents probably perceive the knowledge questions as a ‘truth-check’ (why else 
would the questions be there?), and might as well be prepared for more questions of 
that type, hence explaining the lowered probability that respondents who know both 
of the answers say they follow what is going on ‘most of the time’, when the 
knowledge questions precede the interest question.
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5The most important issues
5.1 Introduction
Schuman and Presser (1981) discuss how the distribution of responses to a question 
about what people believe to be the most important problems facing the country 
changes when the question is closed and specific response alternatives are provided. 
Social scientists generally recommend the employment of closed questions for the 
sake of standardization. Converse and Presser (1986) claim that closed questions are 
more specific than open questions because they spell out the response alternatives 
and therefore they are more apt to communicate the same frame of reference to all 
respondents. In addition such questions make interviewing, coding and analysis 
much easier. However, the relative merits of open-ended and closed questions have 
been the subject of a great deal of research and debate. Those who argue for the 
superiority of open-ended questions, claim they are better for gathering information 
on complex issues (cf. Bailey, 1978; Kiecolt, 1978), if the researcher wants a very 
detailed answer, or wants to find out which aspects of an issue are uppermost in the 
respondent’s mind (Moser and Kalton, 1971), and finally in the measurement of 
sensitive or disapproved behaviour, where closed questions have been shown to lead 
to underreporting (Bradbum and Sudman, 1979).
In their experiment with an open-ended and a closed form of the question asking 
people what they believed to be the most important problem facing the country, 
Schuman and Presser (1981) found that respondents who were given the closed form 
of the question were more than twice as likely to mention crime and violence than 
respondents answering the open-ended question. They suggest that this may be the
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result of the question’s wording and people’s perception of crime as a local problem, 
i.e that the reference to ‘this country’ may actually deter respondents from 
mentioning crime as the most important problem. However, when crime is explicitly 
given as a response option, it is legitimized as an alternative.
Another possibility, related to the above, but not explicitly mentioned by Schuman 
and Presser (1981), is that the probability of respondents thinking of crime and 
violence as the most important problem facing the country is greatly enhanced by the 
inclusion of the category as a response alternative. As Schuman and Presser state 
when discussing the merits of open-ended questions: ‘Respondents are apt to be 
influenced by the specific closed alternatives given, and ... therefore a more valid 
picture of respondents’ choice is obtained if they must produce an answer 
themselves’ (1981, p. 80). They also argue that ‘almost all respondents work within 
the substantive framework of priorities provided by the investigators, whether or not 
it fits their own priorities’ (Schuman and Presser, 1981, p.86) and are unlikely to use 
the ‘other’ category provided on the closed question form. In other words, it is 
conceivable that the specific closed alternatives lead to a change in the interpretation 
of the question.
A related phenomenon that may also be an explanatory factor in this context is the 
problem of acquiescence or the tendency of some respondents to agree with survey 
items. Schuman and Presser (1981) describe three different interpretations of this 
tendency, found in the literature. The prevailing view in psychology has regarded 
acquiescence as a personality trait (cf. Couch and Keniston, 1960), although it has, 
for example, been challenged by Rores (1965) and Nunnally (1978) who believe 
acquiescence to be of little importance ‘either as a measure of personality or as a 
source of systematic invalidity in measures of personality and sentiments’ (p. 669). 
The other two interpretations, assuming a relationship between acquiescence and 
education and social status, come out of survey research and, if correct, would
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suggest it to have a more profound influence in survey research and other research 
based on samples of the general population than in psychological research that 
usually relies on samples of college students. Lenski and Leggett (1960) and Carr 
(1971) interpret acquiescence as a form of deference shown by low-status 
respondents towards the interviewer, but Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 
(1960, p. 513) believe it to be the ‘tendency for poorly educated people to be 
uncritical of sweeping statements and to be “suggestible” where inadequate frames 
of reference are available’. Hence, the latter interpretation also gives one reason to 
suspect that poorly educated people answering a question such as the question about 
the most important problem facing the country will be more susceptible to the form 
of the question than people with more education.
To test this a question similar to the question about the most important problem was 
constructed. Instead of closing the question and giving five response alternatives, the 
question was left open but in the preamble two examples of issues or problems were 
given as a clarification. The wording of the question was as follows: 1) ‘Issues such 
as Albert’s affair and the idea of declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear 
weapons are much talked about these days. Which issues of national importance are 
you most concerned about?’; 2) ‘Issues such as pay disputes and inflation are much 
talked about these days. Which issues of national importance are you most 
concerned about?’; 3) ‘Which issues of national importance are you most concerned 
about these days?’
5.2 Effect o f prompting
Table 5.2.1 shows that providing respondents with examples of what kind of issues 
might be the most important problems facing the nation has a very substantial 
influence on responses. More than 70% of respondents said they believed one of the 
prompts was the most important issue of national importance. Just under a quarter of 
respondents who were not prompted mentioned the general example pay disputes,
176
and inflation as the most important issues and only 14.6% believed Albert’s affair 
was the most important. No one even mentioned declaring the Nordic countries free 
of nuclear weapons without being prompted, but nearly a fifth of respondents who 
were prompted with that issue said it was the most important issue of national 
importance at that time. Contrary to the results from the pilot study, there does not 
seem to have been any support for the hypothesis that respondents who were not 
prompted were more likely to be unable to tell which issues of national importance 
they were most concerned about. However, respondents in this group certainly came 
up with a greater variety of issues than the other two groups. Issues that were not 
mentioned by at least one percent of respondents in all three waves were collapsed 
and called ‘other’.
Table 5.2.1 The most important issues and experimental condition in
Wave 1
Prompted:
Albert/
nukes
Prompted: 
pay disp./ 
inflation
Not prompted Total
None 10.6 % 19.3 % 15.6% 15.3 %
Albert’s affair 58.3 2.1 14.6 23.7
Nuclear-free North 18.6 0.0 0.0 5.6
Pay disputes 6.1 63.1 20.9 29.9
Inflation 0.3 10.0 2.3 4.1
Elections - politics 1.9 1.5 11.6 5.5
Regional policy 0.0 0.9 13.3 5.4
Economy 0.3 0.6 6.5 2.8
Other 3.8 2.4 15.3 7.8
Total (n) 312 331 398 1041
%2=813.9;df=16;p=001
In Wave 2 all respondents were asked what they believed to be the most important 
national issue, but this time they were not prompted. As can be seen in table 5.2.2 
there were still statistically significant differences between the three groups 
(prompted with specific examples, prompted with general examples, and not 
prompted). However, the differences were minute compared to Wave 1. Less than
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7% of respondents prompted with the specific examples in Wave 1 mentioned them 
in Wave 2, as opposed to 2.9 and 2.1% in the other two groups. The 16.5% of 
respondents not prompted or prompted with general examples said the general 
examples, pay disputes and inflation, were the most important issues. The 
comparable figure for the group prompted with the specific examples was 12.4%, 
with the differences only about 4%.
Table 5.2.2 The most important issues in Wave 2 and the experimental
condition in Wave 1
NO PROMPTS IN WAVE 2
Prompted: 
Albert/ 
nukes 
in Wave 1
Prompted: 
pay disp./ 
inflation 
in Wave 1
Not prompted 
in Wave 1
Total
None 14.2 % 18.0 % 15.2 % 15.8 %
Albert’s affair 3.3 2.2 1.2 2.1
Nuclear-free North 3.6 0.7 0.9 1.7
Pay disputes 9.5 13.3 13.7 12.3
Inflation 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.0
Elections - politics 45.3 40.6 39.6 41.7
Regional policy 2.9 1.8 7.7 4.4
Economy 5.8 8.3 7.7 7.3
Other 12.4 11.9 11.0 11.7
Total (n) 274 278 336 888
X2=33.0; df=16; p= 01
The wording of the question was slightly changed in the Wave 3 that took place after 
the election, that is, people were asked about their recollection: ‘Which issues did 
you find the most important in the election campaign?’ No significant differences 
could be seen between responses of the three groups to this question, so although 
prompting had a substantial effect it did not last a very long time, since no trace of it 
could be seen in the third and final wave that took place just over a month after the 
first wave. However, it is possible that the different wording of the question in Wave 
3 diminished the effects of the prompting (see table 5.2.3).
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Table 5.2.3 The most important issues in Wave 35
NO PROMPTS IN WAVE 3
Prompted: Prompted: Not prompted Total
Albert/ pay disp./ in Wave 1
nukes inflation
in Wave 1 in Wave 1
None 22.4 % 27.8 % 25.2 % 25.1 %
Albert’s affair 6.3 3.5 5.3 5.0
Nuclear-free North 3.9 1.5 2.2 2.5
Pay disputes 14.1 12.7 12.8 13.2
Inflation 5.1 5.8 4.0 4.9
Elections - politics 3.5 3.1 2.8 3.1
Regional policy 4.3 5.0 10.3 6.8
Economy 24.7 28.6 24.3 25.7
Other 15.7 12.0 13.1 13.5
Total (n) 255 259 321 835
X2 = 1 9 .9 ;  df=16; p=.226
The analysis above focussed solely on respondents’ first choice, but they were 
allowed to name the three issues of national importance they were most concerned 
about. Looking at which issues respondents named as the second and third most 
important issues of national importance, one can see that for most categories another 
5-6% of respondents identified these issues as the most important ones. The increase 
seems to have been approximately the same in all experimental conditions for all 
categories of responses other than those used as prompts, and a somewhat greater 
increase for the ‘other’ category in the group that was not prompted. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that much important information will be lost by sacrificing the second and 
the third most important issues for the sake of simplicity of statistical analysis. Table 
5.2.4. shows the percentage of respondents in each experimental group that 
mentioned each issue (multiple response).
5 The wording of the question in Wave 3 was different from Waves 1 and 2. Respondents were 
asked which issues of national importance they believed to have been the most important in the 
election campaign.
Table 5.2.4 The most important issues in Waves 1, 2, and 3 (multiple 
response - %)
Prompted: Prompted: Not prompted Total
Albert/ pay disp./ in Wave 1
nukes inflation
in Wave 1 in Wave 1
Wave
I II III I II III I II III I II III
Albert’s affair 72.1 4.7 8.2 8.5 2.2 4.2 23.4 2.4 5.6 33.2 3.0 6.0
Nuclear-free North 63.1 4.7 4.7 2.1 1.4 2.7 2.5 1.5 3.1 20.6 2.5 3.5
Pay disputes 21.2 14.2 22.0 78.5 20.5 19.3 39.9 16.1 21.2 46.6 16.9 20.8
Inflation 5.1 4.4 7.1 35.3 5.4 8.5 6.0 5.4 5.9 15.1 4.2 7.1
Elections - politics 5.4 47.1 5.9 5.1 43.2 3.1 17.8 42.9 3.7 10.1 44.3 4.2
Regional policy 4.5 3.6 5.1 4.8 2.2 6.9 23.4 9.2 13.7 11.8 5.3 9.0
Economy 20.8 7.7 27.5 23.0 9.0 30.9 27.1 9.2 27.7 23.9 8.7 28.6
Other 18.9 23.0 34.5 15.4 17.3 33.6 38.7 19.3 30.2 25.4 19.8 32.6
None 10.6 14.2 22.4 19.3 18.0 27.8 15.6 15.2 25.2 15.3 15.8 25.1
Total (n) 312 274 255 331 278 259 398 336 321 1041 888 835
Table 5.2.4 shows the distribution of responses in all three waves and shows that 
around three quarters of respondents who were prompted with the specific examples 
said one or both of the prompts were among the three most important issues at the 
moment. A full 79% of respondents prompted with pay disputes and inflation said 
they believed pay disputes to be one of the three most important issues of national 
importance, but 35% in this group believed inflation was one of the three most 
important issues. The table also shows that although there are statistically significant 
differences between responses, both in Wave 1 and 2, prompting in Wave 1 did not 
have a very large effect on responses in Wave 2 although respondents who were 
prompted were slightly more likely than other respondents to mention the particular 
issues they were prompted with.
5.3 Effect o f prompting and demographic variables
Social scientists (cf. Carr, 1971; Campbell et al., 1960) have found that aquiescence 
is more common among people with shorter education and thus it is not unlikely that 
education also conditions the effects of prompting. In line with these findings, one
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would expect respondents with the least education to be the most likely to say that 
the issues mentioned in the preamble to the question were the issues they were most 
concerned about. Table 5.3.1 shows that it depends on the education of respondents 
what kind of issues they believed to be of greatest importance. The shorter their 
education, the more likely respondents were to say that the specific examples 
(Albert’s affair and declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons) were the 
most important issues of national importance. The more educated respondents were 
more likely to mention the more general issues such as pay disputes and inflation. 
However, the interaction between prompting and education was not significant
(L'R-%^issue*prompt*education= 8 .5 , df=12, p=.742).
Table 5.3.1 The most important issues in Wave 1 and education of
respondents - %
Prompted: Prompted: Not prompted Total
Albert/ pay disp./ in Wave 1
nukes inflation
in Wave 1 in Wave 1
EDUCATION*
I II III I II III I II III I II III
None 14.5 7.1 5.4 28.1 7.8 8.3 21.8 9.3 5.0 21.8 8.1 6.4
Albert/nukes 80.0 78.7 70.3 2.3 2.6 2.1 16.2 13.6 2.5 28.8 31.9 22.4
Pay disputes/inflation 1.8 7.1 13.5 65.6 84.3 75.0 17.9 25.0 30.0 28.3 36.9 42.4
Other 3.6 7.1 10.8 3.9 5.2 14.6 44.1 52.1 62.5 21.1 23.0 28.8
Total (n) 110 127 37 128 115 48 179 140 40 417 382 125
X2= 14 .2 ; p= .05 X2= 2 6 .9 ; p= .001 X2= 2 1 .4 ; p= .01 X2= 4 5 .7 ; p= .001
* I = compulsory education, II = Upper secondary school, III = University education 
h-R. X^issue*prompt*education~8.5, df=12, p=.742
Respondents with a university education were also less likely to say that they 
couldn’t think of any issues of national importance than respondents with less 
education and they were more likely to state other issues than those given as 
examples. This suggests that the more educated respondents named more issues than 
less educated respondents, but respondents were asked to restrict their answer to the 
three issues they believed to be of the greatest importance (see table 5.3.2).
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Table 5.3.2 Mean number of issues mentioned in each condition in the
first wave by education
Prompted:
Albert/
nukes
Prompted: 
pay disp./ 
inflation
Not prompted Total
Compulsory education 1.52 1.09 1.11 1.21
(110) (1 28 ) (179 ) (4 1 7 )
Upper secondary school 1.61 1.40 1.33 1.45
(127) (115 ) (140 ) (3 8 2 )
University 1.95 1.31 1.65 1.61
(37) (4 8 ) (40 ) (1 2 5 )
Total 1.62 1.25 1.26 1.36
(274) (2 9 1 ) (359 ) (n = 9 2 4 )
Significantly more issues were mentioned by respondents in the group prompted 
with the specific examples than in the groups prompted with the general examples 
and no examples (F2,9i5=19.1 p=001). Education had a significant effect on the 
number of issues (F2,9i5=14.0 p=001) but there was no significant interaction 
between education and question form (F4j9i5=1.7 p=.147).
It is debatable whether one should expect people to give the same response to this 
question on two different occasions, since their opinions may well change 
frequently, as may the issues that are generally considered to be the most important. 
However, the first two interviews were only between two and three weeks apart, and 
certainly one would not expect more changes in one group than another, but table 
5.3.3 shows that the stability or reliability of responses was much smaller in the 
group that was prompted with specific examples than in the other two groups.
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Table 5.3.3 Reliability or stability of answers in Wave 1 and Wave 2 and
education (i.e., % of respondents giving the same response 
in Wave 1 and Wave 2)
Prompted:
Albert/
nukes
Prompted: Not prompted 
pay disp./ 
inflation
Total
Compulsory education 12.9 % 29.2 % 34.7 % 27.2 %
Upper-secondary educ. 4.5 15.3 31.1 17.5
University education 17.6 24.4 45.7 29.1
Total 10.2 21.9 32.4 22.3
Total (n) 239 245 304 788
L.R. Chi-Square DF Probability
Issue reliability by education by question form 5.4 4 .246
Issue reliability by question form 49.8 2 .000
Issue reliability by education 11.5 2 .003
Table 5.3.3 shows that the reliability or stability of opinion was by far the greatest in 
the group that was not prompted (32.4% gave the same answer in Wave 1 and Wave 
2), but respondents in the group that was prompted with the specific examples were 
very unlikely to give the same response to the open question in Wave 2 (only 10.2% 
gave the same response on those 2 occasions). For some reason, the more general 
examples (pay disputes and inflation) did not seem to have as strong an effect on 
responses as the more specific examples, but this depended to some extent on the 
education of respondents, although there was no significant interaction between issue 
reliability, education and prompting (L.R. %2=5.43, df=4, p= 246).
As depicted in table 5 . 3 . 4  there was a highly significant difference between the 
answers men and women gave to this question when they were not prompted and 
women were more likely than men to say they couldn’t name any nationally 
important issues. Prompting seems to have reduced the variability of responses and 
the difference between men and women almost vanished. However, the interaction 
between issue, prompting and sex was significant (L.R. %2 i s s u e * p r o m p t * s e x = 1 6 . 5 ,  
df=6, p=011). The different prompts seem to have been equally influential where
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men were concerned: 76.9% of men who were prompted with the specific examples 
said that one of them is the most important issue and 78% when prompted with the 
more general examples (x2= 057, df=l, p= 81). This was different for the women. 
They were more likely to agree with the specific examples (77%) than the general 
ones, but 67.5% of the women prompted with pay disputes and inflation said one of 
these was the most important (%2=3.4, df=l, p=.065).
Table 5.3.4 The most important issues in Wave 1 and sex of respondents
- %
Prompted: Prompted: Not prompted Total
Albert/ pay disp./ in Wave 1
nukes inflation
in Wave 1 in Wave 1
Sex*
F M F M F M F M
None 10 .5 1 0 .6 2 5 .3 14 .1 1 8 .7 1 2 .3 1 8 .3 1 2 .4
Albert/nukes 7 7 .0 7 6 .9 1.9 2 .3 1 1 .8 1 7 .4 2 8 .3 3 0 .3
Pay disputes/inflation 9 .2 3 .8 6 7 .5 7 8 .0 3 1 .5 1 4 .4 3 5 .8 3 2 .3
Other 3 .3 8 .8 5 .2 5 .6 3 7 .9 5 5 .9 1 7 .7 2 5 .0
Total (n) 152 160 1 5 4 177 2 0 3 195 5 0 9 5 3 2
X2 = 7 .4  p = .0 5 9 X2 = 6 .6  p = .0 8 4 X2 = 2 4 .3  p = .0 0 1 X2 = 1 3 .6  p = .0 0 4
* F = female, M = male
L.R. X2issue*prompt*sex= 16-5, df=6, p=.011
Age of respondents also seems to have conditioned the effects of prompting. The 
older the respondents the more likely they were to be affected by the prompts, 
whether or not the prompts were specific or general (see table 5.3.5). An interesting 
difference can be seen between the group prompted with the specific examples and 
the one not prompted. The youngest respondents were less likely than other 
respondents to say that the specific examples were the most important issues when 
prompted with them (72% vs. 78% and 83% in the older age groups), but they were
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much more likely to volunteer this response when not prompted (27% vs. 11 and 
6%).
Table 5.3.5 The most important issues in Wave 1 and education of
respondents - %
Prompted: Prompted: Not prompted Total
Albert/ pay disp./ in Wave 1
nukes inflation
in Wave 1 in Wave 1
Age*
I II III I II Ill I II III I II III
None 16.2 6.9 8.6 23.1 18.8 14.9 19.4 11.8 17.3 19.5 12.8 14.1
Albert/nukes 72.1 77.9 82.9 1.0 3.1 1.5 27.4 10.6 5.8 33.9 27.1 27.0
Pay disputes/inflation 7.2 6.9 4.3 70.2 71.3 82.1 24.2 23.5 21.2 32.7 35.4 33.2
Other 4.5 8.4 4.3 5.8 6.9 1.5 29.0 54.1 55.8 13.9 24.7 25.7
Total (n) 111 131 70 104 160 67 124 170 104 339 461 241
X2=8 6 ;p= 20 X 2 = 5;p=.37 X2= 36.7; p=.01 x 2 = 23.6; p=.01
* I = 18-30, II = 31-50, III = 51-70
L.R. %^issue*prompt*age=27.7, df=12, p=.006
The specific issues were selected because they had had extensive media coverage 
during the weeks before the survey was carried out. Thus, it is not unlikely that 
frequency of watching news and reading newspapers did actually influence 
responses to the question about the most important issues and even mediated the 
effect of prompting (see table 5.3.6).
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Table 5.3.6 The most important issues in Wave 1 and news consumption
of respondents - %
Prompted: Prompted: Not prompted Total
Albert/ pay disp./ in Wave 1
nukes inflation
in Wave 1 in Wave 1
News consumption*
H L H L H L H L
None 8 .5 12 .3 8 .6 2 9 .6 9 .1 2 2 .0 8 .8 2 1 .3
Albert/nukes 7 6 .6 7 7 .2 2 .5 1 .8 1 3 .1 1 6 .0 2 7 .5 3 0 .9
Pay disputes/inflation 6 .4 6 .4 8 0 .9 6 5 .7 2 4 .7 2 1 .5 3 7 .7 3 0 .6
Other 8 .5 4 .1 8 .0 3 .0 5 3 .0 4 0 .5 2 5 .9 1 7 .2
Total (n) 141 171 162 1 6 9 198 2 0 0 501 5 4 0
X2 = 3 .5  p = .3 2 X2 = 2 5 .5  p = .0 1 X2 = 1 5 .0 p = .0 1 X2 = 4 0 .8  p = .0 1
* H = heavy (follow news daily on all media, i.e., TV, radio and newspapers), 
L = light (do not follow news daily on all media)
L.R. X^issue*prompt*news=5 .14, df=6, p=.526
The main difference between respondents who were classified as heavy news 
consumers and light consumers was that light consumers were more likely to say that 
they couldn’t think of any nationally important issues. Another difference seems to 
have been in the effects of prompting. The specific examples, Albert’s affair and 
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons, seem to have had the same 
influence whether respondents followed the news on all media every day or not. The 
general examples, on the other hand, seem to have had a greater effect on 
respondents who followed the news every day than on other respondents. However, 
the interaction between issue, prompting and following the news was not significant.
5.4 Prompting and non-response
Results from the pilot study indicated that respondents who were asked the open- 
ended question about which issues of national importance they were most concerned
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about, without being given any examples, were more likely than other respondents to 
say that they couldn’t think of any important issues. However, as discussed above, 
there was no clear indication of this effect in the main study, and in fact, respondents 
who were prompted with the general examples, pay disputes and inflation, appeared 
to be the most likely to give no response (see table 5.4.1).
Table 5.4.1 Non-response and prompting in Wave 1
Prompted:
Albert/
nukes
Prompted: 
pay disp./ 
inflation
Not prompted Total
No response
One or more issues mentioned
10.6 % 
89.4
19.3 % 
80.7
15.6 % 
84.4
15.3 % 
84.7
Total (n) 312 331 398 1041
%2=9.567; df=2; p= 008
For some reason, the specific examples seemed to reduce the likelihood of 
respondents saying that they were not concerned about any issues in particular, but 
there were significantly more respondents, both in the group that was prompted with 
the general examples (%2=9.62, df=l, p=.002) and in the group that was not 
prompted (%2=3.77, df=l, p=.05), who reported not being concerned about any issues 
of national importance. However, there was no statistically significant difference 
between the group prompted with the general examples and the group that was not 
prompted (%2=1.79, df=l, p=.182), in terms of non-response.
It was suggested above that poorly educated respondents were more likely to be 
affected by the prompts given, and since age and sex are strongly related to 
education, the effect of these variables on non-response and the effects of prompting 
were examined with logit analysis. The analysis shows that prompting, education
187
and sex had an interacting effect on whether or not people provided an answer to the 
question.
Table 5.4.2 Models for non-response with prompting, sex, education and
age as explanatory variables
Model Lambda parameters included 
in the model*
Chi-square DF P
1. Independence (N) 74.86 35 .000
2. Main effects (N)(NP)(N S)(NE)(N A) 22.78 29 .786
3. Two-way interactions (N)(NP)(NS)(NE)(NA)
(NPS)(NPE)(NPA)(NSE)
(NSA)(NEA) 14.48 16 .563
4. Three-way interactions (N)(NP)(NS)(NE)(NA)
(NPS)(NPE)(NPA)(NSE)
(NSA)(NEA)(NPSE)(NPSA)
(NPEA)(NSEA) 1.50 4 .827
* N=no issues mentioned P=prompting S=sex of respondent
E=education of respondent A=age of respondent
Prompting, education, and age all showed a significant relationship with responding 
or not responding to the question about the most important issues (a significant main 
effect), and sex of respondent showed a borderline significance (see table 5.4.3).
Table 5.4.3 Test for main effects of prompting, sex, education and age,
on non-response
Effect deleted from 
main effects model 
in table 5.4.2.
Lambda parameters 
included in the model
Chi-square DF P Conditional
Chi-square
DF P
Prompting (N)(NA)(NE)(NS) 32.83 31 .377 10.05 2 .006
Sex (N)(NP)(NA)(NE) 25.61 30 .695 2.83 1 .093
Education (N)(NP)(NA)(NS) 50.26 30 .012 27.48 1 .000
Age (N)(NP)(NE)(NS) 36.71 31 .221 13.93 2 .001
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As can be seen in table 5.4.4, none of the two-way interactions reached significance, 
but there was a highly significant three-way interaction between prompting, sex and 
education (see table 5.4.5).
Table 5.4.4 Significance test for two-way interactions between
prompting, sex, education and age
Effect deleted 
from two-way 
interaction effects 
model in table 5.4.2.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Prompt x sex 16.45 18 .561 1.97 2 .373
Prompt x education 14.52 18 .695 0.04 2 .980
Prompt x age 17.10 20 .646 2.62 4 .628
Sex x education 16.36 17 .499 1.88 1 .170
Sex x age 14.62 18 .688 0.14 2 .932
Education x age 15.30 18 .642 0.82 2 .664
Table 5.4.5 Significance test for two-way interactions 
prompting, sex, education and age
between
Effect deleted 
from three-way 
interaction effects 
model in table 5.4.2.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Prompt x sex x education 8.26 6 .219 6.76 2 .034
Prompt x sex x age 3.33 8 .912 1.83 4 .767
Prompt x education x age 2.94 8 .938 1.44 4 .837
Sex x education x age 3.02 6 .806 1.52 2 .468
The best model for explaining non-response to the question about the most important 
issues is a model with main effects of all the independent variables (prompting, sex, 
education and age), two-way interactions between prompting and sex, prompting and 
education, and sex and education, and the three way interaction between prompting, 
sex and education (%2=12.42, df=22, p=.948). Table 5.4.6 shows the parameter 
estimates for the best model.
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Table 5.4.6 X -  Parameters, log-odds, odds, predicted, and actual
proportion of respondents who mention no issue
EFFECT A,-para- Log-odds Odds Predicted Observed
LEVEL meters proportion proportion
Most important issue
1. nothing -0.930 -1.860 0.156 0.135
Most important issue by prompting 
1. specific -0.252 -0.504 0.094 0.086
2. general 0.212 0.424 0.238 0.192
3. no prompts 0.040 0.080 0.169 0.144
Most important issue by sex 
1. male -0.057 -0.114 0.139 0.122
2. female 0.057 0.114 0.174 0.149
Most important issue by education 
1. compulsory 0.244 0.488 0.254 0.202
2. more than comp. -0.244 -0.488 0.096 0.087
Most important issue by age 
1. 18-30 0.255 0.510 0.259 0.206
2.31-50 -0.125 -0.250 0.121 0.108
3.51-70 -0.130 -0.260 0.120 0.107
Most important issue by prompting by 
1.1. specific-male
sex
0.112 0.224 0.105 0.095
1.2. specific-female -0.112 -0.224 0.084 0.078
2.1. general-male -0.065 -0.130 0.186 0.157
2.2. general-female 0.065 0.130 0.304 0.233
3.1. no prompt-male -0.047 -0.094 0.137 0.120
3.2. no prompt-female 0.047 0.094 0.208 0.172
Most important issue by prompting by education 
1.1. speciflc-comp. -0.022 -0.044 0.147 0.128
1.2. specific-m.th.comp 0.022 0.044 0.060 0.057
2.1. general-comp. 0.019 0.038 0.403 0.287
2.2. general-m.th.comp -0.019 -0.038 0.141 0.123
3.1. no prompt-comp. 0.003 0.006 0.276 0.217
3.2. no prompt-m.th.comp -0.003 -0.006 0.103 0.093
Most important issue by sex by education 
1.1. male-comp. -0.100 -0.200 0.185 0.156
1.2. male-m.th.c. 0.100 0.200 0.104 0.094
2.1. female-comp. 0.100 0.200 0.347 0.258
2.2. female-m.th.c. -0.100 -0.200 0.088 0.081
Table continued on next page
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Table 5.4.6 Continued
EFFECT
LEVEL
^.-para­
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Most important issue by prompting by sex by education
1.1.1. specific-male-comp. -0.186 -0.372 0.092 0.085 0.095
1.1.2. specific-male-m.th.c 0.186 0.372 0.119 0.107 0.110
1.2.1. specific-female-comp. 0.186 0.372 0.233 0.189 0.182
1.2.2. specific-female-m.th.c. -0.186 -0.372 0.031 0.030 0.035
2.1.1. general-male-comp. 0.113 0.226 0.324 0.245 0.235
2.1.2. general-male-m.th.c -0.113 -0.226 0.107 0.097 0.104
2.2.1. general-female-comp. -0.113 -0.226 0.501 0.334 0.312
2.2.2. general-female-m.th.c. 0.113 0.226 0.184 0.156 0.173
3.1.1. no prompt-male-comp. 0.073 0.146 0.213 0.175 0.178
3.1.2. no prompt-male-m.th.c -0.073 -0.146 0.088 0.081 0.083
3.2.1. no prompt-female-comp. -0.073 -0.146 0.359 0.264 0.252
3.2.2. no prompt-female-m.th.c. 0.073 0.146 0.120 0.107 0.120
Generally speaking, women with compulsory education only, were more likely to 
have no opinion on which issues were the most important ones than any other group 
and were at least twice as likely as the women with more than compulsory education 
to have no opinion. Almost a third of the women with compulsory education only 
who were prompted with the general examples and a quarter of those not prompted 
said they were not sure which issues, if any, they were most concerned about. The 
comparable figure for the women prompted with the specific issues was 18.2%. The 
only group where non-response did not seem to be related to the experimental 
condition were the men with more than compulsory education. The other groups, 
men and women with compulsory education only and women with more than 
compulsory education all followed the same pattern, i.e., they were most likely to 
give a non-response when prompted with the general examples, then if they were not 
prompted, and least likely to have no opinion if they were prompted with the specific 
examples. Thus the two types of examples seem to have had different effects on the 
likelihood of non-response: the specific examples reduced the likelihood, whereas 
the general examples increased it.
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It is not clear why providing respondents with general examples such as pay disputes 
and inflation had the effect of increasing the probability of non-response where 
specific examples seemed to reduce this probability. The main difference between 
these two types of examples appears to have been that the specific examples were at 
the time popular news items, one of them (Albert’s affair) qualifying as a political 
scandal, whereas the general examples were of a much more persistent nature. It is 
conceivable that such items can act as a turn-off for people who have little interest in 
economic and political issues in general.
Partial support for this hypothesis can be seen in table 5.4.7 where the sample is 
divided according to their expressed interest in following what is going on in 
government and public affairs.
Table 5.4.7 Effects of prompting and political interest on non-response
to question about the most important issues
Interested inpolitics Not interested in politics
specific
prompts
general
prompts
no
prompts
total specific
prompts
general
prompts
no
prompts
total
non-response 
some issues
5.2%
94.8
10.1%
89.9
6.1%
93.9
7.0%
93.0
17.4%
82.6
27.5%
72.5
26.5%
73.5
24.3%
75.7
Total (n) 174 159 213 546 138 171 185 494
X2=3.46; df=2; p=. 177 X2=5.01; df=2; p= 082
There was no significant difference between the proportion of non-response in the 
three experimental groups among respondents who were interested in politics 
(followed what is going on in government and public affairs most of the time), and 
these respondents were much more likely to have an opinion about which issues 
were the most important than respondents who did not express the same interest in 
politics. Only 7% of respondents who generally followed what is going on did not
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have an opinion as opposed to 24.3% of respondents who were less interested in 
politics. In the latter group, the specific examples seemed to substantially reduce 
non-response, but no difference was found between the groups that were not 
prompted or prompted with the general examples, which may suggest that 
respondents interpreted the question as asking for general economic/political issues. 
The chi-square for the effects of prompting on non-response among respondents who 
were not very interested in politics, however, only reached borderline significance 
(x2=5.01; df=2; p=.082) and there was no significant interaction between prompting 
and political interest (LRx2=1.23; df=4; p= 541).
A somewhat clearer picture emerges when one looks at these effects for men and 
women separately. Prompting did not have any effect on non-response among men, 
whether or not they were generally interested in what was going on in government 
and public affairs. However, as can be seen in table 5.4.8, the specific examples 
significantly reduced the likelihood of women who were not interested in politics 
saying that they did not have an opinion on which issues were the most important.
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Table 5.4.8 Effects of prompting, political interest, and sex on non­
response to question about the most important issues
Interested in politics Not interested in politics
specific
prompts
general
prompts
no
prompts
total specific
prompts
general
prompts
no
prompts
total
Male
non-response 
some issues
5.6%
94.4
8.0%
92.0
5.4%
94.6
6.3%
93.8
20.8%
79.2
22.1%
77.9
25.8%
74.2
23.0%
77.0
Total (n) 107 100 129 336 53 77 66 196
X2=0.75; df=2; p=.688 X2=0.47; df=2; p=.790
Female 
non-response 
some issues
4.5
95.5
13.6
86.4
7.1
92.9
8.1
91.9
15.3
84.7
31.9
68.1
26.9
73.1
25.2
74.8
Total (n) 67 59 84 210 85 94 119 298
%2=3.65; df=2; p=.161 X2=6.86; df=2; p=.032
Interaction between prompting, political interest and sex: %2=.026; df=2; p=.987
Despite the strong effect found for women who showed little interest in politics, 
there was no significant interaction between prompting, political interest and sex 
(x2= 026; df=2; p= 987). The results suggest that including the specific examples in 
the preamble to the question may alter respondents’ interpretation of the question by 
widening its frame of reference. The fact that there is an even higher proportion of 
respondents who did not state an issue when they were prompted with the general 
examples than when they were not prompted at all may suggest that these examples 
led to a narrower frame of teference, confining possible responses to hard core 
political or economic issues and leading to a higher proportion of non-response, 
particularly among female respondents not interested in politics.
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5.5 Effect o f specific and general examples
If the interpretation that the general examples narrowed the frame of reference and 
the specific examples widened it is correct, one would not only expect to find 
differences in terms of non-response but also in the distribution of the actual issues 
mentioned and in the number of people assenting that the examples were the issues 
they were most concerned about. It has already been shown in table 5.3.2 that 
respondents in the group prompted with the specific items mentioned significantly 
more issues than respondents in the other two groups. The smaller proportion of 
respondents expressing no opinion when prompted with the specific examples can 
not be explained by these respondents being more likely to agree that the prompts 
were the issues they were most concerned about, but rather that they came up with a 
greater variety of issues. This result agrees with the interpretation that the specific 
examples opened up the frame of reference (see table 5.5.1).
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Table 5.5.1 Percent of respondents who say the prompts given in Wave
1 are the most important issues o f national importance
Interested in politics
specific general 
prompts prompts
total
Not interested in politics
specific general no 
prompts prompts prompts
Wave 1
non-response 5.2% 10.1% 7.5% 17.4% 27.5% 23.0%
other issues 16.7 10.1 13.5 7.2 5.3 6.1
the prompts 78.2 79.9 79.0 75.4 67.5 70.9
Total (n) 174 159 333 138 171 309
X2=5.36; df=2; p=.069 X2=4.58; df=2; p=. 101
Wave 2
non-response 7.3 7.4 7.3 22.6 28.2 25.6
other issues 84.0 72.8 78.7 72.6 58.5 65.0
the prompts 8.7 19.9 14.0 4.8 13.4 9.4
Total (n) 150 136 286 124 142 266
X2=7.52; df=2; p=.023 X2=7.98; df=2; p=.019
Wave 3
non-response 19.3 17.8 18.6 26.1 37.7 32.2
other issues 70.0 63.6 66.9 64.3 43.8 53.5
the prompts 10.7 18.6 14.5 9.6 18.5 14.3
Total (n) 140 129 269 115 130 245
X2=3.37; df=2; p= 185 X2= 10.73; df=2; p=.005
The pattern of responses in all waves depended to some extent on the type of 
prompting that was used in Wave 1. Respondents who were not interested in politics 
were less likely to have no opinion if they were prompted with specific rather than 
general examples. In Wave 1 this seemed to be due to their agreeing with the 
prompts, but in Waves 2 and 3 they were much more likely than the respondents 
who got the general examples to state issues other than the prompts as the most 
important. Type of prompting did not affect the proportion of non-response in any 
wave among respondents who were interested in politics, but in all cases, 
respondents who were given the specific examples were more likely to mention 
other issues than they were prompted with as the issues of national importance they
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were the most concerned about. This result certainly gives some support to the 
hypothesis that general examples, such as pay disputes and inflation narrow people’s 
interpretations of what kind of answers are acceptable, whereas specific examples 
convey the message that almost any kind of issues or problems will be taken as valid 
answers. This should also explain the lower reliability or stability in the group 
prompted with the specific examples, since the problems mentioned were of a more 
temporary nature than the general ones and can often be resolved within a short 
period of time, and thus lose their importance.
5.6 The most important issues and changes between waves
It has been suggested that attitude change produced by consistency pressures can be 
enduring on some occasions (cf. Rokeach, 1975), and that once a respondent has 
made a judgement s(he) is likely to retrieve that judgement and reuse it when 
rendering related judgements later (Lingle and Ostrom, 1979; Lingle, 1979). The 
analysis above suggests that the changes in responses between waves are, to some 
extent, affected by the experimental condition in Wave 1. As displayed in table 
5.3.3, respondents who were prompted were less likely to mention the same issue as 
the most important one in Waves 1 and 2 (that were approximately two weeks apart), 
and respondents prompted with the specific issues were less likely to give the same 
response than respondents prompted with the more general examples. Table 5.6.1 
shows that when asked what was the most important issue in the election campaign, 
respondents were more likely to mention the issue they thought was the most 
important in Wave 2 rather than the issue from Wave 1. As the table shows, 
prompting respondents in Wave 1 had a significant effect on the stability of 
responses and the respondents who were not prompted were much more likely to 
mention the same issue on all three occasions than the respondents prompted with 
the specific or the general examples.
Table 5.6.1 Stability of responses to the question about what are the
most important issues in Waves 1, 2, and 3, and 
experimental condition in Wave 1
Prompted: 
Albert/ 
nukes 
in Wave 1
Prompted: 
pay disp./ 
inflation 
in Wave 1
Not 
prompted 
in Wave 1
Total X2 df p n
Same response in 1 and 2 10.2% 22.3% 33.9% 23.0 °/< 48.1 2 .000 888
Same response in 1 and 3 12.9 20.5 27.1 20.7 17.4 2 .000 835
Same response in 2 and 3 23.9 30.9 29.9 28.4 3.7 2 .160 835
Same response in 1, 2 and 3 3.9 11.2 15.0 10.4 18.8 2 .000 835
Reliability of responses was by far the lowest in the group prompted with the 
specific issues. Only 3.9% of respondents in this group mentioned the same issue as 
the most important one in all three waves. This ratio was much higher in the group 
that was prompted with the general examples and in the group that was not 
prompted, or 11.2% and 15% respectively.
Loglinear analysis shows that the effects of prompting with general or specific 
examples depended on demographic variables, such as gender, age and education. 
When examining changes in responses between Waves 1 and 2, two four-way 
interactions were found to be statistically significant. The effects of prompting 
depended, firstly, on a combination of age and education (L.R.%2=9.60, df=4, 
p=.048), and secondly, on a combination of sex and education (L.R.%2=9.77, df=2, 
p=.008). Tables 5.6.2 and 5.6.3 show how stable responses in the experimental 
groups were between Waves 1 and 2, and table 5.6.4 shows the percentage of 
respondents who gave the same response in Waves 1, 2, and 3 and the effects of 
prompting, age and education thereupon.
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Table 5.6.2 Percent of respondents who give the same answer in Waves
1 and 2 and effects of prompting, age and education
Prompt Age Compulsory More than compulsory
education education
n n
Specific examples 18-30 17.9 28 13.4 67
General examples 18-30 28.6 21 23.4 64
No examples 18-30 41.7 36 24.6 69
Specific examples 31-50 8.6 * 35 6.0 * 83
General examples 31-50 27.1 59 15.9 82
No examples 31-50 41.0 61 34.5 87
Specific examples 51-70 13.8 29 6.3 * 32
General examples 51-70 34.6 26 11.5 26
No examples 51-70 21.3 47 47.2 36
* means that the effect of prompting was significant at the ,05 level in the age and educational group
marked. L.R%^stability*prompt*age*education=9.60, df=4, p= 048
Table 5.6.3 Percent of respondents who give the same answer in Waves
1 and 2 and effects of prompting, sex and education
Prompt Sex Compulsory More than compulsory
education education
n n
Specific examples female 19.3 57 9.2 * 76
General examples female 31.3 64 23.4 64
No examples female 31.7 82 42.2 83
Specific examples male 2.9 * 35 8.5 * 106
General examples male 26.2 42 14.8 108
No examples male 38.7 62 26.6 109
* means that the effect of prompting was significant at the .05 level in the sex and educational group 
marked. LR.X^stability*prompt*sex*education=9.77, df=2, p=.008
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Table 5.6.4 Percent of respondents who give the same answer in Waves
1, 2 and 3 and effects of prompting, age and education
Prompt Age Compulsory More than compulsory
education education
n n
Specific examples 1 8 -3 0 7 .4 2 7 6 .8 5 9
General examples 1 8 -3 0 1 5 .8 19 1 5 .3 5 9
No examples 1 8 -3 0 2 8 .6 3 5 9 .4 6 4
Specific examples 3 1 -5 0 3 .0 3 3 2 .5 * 7 9
General examples 3 1 -5 0 1 6 .4 5 5 5 .2 7 7
No examples 3 1 -5 0 1 8 .6 5 9 1 4 .5 83
Specific examples 5 1 -7 0 3 .8 2 6 0 .0 * 31
General examples 5 1 -7 0 1 6 .0 2 5 0 .0 2 4
No examples 5 1 -7 0 4 .5 4 4 1 9 .4 3 6
* effect of prompting was significant at the .05 level in the age and educational group marked.
L - R - X ^ s ta b i l i ty * p ro m p t* a g e * e d u c a t io n = 1 4 .6 5 , d f= 4 , p = .0 0 6
If specific issues or occurrences are taken as valid answers to the question about 
which issues of national importance people are most concerned about, which indeed 
they must be when such issues are used as examples in the preamble to the question, 
one would expect much more frequent shifts or changes within such a framework. 
The general issues or problems are of a different kind, because they do not disappear 
and are never irrevocably solved, although they are not equally serious at all times. 
Thus if people are concerned about inflation in March, it is highly likely that they 
will also be concerned about inflation in April, and much more likely that concerns 
about such matters will be relatively persistent compared with matters such as a 
minister being fired (as in the Albert affair).
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5.7  Conclusion
It seems fair to argue that people generally do not have a very strong feeling about 
which issues of national importance are the most important ones, since almost a fifth 
of respondents were unable to answer the question (although this proportion varies 
somewhat). Respondents who were not prompted and respondents who were 
prompted with general issues were likely to give a response that was at a very 
general political-economic level, whereas respondents prompted with the specific 
examples gave much more divergent responses and at a different level of abstraction.
Beliefs about which national issues are most important are probably in most cases 
what Abelson (1986) calls ‘distal beliefs’, i.e., beliefs ‘about objects only remotely 
experienced or not sensibly verifiable’ (p. 229). He contends that people often 
express an opinion they don’t really have but have merely borrowed. Factors that are 
instrumental in changing the status of a belief from being ‘borrowed’ towards being 
‘possessed’ are, according to Abelson’s (1986) theory: public commitment to a 
belief, suffering for a belief, explaining a belief, elaborating a belief, or tracing its 
origins, defending a belief, attributing longevity to a belief, and becoming aware of 
the value of a belief. For many people the question of what may be the most 
important problem facing the nation never arises, and thus they are unlikely to 
‘possess’ an opinion. It is a lot easier to say simply that you agree than having to 
come up with some issues yourself that you may or may not have considered before. 
Hence these people are likely to ‘borrow’ the prompts from the question and use 
them as their answer. However, people who are generally interested in politics and 
follow what is going on in government and public affairs are more likely to have 
discussed the matter, explained a particular belief, defended their point of view, etc., 
and as a consequence, are more likely to ‘possess’ a belief concerning the most 
important issues. People who possess a belief and are committed to it should be more 
likely to resist persuasive attacks and thus, should also be less likely to be influenced
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by the examples they are presented with. The results above lend very meagre support 
to this view. Those respondents interested in politics (follow what is going on in 
government and public affairs most of the time) were only slightly less likely (85.4% 
of those who mentioned at least one issue) than respondents who were not so 
interested in politics (92%) to agree to the prompts as the issues of national 
importance they were most concerned about. Political interest, however, did not 
seem to have any effect on the stability or reliability between waves, although one 
would according to Abelson’s (1986) theory, expect someone who ‘possesses’ a 
belief to show more consistency in responses than a person who merely ‘borrows’ 
one.
Type of prompting was found to affect stability of responses in such a way that 
respondents prompted with the specific examples were found to be less likely to say 
that they had no opinion on which issues were the most important in Wave 1. They 
were not, however, more likely to ‘borrow’ the prompts than respondents who got 
the general examples. In Wave 2, the main difference between the two groups that 
were prompted was that the respondents prompted with the specific examples were 
much more likely to proclaim issues other than the prompts the most important ones. 
This result, along with no differences found between the group prompted with the 
general examples and the group not prompted at all, strongly suggest that the 
specific examples had an effect on the interpretation of the question by widening its 
frame of reference.
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6Context effects on attitudes towards abortion and 
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear 
weapons
6.1 Introduction
Attitude questions, especially general questions that ask for a global judgement, have 
been shown to be quite susceptible to the context within which they are asked. 
Tourangeau and Rasinski (1986) found that it was possible to increase or decrease 
the probability of respondents giving a favourable response to an attitude question by 
asking them if they agreed or disagreed with attitudinal assertions that were either 
pro- or anti-attitudinal. Various researchers have shown that this susceptibilty to the 
context is often mediated by factors such as attitude strength, knowledge of the 
subject, involvement, etc. (see discussion in chapter 1 and Tourangeau and Rasinski, 
1988), and Tourangeau and Rasinski (1986) demonstrated that respondents with 
mixed views on the issue were more easily influenced by the context than partisan 
respondents.
In the experiments reported here, emphasis was laid on 1) measuring the strength 
and ambivalence of the attitude, 2) collecting base rate data to see how the context 
can affect reliability of attitude questions, and 3) selecting issues with different 
levels of agreement and variance, i.e., abortion, an issue on which one can expect 
substantial disagreement and thus large variance, and attitudes towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons, an issue on which one can expect a greater 
uniformity of opinion, and thus a smaller variance.
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6.2 Context effect on attitude towards abortion
Table 6.2.1 shows the association between the abortion question and the pro-/anti- 
context items.
Table 6.2.1 Abortion by context
pro-context
Context
anti-context Total
favour strongly 8.4% 11.3% 9.9%
favour 29.2 20.1 24.6
neither-nor 4.0 7.8 5.9
oppose 27.2 21.6 24.4
oppose strongly 31.2 39.2 35.2
Total (n) 202 204 406
X2= 10.04, df=4, p=.04
Size of effect (favour strongly): -2.9%
Size of effect (oppose strongly): 8.0%
The context effects in table 6.2.1. are not very clear, albeit statistically significant. 
Tourangeau (1986) found that respondents who disagree with the context items tend 
to show what he calls backfire effects, that is, respondents engage in counterarguing 
and give a response opposite to the one predicted, i.e., respondents disagree with the 
context items and give their response to the abortion question in accordance with 
their disagreement. The figures in table 6.2.1 suggest that a backfire effect may have 
been operating in the anti-context group, where 11.3% (n12=23) of respondents said 
they strongly favoured abortion on demand, as opposed to 8.4% (nn=17) in the pro­
context group. It is obvious in table 6.2.1 that there were no great differences in the 
proportion of respondents favouring or opposing abortion depending on which of the 
two context groups they belong to. This can be seen more clearly in table 6.2.2 
(respondents who gave the middle response are excluded).
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Table 6.2.2 Abortion (dichotomous) by context
Context
pro-context anti-context Total
favour 39.2% 34.0% 36.6%
oppose 60.8 66.0 63.4
Total (n) 194 188 382
X2=1.08, df=l, p=.30 
Size of effect: 5.2%
A quick glance at table 6.2.2 would suggest that although the context may well shift 
responses in such a way that respondents expressed their opinions with more or less 
intensity according to the context within which the abortion question was asked, it 
certainly did not have such a strong effect that respondents changed their response 
from favour to oppose or vice versa. Although the differences between the pro- and 
anti-context groups were in the predicted direction, a difference of 5.2% is no more 
than one would expect by chance within such a small sample (n=382). Furthermore, 
the groups may well have been biased in this direction before they were presented 
with the different context items. This is in fact what can be seen in table 6.2.3. It has 
to be emphasised that the context items cannot be the cause o f the slight 
differences (3.4%) that are found in table 6.2.3, since the abortion question was 
asked in the first interview whereas the context items appeared in the third 
interview, a month later.
Table 6.2.3 Abortion (base rate question) by context6
Context
pro-context anti-context Total
favour 36.7% 33.3% 35.0%
oppose 63.3 66.7 65.0
Total (n) 199 192 391
%2=0.48, df=l, p=.49
6 Responses to the abortion question were collected a month before responses to the context items, so the 
context can have had no effect on reported attitudes towards abortion.
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Although the context can only have affected responses to the abortion question in 
table 6.2.2, a comparison between tables 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 reveals that the tables are 
almost identical and the differences are no more than one would expect to find in a 
simple test-retest design with no changes in the questionnaire. This leads to two 
possible, but rival, interpretations. The first is that the context items had absolutely 
no effect on which side respondents advocated. The second interpretation is more 
complicated and calls for more complicated analysis of the data, i.e., the context had 
an effect on individual responses but has cancelled itself out in the overall sample. 
Thus, the latter explanation suggests that two different effects, each of which have 
been identified by Tourangeau (1986), were operating, i.e., priming (assimilation or 
consistency) and backfire (contrast) effects, that is, some respondents moved in the 
predicted direction while others moved in the opposite direction. In order to choose 
between the two interpretations it is necessary to look at the effects of the context on 
the target question, taking into account such variables as the base rate data, and the 
background variables, sex, education, and age to see if any of these variables 
conditioned the effect of the context.
Table 6.2.4 Abortion by context, controlling for responses to the base
rate question
Response to base rate question 
Favour Oppose
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
favour strongly 2 2 .9 % 2 5 .0 % 2 3 .9 % 0 .8 % 5 .5 % 3 .2 %
favour 5 8 .6 4 2 .2 5 0 .7 1 3 .6 6 .3 9 .9
neither-nor 2 .9 6 .3 4 .5 3 .2 6 .3 4 .8
oppose 1 2 .9 17 .2 1 4 .9 3 3 .6 2 3 .6 2 8 .6
oppose strongly 2 .9 9 .4 6 .0 4 8 .8 5 8 .3 5 3 .6
Total (n) 7 0 6 4 13 4 125 1 2 7 2 5 2
X2 = 5 .4 9 ,  d f= 4 ,  p=.24 X2=12.31, d f ^ 4 ,  p=.02
cells with E.F.<5= 4 of 10 (40%) cells with E.F.<5=2 of 10 (20%)
Size of effect (favour strongly): -2.1% Size of effect (favour strongly): -4.7%
Size of effect (oppose strongly): 6.5% Size o f effect (oppose strongly): 9.5%
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Although only one of the subtables in table 6.2.4 has resulted in a significant chi- 
square, the overall pattern is quite similar. Only 134 respondents gave a favourable 
response to the abortion question in the first interview and with 40% of the cells with 
an expected frequency less than 5, the chi-square statistic is not very reliable because 
of the fact that the sampling distribution of the test statistic approximates the 
sampling distribution given in the chi-square table only when N is large. Thus, it is 
worth looking at the same cross-tabulation with the target question coded as a 
dichotomy to see if a clearer picture can be obtained (see table 6.2.5).
Table 6.2.5 Abortion (dichotomous) by context, controlling for
responses to the base rate question
Response to base rate question
Favour Oppose
pro- anti- Total pro- anti- Total
context context context context
favour 83.8% 71.7% 78.1% 14.9% 12.6% 13.8%
oppose 16.2 28.3 21.9 85.1 87.4 86.3
Total (n) 68 60 128 121 119 240
3C2=2.76, df=l, p=.10 %2=0.26, df=l, p=.61
Size of effect: 12.1% Size of effect: 2.3%
An interesting difference between tables 6.2.4 and 6.2.5 is that one might be tempted
to conclude from table 6.2.4 that respondents who were originally opposed to
abortion were more easily influenced by the context, whereas table 6.2.5 might lead 
one to the opposite conclusion, i.e., that respondents who were in favour of abortion 
on demand were more easily influenced. Of course, closer inspection of the tables 
shows that neither conclusion can be justified without some further support. It seems 
to be the case that those respondents who favoured abortion initially were more 
likely to change sides, whereas those who opposed abortion in the first interview 
were more likely to polarize their responses under the anti-abortion condition and 
give a stronger response, thus giving grounds for the two different conclusions.
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Although the changes in response to the abortion question were in the predicted 
direction for those respondents who expressed a favourable attitude towards abortion 
in the first interview, there was still quite a high proportion of respondents who 
changed their response from favour to oppose in the pro-abortion context, or 16.2% 
(11 respondents), and this has to be explained. In the other group (respondents who 
were opposed to abortion on demand in the first interview), there was only a 
negligible difference between the proportions of respondents who change their 
opinions from oppose to favour under the two different conditions, or, 14.9% and 
12.6% in the pro- and anti-context conditions respectively. Again, there is no way of 
choosing between the two possible explanations: either people’s attitudes towards 
abortion on demand are generally unstable or the two effects, priming and backfire 
(assimilation and contrast) mentioned above are in operation for different 
respondents. Thus, other variables have to be introduced in order to identify the 
different groups.
Tourangeau (1988) has suggested a few variables that may affect the size and the 
direction of context effects. Among these are strength of the attitude and expertise or 
involvement of respondents. Tourangeau claims that partisan respondents, or 
respondents with strong views, are not affected by the context because prior items 
cannot prime beliefs that respondents do not have and, in the same vein, prior items 
will not affect responses if they prime beliefs that would have been retrieved 
anyway. This could well explain the consistency effect due to priming, but it can not 
at the same time explain the backfire effect, which Tourangeau and Rasinski (1986) 
believe to be due to counterarguing. Expertise or involvement seems to be a more 
promising factor in this case, but since we do not have any measure of expertise or 
involvement, it is necessary to make a few assumptions. Tourangeau and Rasinski do 
not mention the effect (or absence of effect) of such variables as sex, education, and 
age, but it is not unreasonable to assume that women show more involvement in 
such issues as abortion, although not necessarily more expertise than do men.
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Involvement in an issue refers to how much respondents care about it, but expertise 
to how much they know about it (Fiske et al, 1981). If this is true, one would expect 
male respondents to show the predicted consistency effect, but not women. But a 
question remains: Would one expect women to show backfire effects? Table 6.2.6 
shows the effect of context for male and female respondents separately.
Table 6.2.6 Abortion (dichotomous) by context, controlling for sex
Sex
Male Female
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
favour 52.0% 37.5% 44.9% 25.5% 30.4% 28.0%
oppose 48.0 62.5 55.1 74.5 69.6 72.0
Total (n) 100 96 196 94 92 186
X^=4.16, d f = l ,  p=.04 % 2 = 0 .5 5 , d f = l ,  p=.46
Size of effect: 14.5% Size of effect: -4.9%
Table 6.2.6 shows that the context does produce the expected consistency effect 
among male respondents, but not among the female respondents. The subtable for 
women shows a trend in the backfire direction, but this trend was small (4.9%) and 
statistically nonsignificant. Thus, we have taken the first step towards identifying 
who was affected by the context and who was not.
Schuman and Presser (1981) suggest that the conservative position is held with more 
passion by its supporters than is the liberal position by its supporters. Thus, if the 
abortion opponents hold their attitude with greater fervour than do the abortion 
supporters, one would, according to Tourangeau and Rasinski (1986, 1988), expect 
those who expressed a favourable attitude towards abortion on demand in the initial 
interview to be more susceptible to the different contexts in the subsequent
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interview. Schuman and Presser (1981), on the other hand claim that this is not 
necessarily so. They hypothesize that crystallization (as operationalized by over-time 
reliability and is highly correlated with intensity of attitude) of an attitude may be a 
major factor in explaining random measurement errors, that is, random measurement 
errors are, at least in part, a function of low attitude strength or poor crystallization. 
They also claim that ‘random measurement error and systematic form effects may be 
fundamentally different in origin, and that only the former is due to poorly 
crystallized attitudes’ (pp. 268-269). However, Schuman and Presser do not hold this 
view very strongly, because of the limited evidence they have to support it, but 
present it as an hypothesis to be tested.
Before turning to the issue of strength of the attitude towards abortion on demand, it 
is worth looking at table 6.2.7a that shows the effect of context on responses to the 
abortion question for men, controlling for responses to the base rate question, and 
table 6.2.7b that shows the association of the same variables for women.
Table 6.2.7a Abortion (dichotomous) by context, controlling for base-rate
attitude towards abortion. Male respondents only.
Response to base rate question 
Favour Oppose
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
favour 91.5% 73.3% 84.4% 15.7% 15.3% 15.5%
oppose 8.5 26.7 15.6 84.3 84.7 84.5
Total (n) 47 30 77 51 59 110
X2=4.59, df=l, p=.03 df=l, p=.95
Size of effect: 18.2% Size of effect: 0.4%
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Table 6.2.7b Abortion (dichotomous) by context, controlling for base-rate 
attitude towards abortion. Female respondents only
Response to base rate question 
Favour Oppose
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
favour 66.7% 70.0% 68.6% 14.3% 10.0% 12.3%
oppose 33.3 30.0 31.4 85.7 90.0 87.7
Total (n) 21 30 51 70 60 130
%2=0.06, df=l, p= 80 3C2=0.55, df=l, p=. 46
Size of effect: 3.3% Size o f effect: 4.3%
As can be seen in tables 6.2.7a and 6.2.7b, only one of the four groups seems to have 
been affected by the context, i.e., male respondents who initially said they favoured 
abortion on demand (x2=4.59, p=.0322). Although the response pattern for women 
who gave a favourable response to abortion in the first interview was in the direction 
of a backfire effect, i.e., 33.3% (7 respondents) of respondents in the pro-context 
group opposed abortion in the second interview, as opposed to 30% (9 respondents) 
under the anti-context condition, this difference was very small and far from being 
significant. The differences that are found for respondents who opposed abortion in 
the initial interview were in the predicted direction, but they were negligible, non­
significant, and did not show any evidence of a context effect. This result gives 
support to two hypotheses: 1) the conservative attitude (opposition to abortion on 
demand) was held with greater fervour than the liberal position, (further support for 
this is given in table 6.2.8.), 2) women were probably more involved in this issue, 
and thus less likely to be influenced by the different contexts, than were men.
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Table 6.2.8 Attitude towards abortion by strength
Strength o f attitude 
Strong vs. vague Very strong vs. not very strong
Strong Vague Total Very
strong
Not very 
strong
Total
favour 3 4 .0 % 5 1 .9 % 3 6 .5 % 2 7 .8 % 4 3 .5 % 3 6 .5 %
oppose 6 6 .0 4 8 .1 6 3 .5 7 2 .2 5 6 .5 6 3 .5
Total (n) 3 2 4 5 4 3 7 8 1 6 9 2 0 9 3 7 8
%2 = 6 .4 0 ,  d f = l ,  p=.01 X2 = 9 .9 7 ,  d f=  1, p= 00
Table 6.2.8. has two subtables in order to emphasize that the majority of respondents 
who reported feeling very strongly about the matter of abortion were opposed to 
abortion on demand, whereas the majority of those who reported holding a vague 
attitude favoured abortion on demand. Thus, as mentioned above, this lends support 
to the hypothesis that the conservative attitude was held with greater fervour than the 
more liberal attitude favouring abortion on demand.
Another variable that might condition the effects of the context is age of 
respondents. Many studies have found that younger adults may have weaker and 
more changeable attitudes than older adults (cf. Glenn, 1980; Sears, 1981, 1986). 
Although many studies suggest that susceptibility to persuasive messages does to 
some extent depend on age, there is not full agreement among researchers whether, 
or what kind of relationship there is between attitude change and age. Sears (1981) 
has grouped hypotheses dealing with this issue into four major categories:
1) The lifelong-openness notion, suggesting that people at all ages have 
the same potential for attitude change, i.e., that there is no relation 
between attitude change and age.
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2) The life-cycle hypothesis suggests that people’s attitudinal position 
may to some extent depend on their age or life stage (for example that 
young people may be more liberal but become conservative as they grow 
older), thus predicting an interaction between age and attitudinal 
position.
3) The impressionable-years hypothesis suggests that adolescents and 
young adults may be more likely to change any of their attitudes, than 
older adults, given strong enough pressure. Hence, this view asserts an 
interaction between persuasibility and age, irrespective of attitudinal 
position.
4) The final hypothesis is persistence. This view suggests that there is a 
simple relationship between attitude change, or rather attitude formation 
and age, with attitude change most likely to occur in the preadult years 
while they are being formulated, and the resulting attitudes becoming 
relatively immune from change in later years.
Table 6.2.9 shows how the context effect was conditioned by the age of the
respondents.
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Table 6.2.9 Abortion (dichotomous) by context, controlling for age
pro-context
Context
anti-context Total
18-30 years
favour 49.2% 24.6% 36.3%
oppose 50.8 75.4 63.7
Total (n) 59 65 124
%2=8.05 df=l, p=.00
Size of effect: 24.6%
31-50 years
favour 37.9 40.7 39.2
oppose 62.1 59.3 60.8
Total (n) 95 81 176
X2=0.15 df=l, p=.70
Size of effect: -2.8%
51-70 years
favour 27.5 35.7 31.7
oppose 72.5 64.3 68.3
Total (n) 40 42 82
X2=0.64 df=l, p=.42
Size of effect: -8.2%
The results in table 6.2.9 do not confirm the lifelong-openness hypothesis, that there 
is no relation between attitude change and age, nor do they seem to confirm the life­
cycle hypothesis stating that there is an association between attitudinal position and 
age, although this can not be contended with confidence without taking into account 
the base-rate data for the attitude question. This is because the possibility remains 
that the youngest age group was the most liberal in the initial interview, but because 
this age group is the only one that seems to have been affected by the context, the 
results in table 6.2.9 may be misleading with respect to the life-cycle hypothesis. If 
this is so, it suggests a combination of the life-cycle hypothesis and the 
impressionable-years hypothesis which states that younger adults have more 
changeable attitudes than older adults. Whether or not the persistence hypothesis is
214
refuted or confirmed by these data, is debatable and depending on where we put the 
limits between adulthood and preadulthood.
Table 6.2.10 Abortion (dichotomous, base-rate question) by age
18-30
Age
31-50 51-70 Total
favour 42.1% 38.8% 26.5% 37.2%
oppose 57.9 61.2 73.5 62.8
Total (n) 318 436 211 965
X2=14.04, df=l, p=.000
Table 6.2.10 depicts a monotonic relation between attitudinal position and age, with 
the youngest respondents being the most likely to support abortion on demand 
(although the majority of respondents in all age groups were opposed to abortion on 
demand). Hence, this result provides evidence for the life-cycle hypothesis, claiming 
that age affects attitudinal position. Taken together, tables 6.2.9 and 6.2.10 show that 
the youngest age group was the most likely to respond in favour of abortion, in the 
absence of any pressure to do otherwise, but these respondents were also the most 
likely to change their response to make it consistent with responses to related 
questions. The most probable explanation for this is the above mentioned idea, that 
the life-cycle hypothesis and the impressionable-years hypothesis are both true to a 
certain extent.
The relation between the final variable, education, and attitude change has caused 
considerable confusion among researchers. It is often assumed that education will be 
positively related to response consistency over time, a thesis proposed by Converse 
in his early writings (cf. 1964), but largely withdrawn by him at a later point (1975).
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As Bishop et al. (1980) point out, it seems reasonable to believe that education 
should affect attitude stability because higher education is commonly seen as 
encouraging people to relate issues to each other and to be consistent in their 
thinking. Indeed, if higher education does encourage people to relate issues and to be 
consistent, one might also expect more educated respondents to be more susceptible 
to different contexts. Obviously, with respect to attitude stability, these two 
hypotheses may often be in contradiction with one another (i.e., if changes are made 
in the questionnaire); the former stating that highly educated respondents should 
exhibit greater reliability in responses; the latter suggesting that the responses given 
by highly educated respondents should be more influenced by the context within 
which the questions are asked. This, and the relationship between sex, age and 
education may well contribute to the conflicting results that have been found with 
respect to the association between education and attitude change.
In addition, in the case of abortion, less educated respondents have been found to 
feel more strongly about the issue than more educated respondents (Schuman and 
Presser, 1981).
The relationship between attitude towards abortion, context and education is 
presented in table 6.2.11.
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Table 6.2.11 Abortion (dichotomous) by context, controlling for 
education
Education
Compulsory More than compulsory
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
favour 27.3% 30.4% 28.8% 47.0% 36.1% 41.5%
oppose 72.7 69.6 71.2 53.0 63.9 58.5
Total (n) 77 69 146 117 119 236
X2=0.18, df=l, p=.67 X2=2.87, df=l, p=.09
Size of effect: -3.1% Size o f effect: 10.9%
As can be seen in table 6.2.11, the context had no effect on responses to the attitude 
question among respondents with compulsory education only, but, although not very 
significant, had an effect in the predicted direction among respondents with more 
than compulsory education.
It is apparent from the above analysis that all the variables mentioned (sex, age, 
education, and strength of attitude) had a bearing on the relationship between context 
and attitude towards abortion on demand. Thus, it is important to see how these 
variables were interrelated. In order to do that a selection of logit models were fitted.
6.3 Logit analysis o f attitudes towards abortion, context and strength 
of attitude.
Unfortunately the sample was too small to be broken down by all the variables, i.e., 
the target question attitude towards abortion, the base-rate question about attitudes 
towards abortion, context, sex, education, age of respondents (coded into three 
groups), and strength of attitude towards abortion.
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Many theorists have suggested that attitude stability and resistance to change depend 
to a large extent on the strength of the attitude (Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1986; 
1988; Schuman and Presser, 1981; Schuman, Presser and Ludwig, 1981; Sears, 
1981; Converse, 1976), that is, the stronger people feel about a particular issue, the 
less likely they are to be affected by contextual variations. Although it has already 
been shown that respondents with very strong attitudes were much more likely to 
oppose abortion on demand (x2=9.97, p= 002, n=378) and that those who opposed 
abortion in the first wave were less likely to be influenced by the context (see table 
6.2.5), it is not clear from the above analysis whether there was a significant 
interaction between these variables. To test whether these interactions were 
significant logit models were fitted to the variables attitude towards abortion (target 
question), the base-rate attitude towards abortion, context, and strength of attitude. 
The strength variable was coded onto two categories, i.e., ‘very strong’ vs. ‘not very 
strong’. Ther were 5 response alternatives in the original variable, ranging from 
‘very strong’ to ‘very vague’, but because only 54 of the 378 respondents said they 
did not have a strong attitude towards abortion it seemed to be more fruitful to code 
the variable into the two categories ‘very strong’ and ‘not very strong’. Goodness-of- 
fit statistics for three basic models are shown in table 6.3.1. The models are: 1) a 
model of independence; 2) a model including all main effects; and 3) a model with 
all two-way interactions.
Table 6.3.1 Goodness-of-flt statistics for attitude towards abortion -
with abortion (base-rate measure), context, and strength of 
attitude as explanatory variables
Model chi-square DF Significance conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Independence 167.06 7 .000
Main effects 7.15 4 .128 159.91 3 .000
Two-way interactions 3.12 1 .077 4.03 3 <.20
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Table 6.3.2 shows the significant tests for the main effects. The only variable that 
had a significant main effect on attitude towards abortion in the second study, is the 
answer to the same question in Wave 1.
Table 6.3.2 Significance test for main effects of abortion (base-rate
measure), context, and strength of attitude on attitude 
towards abortion
Effect deleted 
from main effects 
model in 
table 6.3.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Strength
Context
Abortion (base-rate)
8.20
9.34
155.93
5 .146 
5 .096 
5 .000
1.05
2.20
148.79
1 <.500 
1 <.200 
1 .000
None of the two-way interactions (table 6.3.3) reached significance, although both
the interaction between the base-rate attitude and strength of attitude, and the
interaction between context and strength approached significance (p<.20).
Table 6.3.3 Significance test for two-way interactions between abortion 
(base-rate measure), context, and strength of attitude
Effect added to 
main effects 
model in 
table 6.3.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Base-rate x context 
Base rate x strength 
Context x strength
6.53
5.47
5.12
3 .088 
3 .140 
3 .163
0.61
1.67
2.02
1 <.50 
1 <.20 
1 <.20
Although none of the two-way interactions were statistically significant, the changes 
in attitude towards abortion in relation to strength of attitude and context were in the 
predicted direction (see table 6.3.4.). The fit for the model with all two-way
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interactions shows that the three-way interaction between attitude towards abortion 
(base-rate), context, and, strength of attitude was significant (%2=3.12, df=l, p=.077).
Table 6.3.4 Changes in attitude towards abortion between studies,
broken down by context and strength of attitude
Context Strength of attitude Direction of change Number and % of respondents 
who change their response
Predicted direction
pro-context very strong oppose - favour 6(11.11%)
pro-context not very strong oppose - favour 12(18.18%)
anti-context very strong favour- oppose 4 (16.67%)
anti-context not very strong favour- oppose 13(36.11%)
Opposite direction
pro-context very strong favour- oppose 5 (26.32%)
pro-context not very strong favour- oppose 6 (12.24%)
anti-context very strong oppose - favour 6 (8.57%)
anti-context not very strong oppose - favour 8 (16.67%)
A total of 12.57% of respondents with ‘very strong* attitudes, changed their response 
between waves in the predicted or the opposite direction. The equivalent figure was 
19.6% for respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes. Thus, respondents with ‘very 
strong’ attitudes towards abortion were, first of all, more likely to oppose abortion 
on demand than respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes. Secondly, respondents 
who oppose abortion on demand were less likely to change their response as a result 
of different contexts. Thirdly, respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes were more 
likely to change their response to make it consistent with responses to the context 
items, and finally respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes were more likely to 
change their response, irrespective of whether the change was in the predicted, or the 
opposite direction. The only cell in table 6.3.4. that deviated from the predictions 
made was the cell for respondents with ‘very strong’ attitudes, who changed their 
response from favour to oppose under the pro-context condition. This might suggest 
that respondents with ‘very strong’ attitudes were more likely to show a backfire 
effect under the pro-context condition, than were respondents with ‘not very strong’
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attitudes. On the other hand, this might well have been due to random fluctuations, 
since only 19 respondents with very strong attitudes in the pro-context condition said 
they favoured abortion on demand in the first study.
Table 6.3.5 shows the parameters for the saturated model.
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Table 6.3.5 X-parameters, log-odds, odds, predicted, and actual
proportion of respondents saying they favour abortion on 
demand, based on the saturated model for the variables: 
attitude towards abortion (target), base-rate attitude, 
context, and strength of attitude
EFFECT
LEVEL
A,-para-
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Attitude towards abortion
1. Favour abortion -.149 -0.298 0.743 0.426 0.361
Attitude by base-rate attitude
1. Favour .796 1.592 3.650 0.785 0.781
2. Oppose -.796 -1.592 0.151 0.131 0.134
Attitude by context
1. Pro-context .076 0.152 0.864 0.464 0.399
2. Anti-context -.076 -0.152 0.638 0.390 0.320
Attitude by strength of attitude
1. Very strong -.077 -0.154 0.636 0.389 0.275
2. Not very strong .077 0.154 0.866 0.464 0.432
Attitude by base-rate attitude by context 
1.1. Favour - pro-context .027 0.053 4.480 0.818 0.838
1.2. Favour - anti-context -.027 -0.053 2.974 0.748 0.717
2.1. Oppose - pro-context -.027 -0.053 0.167 0.143 0.150
2.2. Oppose - anti-context .027 0.053 0.137 0.120 0.119
Attitude by base-rate attitude by strength 
1.1. Favour - very strong .090 0.179 3.741 0.789 0.791
1.2. Favour - not very strong -.090 -0.179 3.561 0.781 0.776
2.1. Oppose - very strong -.090 -0.179 0.108 0.098 0.097
2.2. Oppose - not very strong .090 0.179 0.211 0.174 0.175
Attitude by context by strength
1.1. Pro-context - very strong -.112 -0.225 0.592 0.372 0.274
1.2. Pro-context - not very strong .112 0.225 1.262 0.558 0.478
2.1. Anti-context - very strong .112 0.225 0.685 0.406 0.277
2.2. Anti-context - not very strong -.112 -0.225 0.595 0.373 0.369
Attitude by base-rate attitude by context by strength 
1.1.1. Favour - pro - very strong -.135 -0.27012 2.800 0.737 0.737
1.1.2. Favour - pro - n. v. strong .135 0.27012 7.167 0.878 0.878
1.2.1. Favour - anti - very strong .135 0.27012 5.000 0.833 0.833
1.2.2. Favour - anti - n. v. strong -.135 -0.27012 1.769 0.639 0.639
2.1.1. Oppose - pro - very strong .135 0.27012 0.125 0.111 0.111
2.1.2. Oppose - pro - n. v. strong -.135 -0.27012 0.222 0.182 0.182
2.2.1. Oppose - anti - very strong -.135 -0.27012 0.094 0.086 0.086
2.2.2. Oppose - anti - n. v. strong .135 0.27012 0.200 0.167 0.167
Size of effect: Base rate attitude favourable: Very strong: -9.6% Not very strong: 23.9%
Size of effect: Base rate attitude unfavourable: Very strong: 2.5% Not very strong: 1.5%
The results in table 6.3.5 show that only those respondents who had a favourable and 
not very strong attitude towards abortion showed the expected consistency effect, the 
size of which was very substantial or 23.9%. Respondents who had a strong
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favourable attitude towards abortion showed a contrast effect, but opponents of 
abortion on demand showed no effect at all, whether they had very strong or not very 
strong attitudes.
6.4 Logit analysis o f the effects o f context, and background variables, 
on attitudes towards abortion
In order to find the model that best describes the data, four basic models were fitted
to the variables attitude towards abortion (target question), base-rate attitude,
context, sex, and education:
1) Model of independence, i.e., attitude towards abortion is independent of 
all the other variables in the model.
2) Model including all main effects, i.e., all explanatory variables have an 
effect on attitude towards abortion, while this effect does not depend on the 
level of other independent variables.
3) All two-way interactions included, i.e., the effect of independent variables 
depends on the level of other independent variables.
4) All three-way interactions included, i.e., the effect of independent
variables depends on the combined levels of pairs of other independent
variables.
Table 6.4.1 shows the goodness-of-fit statistics for the four basic models
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Table 6.4.1 Goodness-of-fit statistics for attitude towards abortion -
with abortion (base-rate measure), context, sex and 
education as explanatory variables
Model Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Independence 179.88 15 .000
Main effects 17.94 11 .083 161.94 4 .000
Two-way interactions 12.24 5 .032 5.69 6 <.500
Three-way interactions 1.58 1 .201 10.66 4 <.050
As table 6.4.1 shows, the fit of the main effects and the two-way interaction models 
is not very good. This, and the substantial improvement that is found when the three- 
way interactions are added, suggests that there is at least one significant three-way 
interaction. Significance tests for individual main effects are presented in table 6.4.2, 
for two-way interactions in table 6.4.3, and for three-way interactions in table 6.4.4.
Table 6.4.2 Significance test for main effects of abortion (base-rate
measure), context, sex, and education on attitude towards 
abortion
Effect deleted 
from main effects 
model in 
table 6.4.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Abortion 161.25 12 .000 143.31 1 .000
Context 20.11 12 .065 2.17 1 <.200
Sex 20.76 12 .054 2.82 1 <.100
Education 19.42 12 .079 1.49 1 <.300
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Table 6.4.3 Significance test for two-way interactions between abortion
(base-rate measure), context, sex, and education
Effect added to 
main effects 
model in 
table 6.4.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Base-rate x context 17.39 10 .066 0.55 1 <.500
Base-rate x sex 16.94 10 .076 1.00 1 <.500
Base-rate x education 17.75 10 .059 0.19 1 <.700
Context x sex 17.54 10 .063 0.40 1 <.700
Context x education 14.44 10 .154 3.50 1 <.100
Sex x education 17.62 10 .062 0.31 1 <.700
Table 6.4.4 Significance test for three-way interactions between
abortion (base-rate measure), context, sex, and education
Effect added to Chi-square 
two-way inter­
actions model in 
table 6.4.1.
DF Significance Conditional DF 
chi-square
Significance
Base-rate x context x sex 9.78 4 .044 2.46 1 <.200
Base-rate x context x education 10.04 4 .040 2.20 1 <.200
Base-rate x sex x education 11.79 4 .019 0.45 1 <.700
Context x sex x education 6.39 4 .172 5.86 1 <.020
As table 6.4.4 shows, there was a highly significant interaction between context, sex, 
and education. The effect of the base-rate attitude towards abortion, on the other 
hand, was not conditioned by any of the background variables (see tables 6.4.3, and 
6.4.4). Hence the best model is the model with the main effects of the base-rate 
attitude, context, sex, and education, the two-way interaction between context and 
education, two-way interaction between context and sex, two way interaction 
between sex and education and finally the three-way interaction between context, 
sex, and education (Goodness-of-fit: x2=7.34, df=7, p=.395). The parameters for this 
model are presented in table 6.4.5.
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Table 6.4.5 ^-parameters, log-odds, odds, predicted, and actual
proportion of respondents saying they favour abortion on 
demand, based on a model with a main effect of base rate 
attitude, and a three-way interaction between context, sex, 
and education
EFFECT A.-para- 
LEVEL meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Attitude towards abortion (target)
1. Favour -.189 -0.378 0.685 0.407 0.361
Attitude by base-rate attitude
1. Favour .806 1.612 3.435 0.775 0.781
2. Oppose -.806 -1.612 0.137 0.120 0.138
Attitude by context
1. Pro-context .073 0.147 0.794 0.442 0.397
2. Anti-context -.073 -0.147 0.592 0.372 0.324
Attitude by sex
1. Male .140 0.280 0.906 0.475 0.439
2. Female -.140 -0.280 0.518 0.341 0.282
Attitude by education
1. Compulsory -.106 -0.212 0.554 0.357 0.266
2. More than compulsory .106 0.212 0.847 0.459 0.419
Attitude by context by sex
1.1. Pro-context - male .095 0.190 1.270 0.559 0.520
1.2. Pro-context - female -.095 -0.190 0.496 0.332 0.264
2.1. Anti-context - male -.095 -0.190 0.647 0.393 0.348
2.2. Anti-context - female .095 0.190 0.541 0.351 0.300
Attitude by context by education
1.1. Pro-context - compulsory -.149 -0.299 0.476 0.323 0.270
1.2. Pro-context - m. than comp. .149 0.299 1.323 0.570 0.478
2.1. Anti-context - compulsory .149 0.299 0.645 0.392 0.262
2.2. Anti-context - m. than comp. -.149 -0.299 0.543 0.352 0.360
Attitude by sex by education
1.1. Male - compulsory .045 0.090 0.802 0.445 0.375
1.2. Male - m. than compulsory -.045 -0.090 1.025 0.506 0.466
2.1. Female - compulsory -.045 -0.090 0.383 0.277 0.193
2.2. Female - m. than comp. .045 0.090 0.701 0.412 0.357
Attitude by context by sex by education
1.1.1. Pro - male - compulsory .202 0.405 1.249 0.555 0.469
1.1.2. Pro - male - m. than comp. -.205 -0.405 1.291 0.563 0.545
1.2.1. Pro - female - compulsory -.205 -0.405 0.182 0.154 0.119
1.2.2. Pro - female - m. than comp. .205 0.405 1.356 0.576 0.388
2.1.1. Anti - male - compulsory -.205 -0.405 0.515 0.340 0.250
2.1.2. Anti - male - m. than comp. .205 0.405 0.814 0.449 0.385
2.2.1. Anti - female - compulsory .205 0.405 0.809 0.447 0.268
2.2.2. Anti - female - m. than comp. -.205 -0.405 0.362 0.266 0.327
Size of effect for male respondents: Comp, education: 21.9% More than comp, ed.: 16.0%
Size of effect for female respondents: Comp, education:-14.9% More than comp, ed.: 6.1%
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The odds and the proportions (table 6.4.5) for the interaction between attitude 
towards abortion, context, sex and education show that male respondents were 
affected by the context as predicted. The only difference between men with 
compulsory education only and more educated men was that more educated men 
were more likely to favour abortion on demand and the size of the effect was 
somewhat larger for men with less education, or 21.6% as opposed to 16% for those 
with further education. Female respondents with compulsory education only were 
likely to show a backfire effect, i.e., they were more likely to favour abortion on 
demand under the anti-context condition than under the pro-context condition, a 
difference of 14.9%. Women with more than compulsory education, on the other 
hand, resembled the male respondents in that they showed the predicted 
susceptibility to the context, although the size of the effect was smaller, or only 
6.1%. None of the standardized residuals (depicted in table 6.4.6) is larger than ± 
1.96. Hence, there are no important deviations from the model.
Table 6.4.6 Observed, (expected) frequencies and standardized
residuals for the model with main effects of the base-rate 
attitude, context, sex, and education, and two- and three- 
way interactions between context, sex, and education
Base-rate Context Sex Education
Attitude towards abortion
Standardized 
Favour Residuals Oppose
Standardized
Residuals
favour pro-context male compulsory 12(11.21) .236 1(1.79) -.591
favour pro-context male more than comp. 31(29.45) .286 3(4.55) -.727
favour pro-context female compulsory 2(3.81) -.928 6(4.19) .885
favour pro-context female more than comp. 12(11.33) .198 1(1.67) -.517
favour anti-context male compulsory 4(4.32) -.156 2(1.68) .250
favour anti-context male more than comp. 18(19.27) -.290 6(4.73) .586
favour anti-context female compulsory 7(6.42) .230 1(1.58) -.464
favour anti-context female more than comp. 14(14.18) -.048 8(7.82) .065
oppose pro-context male compulsory 3(3.79) -.406 16(15.21) .203
oppose pro-context male more than comp. 5(6.55) -.606 27(25.45) .308
oppose pro-context female compulsory 3(1.19) 1.662 31(32.81) -.316
oppose pro-context female more than comp. 7(7.67) -.241 29(28.33) .125
oppose anti-context male compulsory 2(1.68) .250 16(16.32) -.080
oppose anti-context male more than comp. 7(5.73) .533 34(35.27) -.215
oppose anti-context female compulsory 4(4.58) -.272 29(28.42) .109
oppose anti-context female more than comp. 2(1.82) .135 25(25.18) -.036
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Since it has been shown above that the effect of the context depends to a certain 
extent on the age of respondents (see table 6.2.9), age was added to the model as a 
covariate to see whether any of the effects in the model above were conditioned by 
the age of respondents. The results are presented in table 6.4.7.
Table 6.4.7 Significance tests for the conditioning effects of age on base-
rate attitude, context, sex, and education
Effect tested Chi-square DF Significance Conditional DF 
chi-square
Significance
Context x sex x education x age 5.95 6 .429 1.39 1 <.300
Context x education x age 7.15 6 .307 0.19 1 <.700
Context x sex x age 4.36 6 .627 2.97 1 <.100
Sex x education x age 6.91 6 .329 0.43 1 <.700
Education x age 7.34 6 .291 0.00 1 <.990
Sex x age 7.21 6 .302 0.13 1 <.800
Context x age 7.20 6 .302 0.13 1 <.800
Base-rate attitude x age 6.84 6 .335 0.49 1 <.500
The interaction between context, sex, and age approached significance (%2=2.97, 
df=l, p<.10), but more importantly, when only main effects of all variables were 
included in the model, there was found to be a highly significant interaction between 
context and age (x2=6.21, df=l, p<.02). This interaction loses its significance when 
the three-way interaction between context, sex, and education is added (as can be 
seen in table 6.4.7 the significance level for this effect is <.80), which might suggest 
that much of the conditioning effect of the age of respondents was due to the 
peculiar combination of sex and education for the different age groups.
Tourangeau (1986) has suggested that the contrast or backfire effect is due to 
respondents disagreeing with the context items and thus taking a much stronger 
position than they otherwise might have. The only group of respondents that showed 
a contrast effect was female respondents with compulsory education. However, they 
did not disagree with the women’s rights items any more than other respondents, but 
were slightly more likely to agree with the traditional items stating that women
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should stay at home and leave running the country to men and that it is wrong for a 
married person to have sexual relations with other than the marriage partner. Table 
6.4.8 shows the average agreement in each group.7
Table 6.4.8 Average agreement to context items on women’s rights (pro)
and traditional values (anti)
Context Sex Education Mean Standard dev. n
pro male compulsory 9.17 1.13 36
pro male more than compulsory 9.61 0.73 70
pro female compulsory 9.38 1.33 47
pro female more than compulsory 9.45 1.19 53
anti male compulsory 8.22 1.48 27
anti male more than compulsory 7.92 1.70 78
anti female compulsory 8.47 1.50 47
anti female more than compulsory 7.89 1.67 53
There was not a significant difference between male and female respondents, but there was a 
significant interaction between context and education Fi 403=5.97, p=.015.
Agreement was coded into two categories (above or below average agreement [8.7]) 
to try to obtain a simpler picture of how agreement might mediate the effects of the 
context. It turns out that the results lend substantial support to Tourangeau’s (1987) 
claim that disagreement with the context items leads to a backfire or contrast effect 
(see table 6.4.9).
7 Agreement was measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 stands for ‘strongly agree*. To get a joint 
measure of agreement for the two items, the two values were added, resulting in a scale ranging from 2 
to 10.
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Table 6.4.9 Effect of context and agreement to context items on attitude
towards abortion
Agreement to context items
Above average
pro- anti­
context context
Total
Below
pro­
context
average
anti­
context
Total
favour 42.2% 29.6% 37.5% 22.2% 40.2% 36.0%
oppose 57.8 70.4 62.5 77.8 59.8 64.0
Total (n) 166 98 264 27 87 114
X2=4.16, df=l, p= 041 %2=2.90, df=l, p=.089
Interaction between context and agreement: LR%2=6.44, df=l, p=.011
General log-linear analysis, including the base-rate attitude, context, agreement, sex 
and education shows, that there was a significant interaction between context, 
agreement and sex, but the interaction between context, sex and education discussed 
above lost its significant when agreement was taken into account. As shown in table 
6.4.10, although there was a very small backfire effect for women who do not agree 
with the context items, there was a much more robust effect found among male 
respondents.
Table 6.4.10 Effect of context, agreement to context items and sex on 
attitude towards abortion
Context Agreement Sex Favour
%
Oppose
%
n size of effect
pro agree male 58.8 41.2 85
anti agree male 31.1 68.9 45 27.7%
pro disagree male 14.3 85.7 14
-30.6%anti disagree male 44.9 55.1 49
pro agree female 24.7 75.3 81
-3.6%anti agree female 28.3 71.7 53
pro disagree female 30.8 69.2 13
-3.4%anti disagree female 34.2 65.8 38
Total in pro-context condition 39.2 60.8 194
Total in anti-context condition 34.0 66.0 188 5.2%
Interaction between context, agreement and sex: LR%2=7.01, df=l, p=.008
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In the overall sample there was only a small and statistically nonsignificant effect 
(5.2%) of different context items. When sex and agreement with the context items 
are taken into account, a much clearer and different pattern emerges. Male 
respondents who agreed with the context items showed a strong assimilation effect 
(27.7%), while men who did not agree with the items showed an even stronger 
contrast effect (-30.6), hence when taken together the effects were cancelled out. The 
context did not seem to have a significant effect on female respondents whether or 
not they agreed or disagreed with the items, although as shown above, women who 
had finished compulsory education or less showed a contrast effect. Very few 
respondents disagreed, or did not strongly agree with the women’s rights items, 
making more detailed analysis very difficult.
6.5 Think-aloud and attitudes towards abortion
The attitudinal assertions concerning traditional values and women’s rights and the 
attitude questions were included in the experiments where respondents were asked to 
think-aloud while answering the questions.
The effects of the different contexts can be seen very clearly in table 6.5.1. In the 
anti-abortion group there were two favourable responses, four respondents favoured 
abortion given that certain conditions were fulfilled, and three said they oppose 
abortion on demand. The pattern of responses in the group that got the pro-abortion 
context was very different, i.e., none of the eight respondents opposed abortion on 
demand, five said they favour abortion on demand, and two said they favoured 
abortion when certain conditions are met, and one respondent answered ‘don’t 
know’.
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Table 6.5.1 Agreement with context items and attitudes towards 
abortion in think-aloud interviews
Anti-abortion context Pro-abortion context
Trouble with 
modern society 
that it is easy 
not to take 
responsibility
Having sex with 
other than your 
marriage partner 
is wrong
Abortion Women should 
stay at home 
and leave the 
running the 
country to men
Evaluation on 
basis of quali­
fications rather 
than sex
Abortion
Disagree Agree Favour(C) Disagree Agree Favour
Agree Agree Favour(C) Disagree Agree Favour(C)
Disagree Agree Favour(C) Disagree Agree Favour
Disagree Agree Oppose Disagree Agree Favour
Disagree Agree Oppose Disagree Agree Don’t know
Agree Agree Favour(C) Disagree Agree Favour
Agree Agree Favour Disagree Agree Favour(C)
Agree Agree Oppose Disagree Agree Favour
Agree Agree Favour
(C) means that the respondent said s(he) was in favour of abortion under certain circumstances
Respondents did not refer to the attitude assertions when they were asked what they 
had been thinking when they answered the question about abortion, so even though 
the assertions (the context) seemed to direct their thoughts, respondents did not seem 
to be aware of these effects. The thoughts listed by the two groups were different. In 
the anti-abortion context, most respondents emphasized the necessity of making sure 
that abortion can’t be used instead of contraception. Only one respondent in the pro­
abortion condition referred to the danger of women relying on abortion instead of 
using contraception. Respondents in this group were more likely to say that they 
were thinking of women’s rights and that women should be able to take 
responsibility for themselves and should have a choice. A young woman said that 
when she was answering the questions she was ‘mainly thinking of women’s 
liberation and that women should have the same opportunities as men and their 
qualities and qualifications should be appreciated.’
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6,6 Summary o f effects o f context on attitudes towards abortion
At first glance, context did not seem to have any effect on attitudes towards abortion 
on demand. However, the results suggest that this was due to the effects cancelling 
out in the overall sample. It has been shown above that male respondents who agreed 
with the attitudinal assertions showed a strong assimilation effect, as predicted, but 
men who disagreed with the context items and female respondents with compulsory 
education showed a contrast or backfire effect, making their responses dissimilar to 
the context items but at the same time more consistent with their own answers to the 
context items. Not many respondents disagreed with the context items, and none in 
the think-aloud experiments disagreed with the women’s rights items, making it 
impossible to judge whether the contrast effect was due to respondents’ 
counterarguing, as has been suggested by Tourangeau and Rasinski (1986). The fact 
that women seemed to be less likely to be influenced by the context might be a result 
of greater involvement, which is believed to condition context effects.
Strength of attitude was found to be related to attitudinal position in such a way that 
respondents who opposed abortion on demand were likely to have a much stronger 
and less ambivalent opinion than those who were in favour of abortion. Respondents 
opposed to abortion on demand were more resistant to change and less likely to be 
influenced by the context. In other words, the conservative attitude (opposition) was 
held with greater fervour than the liberal position and showed much greater temporal 
stability.
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6.7 Context effect on attitude towards declaring the Nordic countries 
free o f nuclear weapons
Most respondents, or over 80%, had a favourable attitude towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons. The relationship between attitudes towards 
‘nuclear-free north’ and the pro-/anti-context items is depicted in table 6.7.1.
Table 6.7.1 ‘Nuclear-free North’ by context
Context
pro-context anti-context Total
favour strongly 72.4% 58.0% 65.1%
favour 13.6 28.8 21.3
neither-nor 4.0 2.4 3.2
oppose 4.5 4.9 4.7
oppose strongly 5.5 5.9 5.7
Total (n) 199 205 404
%2=14.99, df=4, p= 00
Size of effect (favour strongly): 14.4%
Size of effect (oppose strongly): 0.4%
The major differences between the pro-context and the anti-context groups in table 
6.7.1 are in the top two categories, i.e., favour strongly, and favour. This suggests 
that although there were significant differences between the groups that can be 
attributed to the different contexts, the effect was not so strong as to affect the 
favour-oppose proportions. This becomes apparent in table 6.7.2, which shows no 
differences between the two groups.
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Table 6.7.2 ‘Nuclear-free North’ by context
Context
pro-context anti-context Total
favour 89.5% 89.0% 89.3%
oppose 10.5 11.0 10.7
Total (n) 191 200 391
X2=0.03, d M , p=.87 
Size of effect: 0.5%
With 90% (see table 6.7.2) of respondents in favour of declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons, it is obvious that it is almost impossible to 
compare the respondents who favoured and the respondents who opposed declaring 
the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons with respect to their susceptibility to 
the context. Table 6.7.3 shows the changes in responses to the attitude question and 
how they were affected by the context.
Table 6.7.3 ‘Nuclear-free North’ by context, controlling for responses to
the base rate question
Response to base rate question 
Favour Oppose
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
favour strongly 85.0% 66.5% 75.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
favour 14.4 29.0 21.9 7.7 18.8 13.8
neither-nor 0.0 1.1 0.6 15.4 6.3 10.3
oppose 0.0 2.3 1.2 30.8 18.8 24.1
oppose strongly 0.6 1.1 0.9 46.2 56.3 51.7
Total(n) 167 176 343 13 16 29
X2 = 1 8 .2 4 ,  d f = 4 ,  p= 0 0 1  X2 = 1 .7 8 ,  d f= 3 ,  p= 6 1 8
Cells with E.F.<5= 6 o f  10 (60%) Cells with E.F.<5=6 o f  8  (75%)
Size of effect (favour strongly): 1 8 .1 %  Size of effect (oppose strongly):
10. 1%
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As table 6.7.3 shows, there were only a few people who changed their response from 
one side to the other (this can be seen more clearly in table 6.7.4). Although both 
table 6.7.3 and table 6.7.4 seem to imply that only the respondents who initially said 
they were in favour of declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons were 
pushed in the predicted direction by the context, it is problematic to make such a 
claim when the majority of the cells had expected frequencies of less than 5. 
Nevertheless, the pattern in the subtable for respondents who were in favour of 
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons in the first interview totally 
complied with the predictions, i.e., only one respondent in the pro-context condition 
changed his response from favour to oppose (or neutral), as compared with eight 
respondents in the anti-context condition. The other subtable deviates more from the 
predictions (although it must not be forgotten that this table is based on only 29 
respondents), i.e., more people changed their response from oppose to either neutral 
or favour under the anti-context condition than under the pro-context condition, 4 
and 3 respondents, respectively. However, there was a higher proportion of 
respondents that strongly oppose declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear 
weapons under the anti-attitudinal condition than under the pro-attitudinal one.
Table 6.7.4 ‘Nuclear-free North’ (dichotomous) by context, controlling
for responses to the base rate question
Response to base rate question 
Favour Oppose
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
favour 99.4% 96.6% 97.9% 9.1% 20.0% 15.4%
oppose 0.6 3.4 2.1 90.9 80.0 84.6
Total (n) 167 174 341 11 15 26
%2=3.445 df=l, p=.064 %2=o.58, df=l, p=446
Cells with E.F.<5= 2 of 4 (50%) Cells with E.F.<5=2 of 4 (50%)
Size of effect: 2.8% Size of effect: -10.9%
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Because most of the respondents were in favour of declaring the Nordic countries 
free of nuclear weapons, it was not possible to carry out the analysis in the same way 
as for the attitude towards abortion. Instead, a new variable with three categories was 
created. The categories are: 1) change towards oppose, 2) no change, and 3) change 
towards favour. Table 6.7.5 shows the relationship between this new variable and the 
context.
Table 6.7.5 Change in attitude towards ‘nuclear-free North’ by context
pro-context
Context
anti-context Total
change towards oppose 9.4% 18.9% 14.3%
no change 73.8 66.7 70.2
change towards favour 16.8 14.4 15.6
Total (n) 191 201 392
X2=7.22, df=2, p= 027 Effect: 16.8-9.4:=7.4% Effect: 18.9-14.4=4.5%
The changes in responses that are presented in table 6.7.5 were in the predicted 
direction, with a significance level of .027. The most noticeable aspect of the table is 
how many respondents changed their response towards favour under the anti-context 
condition, i.e., 14.4% of respondents in the anti-context group changed their 
response in the direction opposite to the one predicted. The comparable figure for the 
pro-context group was 9.4%. The significance of the %2 was mainly due to different 
proportions changing their response towards oppose in the two experimental 
conditions. Of the 56 respondents who changed their response towards oppose, 
67.9% were in the anti-context group and 32.1% in the pro-context group. 
Unfortunately, the proportions for respondents who changed in the direction of 
favour did not support the hypothesis as neatly; only 52.5% of the 61 respondents 
who changed their response towards favour belonged to the pro-context group and 
thus 47.5% belonged to the anti-context group. However, this may to some extent be
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explained by a ceiling effect since 63% had already said they were strongly in favour 
of declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons.
Looking at this ‘change’ variable and the reported strength of the attitude towards 
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons provides an opportunity to 
test the hypothesis put forward by Schuman and Presser (1981) that attitude strength 
is associated with reliability but not with resistance to shifting. Table 6.7.6 depicts 
the relationship between attitude change and strength of the attitude.
Table 6.7.6 Change in attitude towards ‘nuclear-free North’ by strength
of attitude
Strength o f attitude 
very strong not very strong Total
change towards oppose 12.2% 17.3% 14.3%
no change 79.1 57.4 70.2
change towards favour 8.7 25.3 15.6
Total (n) 230 162 392
X2=24.99, df=2, p= 000
Table 6.7.6 shows that there was a strong association between reliability and the 
strength of attitude, in such a way that respondents who reported having very strong 
attitudes towards declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons, whether 
for or against, were much less likely to change their response, than respondents who 
did not have very strong attitudes. Whether the former were also less likely to be 
affected by the context can be seen in table 6.7.7.
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Table 6.7.7 Change in attitude towards ‘nuclear-free North’ by context,
controlling for strength of attitude
Strength o f attitude 
Very strong Not very strong
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti­
context
Total
change towards oppose 8 .2 % 1 6 .7 % 1 2 .2 % 1 1 .6 % 2 1 .5 % 1 7 .3 %
no change 7 9 .5 7 8 .7 7 9 .1 6 3 .8 5 2 .7 5 7 .4
change towards favour 12 .3 4 .6 8 .7 2 4 .6 2 5 .8 2 5 .3
Total (n) 1 2 2 108 2 3 0 6 9 9 3 163
X2 = 7 .2 5 ,  d f = 2 ,  p=.0 2 7  
Effects (predicted over opposite) 4.1% 12.1%
X2 = 3 .1 2 ,  df=2, p = .2 1 0  
13%  -4 .3 %
The results presented in table 6.7.7 do indeed support the hypothesis that reliability 
is related to attitude strength -  the stronger the attitude, the greater its reliability. 
Furthermore, the table suggests that resistance to change is not associated with 
attitude strength, but that respondents who did not have very strong attitudes were 
more likely to change their response in a random manner. Although only 20% of 
respondents with ‘very strong’ attitudes changed their response, these changes are 
coherent with predictions in that a larger proportion of respondents who changed, 
changed in the predicted direction. In the pro-context condition 4.1% more 
respondents changed towards favour than towards oppose, but 12.1% more changed 
towards oppose than towards favour in the anti-context condition. The changes, that 
occurred among respondents who did not hold very strong attitudes towards 
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons were less clear cut: 43% of 
these respondents changed their response in one way or the other, but these changes 
were not dependent on the context (x2=3.12, p=.210, n=163). For these respondents, 
the anti-context seemed to ‘backfire’, i.e., 25.8% of respondents in the anti-context 
group changed their response towards favour as opposed to 24.6% in the pro-context 
group. Hence, it is necessary to look at the effect of demographic variables to see if 
there was a group of people that was affected by the context in such a way that it 
resulted in a contrast effect.
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Table 6.7.8 shows the effects of the context for male and female respondents 
separately.
Table 6.7.8 Change in attitude towards ‘nuclear-free North’ by context,
controlling for sex
Sex
Male Female
pro­
context
anti­
context
Total pro­
context
anti- Total 
context
change towards oppose 
no change
change towards favour
12.5%
68.8
18.8
21.7%
62.3
16.0
17.3%
65.3
17.3
6.3%
78.9
14.7
15.8% 11.1%
71.6 75.3
12.6 13.7
Total (n) 96 106 202 95 95 190
X2=3.00, df=2, p=.223 
Effects (pred. over opposite) 6.3% 5.7%
X2 = 4 .3 5 ,  df=2, p = .1 1 3  
8 .4 %  3 .2 %
The most obvious difference between men and women (table 6.7.8) is that female 
respondents showed greater reliability than did the men. This might suggest that the 
women held stronger attitudes towards declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear 
weapons than the men. On the other hand, there was no apparent reason to suspect 
an interaction between context and gender. In fact, although 3% more of the women 
expressed a very strong attitude, there was no significant association between 
strength of attitude and sex (%2=6.69, df=4, p=. 153) Overall, the effect of the context 
was so weak that when the table is broken down by sex, or in fact any of the 
background variables, the context loses its significance. Table 6.7.9 shows the effect 
of the context for the three age groups, 18-30, 31-50, and 51-70, and table 6.7.10 the 
effect for respondents with compulsory education, on the one hand, and respondents 
with more than compulsory education on the other.
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Table 6.7.9 Change in attitude towards ‘nuclear-free North’ by context,
controlling for age
Context 
pro-context anti-context Total
18-30 years
change towards oppose 7.7% 16.7% 12.0%
no change 72.3 66.7 69.6
change towards favour 20.0 16.7 18.4
Total (n) 65 60 125
X2 = 2 .4 3  d f = 2 ,  p=.297
31-50 years
change towards oppose 11.4 17.8 15.0
no change 74.7 69.3 71.7
change towards favour 13.9 12.9 13.3
Total (n) 79 101 180
X2=1.44 df=2, p=.487
51-70 years
change towards oppose 8.5 25.0 16.1
no change 74.5 60.0 67.8
change towards favour 17.0 15.0 16.1
Total (n) 47 40 87
X2 = 4 .3 7  d f= 2 ,  p=.l 12
Significance test for interactions: LR ^2Change*age*context=i .05, df=4, p=.902
L R  ^ 2 change*age = 2 .0 4 ,  d f = 4 ,  p = .7 2 8  
L R  ^ 2 change*context = 7 .3 7 ,  d f = 2 ,  p = .0 2 5
Although the chi-square for the oldest respondents is closest to being significant (and 
would indeed have been significant if there had been as many respondents as in the 
31-50 group, given that the proportions were unchanged), the pattern of change was 
very similar for all age groups, making it unlikely that the effect of context depended 
on age, as the general log-linear analysis in fact shows. The only variable that had a 
significant effect on changes was the context.
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Table 6.7.10 Change in attitude towards ‘nuclear-free North’ by context,
controlling for education
Education
Compulsory More than compulsory
pro­ anti­ Total pro­ anti­ Total
context context context context
change towards oppose 7.1% 19.8% 14.3% 10.7% 18.2% 14.3%
no change 75.7 67.0 70.8 72.7 66.4 69.7
change towards favour 17.1 13.2 14.9 16.5 15.5 16.0
Total 43.5 56.5 100.0 52.4 47.6 100.0
X2=5.26, df=2, p=.072 X2=2.61, df^2, p=.272
Effects (pred. over opposite) 10% 6.6% 5.8% 2.7%
Table 6.7.10 shows that the context effect was closer to being significant for 
respondents with compulsory education only than for respondents with more than 
compulsory education. Nevertheless, the patterns in the two subtables are quite 
similar, making it unlikely that there was a significant interaction between context 
and education (LR ^2Change*education*context=o.808, df=2, p=.668).
6.8 Logit analysis of the effects o f context and strength o f attitude on 
changes in attitudes towards declaring the Nordic countries free of 
nuclear weapons.
In order to test whether the strength of the attitude only affected its reliability or 
whether it also affected susceptibility to different contexts, logit models were fitted 
to test the effects of context and strength on changes in attitude towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons. In other words, did the respondents with 
‘very strong’ attitudes change their response as a result of the context, if they 
changed their response at all, and did respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes to 
a greater extent change their response in a random manner?
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Table 6.8.1 Goodness-of-fit statistics for change in attitudes towards
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons with 
context, and strength of attitude as explanatory variables
Model Chi-square DF Significance Conditional DF Significance
chi-square
Independence 35.56 6 .000
Main effects 3.61 2 .164 31.95 4 .000
Table 6.8.1 demonstrates that the changes in reported attitude were affected by one 
or both context and strength of attitude, i.e., the fit of the independence model is 
inadequate. In addition, the table shows that the interaction between context and 
strength of attitude was significant at .164. Table 6.8.2 shows the significance tests 
for the main effects of context and strength of attitude.
Table 6.8.2 Significance test for main effects of context, and strength of
attitude on changes in attitude towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons
Effect added to Chi-square DF Significance Conditional DF Significance
the independence chi-square
model in 
table 6 .8.1.
Context 28.18 4 .000 7.37 2 .025
Strength 10.70 4 .030 24.85 2 .000
As can be seen in table 6.8.2, both context and strength of attitude made a significant 
contribution to the changes that took place in reported attitudes towards ‘nuclear-free 
North’ from one interview to the other. What these effects were is depicted in table 
6.8.3.
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Table 6.8.3 ^-parameters, log-odds, odds, predicted, and actual
proportion of respondents 1) changing their response, and 2) 
who changed their response, change towards oppose, and 
the effects of context and strength of attitude
EFFECT
LEVEL
^.-para­
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Attitude towards nukes
1. Change/(no change) -.520 ★ -1.041 0.353 0.261 0.298
2. Oppose/(favour) -.044 n.s. -0.088 0.910 0.478 0.479
Attitude towards nukes by context
1.1. Change - pro -.046 n.s. -0.091 0.322 0.244 0.262
1.2. Change - anti .046 n.s. 0.091 0.387 0.279 0.333
2.1. Oppose - pro -.232 * -0.464 0.576 0.365 0.360
2.2. Oppose - anti .232 * 0.464 1.457 0.593 0.567
Attitude towards nukes by strength
1.1. Change - very strong -.167 * -0.334 0.253 0.202 0.209
1.2. Change - not very strong .167 * 0.334 0.493 0.330 0.426
2.1. Oppose - very strong .203 * 0.406 1.375 0.579 0.583
2.2. Oppose - not very strong -.203 * -0.406 0.610 0.379 0.406
* - 95% confidence interval for the parameter does not include 0. 
n.s. - 95% confidence interval includes 0.
The non-significant parameter for the odds of changing one’s attitude towards 
oppose, if a respondent changed her/his attitude at all, implies that about the same 
proportion of respondents changed their response towards oppose and towards 
favour, irrespective of context. The parameters for the context and for the strength of 
the attitude show that 1) about the same number of respondents changed their 
response under the pro- and anti-conditions; 2) respondents in the pro-context group 
were more likely to change their response towards favour, and respondents in the 
anti-context group were more likely to change towards oppose; 3) strength of 
attitude affected reliability in such a way that respondents with a very strong attitude 
were much less likely to change their response than were respondents who did not 
have very strong attitudes; and finally 4) if respondents with very strong attitudes 
changed their attitude, they were more likely to change their response towards
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oppose (irrespective of context), whereas respondents who do not have very strong 
attitudes were more likely to change towards favour.
Finally, table 6.8.4 presents the observed, and expected frequencies and the 
standardized residuals, which show that there were no important deviations from the 
model with the main effects of context and strength of attitude.
Table 6.8.4 Observed, (expected) frequencies and standardized
residuals for the model with main effects of context and 
strength of attitude on changes in attitude towards declaring 
the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons
Change in attitude towards nuclear weapons in the North*
Context Strength -1 Standard. 0 Standard. 1 Standard.
residuals residuals residuals
pro-context very strong 10(10.29) -.090 97(99.81) -.282 15(11.90) .899
pro-context not very strong 8(7.71) .104 44(41.19) .438 17(20.10) -.691
anti-context very strong 18(17.71) .068 85(82.19) .310 5(8.10) -1.089
anti-context not very strong 20(20.29) -.064 49(51.81) -.391 24(20.90) .678
* -l=change towards oppose; 0=no change; l=change towards favour
6.9 Logit analysis of change in attitudes towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free o f nuclear weapons and the effects o f context, strength 
of attitude, and agreement with the context items
As discussed above in relation to attitudes towards abortion it has been suggested 
that ‘backfire’ effects may be due to respondents disagreeing with the context items, 
and thus giving a response opposite to the one predicted. Thus a variable measuring 
agreement with the context items was added. The response scale for the context 
items ranged from 1 to 5 (strongly agree - strongly disagree). Responses to these 
items were more divergent than responses to the context items for the question about 
attitude towards abortion, making it possible to add the two context items and code
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as high agreement if their sum was 4 or less, and low agreement if the sum was 
between 5 and 10.
Table 6.9.1 shows the goodness-of-fit statistics for the three basic models, i.e., 
independence model, main effects model, and the model including the two-way 
interactions.
Table 6.9.1 Goodness-of-fit statistics for change in attitudes towards
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons with 
context, strength of attitude, and agreement with the context 
items, as explanatory variables
Model Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Independence 34.93 14 .002
Main effects 10.77 8 .215 24.16 6 .000
Two-way interactions 1.24 2 .537 9.53 6 .146
The significance tests for the main effects are presented in table 6.9.2, and for the 
two-way interactions in table 6.9.3.
Table 6.9.2 Significance test for main effects of context, strength of
attitude, and agreement on changes in attitude towards 
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons
Effect deleted Chi-square DF Significance Conditional DF Significance
from main effects chi-square
model in 
table 6.9.1.
Context 15.83 10 .105 5.05 2 .080
Strength 24.93 10 .005 14.15 2 .001
Agreement 13.75 10 .185 2.98 2 .225
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Table 6.9.3 Significance tests for two-way interactions between context,
strength of attitude, and agreement
Effect added Chi-square DF Significance Conditional DF Significance
to main effects chi-square
model in 
table 6.9.1.
Context x Strength 9.82 6 .133 0.96 2 .619
Context x Agree 6.57 6 .362 4.20 2 .122
Strength x Agree 6.47 6 .373 4.30 2 .116
Both the two-way interactions between context and agreement, and strength and 
agreement approached significance, but if we include only effects that were 
significant at the .10 level, the best model is the one with the main effects of context 
and strength of attitude (x2=13.75, df=10, p=.185). Table 6.9.4 for the parameters, 
and table 6.9.5 for the observed and expected frequencies are based on this model.
Table 6.9.4 ^-parameters, log-odds, odds, predicted, and actual
proportion of respondents 1) changing their response, and 2) 
who change their response, change towards oppose, and the 
effects of context and strength of attitude
EFFECT
LEVEL
X-para-
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Attitudes to nukes
1. Change/(no change) -.541 * -1.081 0.339 0.253 0.280
2. Oppose/(favour) .002 n.s. 0.004 1.004 0.501 0.495
Attitudes to nukes by context
1.1. Change - pro -.021 n.s. -0.041 0.326 0.246 0.263
1.2. Change - anti .021 n.s. 0.041 0.353 0.261 0.298
2.1. Oppose - pro -.270 * -0.541 0.584 0.369 0.367
2.2. Oppose - anti .270 * 0.541 1.724 0.633 0.625
Attitudes to nukes by strength
1.1. Change - very strong -.146 * -0.292 0.253 0.202 0.209
1.2. Change - not very strong .146 * 0.292 0.454 0.312 0.390
2.1. Oppose - very strong .109 n.s. 0.219 1.249 0.555 0.545
2.2. Oppose - not very strong -.109 n.s. -0.219 0.807 0.446 0.453
* - 95% confidence interval for the parameter does not include 0 
n.s. - 95% confidence interval includes 0
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Table 6.9.5 Observed, (expected) frequencies and standardized
residuals for the model with main effects of context and 
strength of attitude on changes in attitude towards declaring 
the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons
Change in attitude towards nuclear weapons in the North*
Context Strength Agreement -1 Standard.
residuals
0 Standard.
residuals
1 Standard.
residuals
pro very strong high agr. 8(7.98) .009 77(78.06) -.120 12(10.96) .313
pro very strong low agr. 2(1.73) .208 16(16.90) -.219 3(2.37) .407
pro not very str. high agr. 5(6.10) -.446 33(30.91) .376 12(12.99) -.274
pro not very str. low agr. 3(2.20) .542 11(11.13) -.038 4(4.68) -.313
anti very strong high agr. 8(4.61) 1.578 20(23.24) -.672 2(2.15) -.102
anti very strong low agr. 6(9.69) -1.184 54(48.80) .744 3(4.51) -.713
anti not very str. high agr. 5(7.16) -.807 16(18.67) -.619 10(5.17) 2.126
anti not very str. low agr. 11(8.54) .840 23(22.29) .151 3(6.17) -1.276
* -l=change towards oppose 0=no change 1 =change towards favour
The standardized residuals in table 6.9.5 suggest that there are substantial deviations 
from the model with main effects of the context and strength variables only. The cell 
for respondents in the anti-context group, with not very strong attitudes, high 
agreement, and who changed their response towards favour, has a standardized 
residual of 2.13. This is due to the interaction between agreement and strength of 
attitude that was close to beeing significant.
6.10 Logit analysis o f change in attitudes towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons and the effects o f context and 
background variables
Although cross-tabulation of change in attitude towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons, context and background variables did not give 
much reason to suspect any interactions, logit models were fitted to the attitude 
variable, context, sex, education, and age. As can be seen in table 6.10.1 the fit of the 
independence model is remarkably good (x2=29.87, df=46, p=.969).
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Table 6.10.1 Goodness-of-fit statistics for change in attitudes towards
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons with 
context, sex, education and age as explanatory variables
Model Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Independence 29.87 46 .969
Main effects 19.97 36 .986 9.90 10 .449
Two-way interactions 10.56 18 .912 9.41 18 .949
Table 6.10.2 Significance test for main effects of context, sex education, 
and age on changes in attitude towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons
Effect deleted 
from main effects 
model in 
table 6.10.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Context 23.76 38 .966 3.79 2 .150
Sex 24.07 38 .962 4.10 2 .129
Education 19.99 38 .993 0.02 2 .990
Age 21.73 40 .992 1.77 4 .778
Table 6.10.2 shows that the only variables that approached significance were 
context, and gender. None of the two-way interactions in table 6.10.3 are statistically 
significant.
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Table 6.10.3 Significance tests for two-way interactions between context, 
sex, education, and age
Effect added 
to main effects 
model in 
table 6.10.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Context x Sex 19.88 34 .974 0.09 2 .956
Context x Education 19.86 34 .974 0.11 2 .946
Context x Age 19.57 32 .958 0.40 4 .982
Sex x Education 17.48 34 .991 2.48 2 .289
Sex x Age 17.56 32 .982 2.41 4 .661
Education x Age 16.31 32 .990 3.66 4 .454
Table 6.10.4 Observed, (expected) frequencies and standardized 
residuals for the independence model for changes in attitude 
towards declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear 
weapons
Change in attitude towards nuclear weapons in the North*
Context Sex Educ. Age -1 Standard. 0 Standard. 1 Standard.
residuals residuals residuals
pro male comp. 18-30 0(1.20) -1.097 6(5.69) .128 1(1.31) -.267
pro male comp. 31-50 1(1.76) -.573 9(8.33) .232 2(1.91) .065
pro male comp. 51-70 1(1.32) -.279 7(6.25) .301 1(1.43) -.361
pro male m.th.c. 18-30 4(3.81) .096 14(18.05) -.953 8(4.14) 1.899
pro male m.th.c. 31-50 4(4.25) -.123 22(20.13) .417 3(4.62) -.752
pro male m.th.c. 51-70 2(1.91) .067 8(9.02) -.341 3(2.07) .647
pro female comp. 18-30 0(2.23) -1.495 11(10.58) .425 2(2.42) -.273
pro female comp. 31-50 2(2.20) -.135 10(10.41) -.128 3(2.39) .397
pro female comp. 51-70 1(2.05) -.735 10(9.72) .090 3(2.23) .517
pro female m.th.c. 18-30 1(2.79) -1.070 16(13.19) .774 2(3.02) -.589
pro female m.th.c. 31-50 2(3.37) -.748 18(15.97) .509 3(3.66) -.345
pro female m.th.c. 51-70 0(1.89) -1.375 10(8.95) .352 1(2.05) -.734
anti male comp. 18-30 4(1.47) 2.092 5(6.94) -.737 1(1.59) -.469
anti male comp. 31-50 2(1.91) .068 8(9.02) -.341 3(2.07) .647
anti male comp. 51-70 3(2.44) .357 11(11.56) -.164 0(2.65) -1.628
anti male m.th.c. 18-30 3(3.23) -.126 14(15.27) -.326 5(3.50) .800
anti male m.th.c. 31-50 8(5.13) 1.265 23(24.30) -.263 4(5.57) -.665
anti male m.th.c. 51-70 3(1.76) .935 5(8.33) -1.154 4(1.91) 1.512
anti female comp. 18-30 2(1.91) .068 8(9.02) -.341 3(2.07) .647
anti female comp. 31-50 4(4.40) -.191 22(20.83) .257 4(4.77) -.355
anti female comp. 51-70 3(1.61) 1.092 7(7.64) -.230 1(1.75) -.567
anti female m.th.c. 18-30 1(2.20) -.809 13(10.41) .802 1(2.39) -.898
anti female m.th.c. 31-50 4(3.37) .341 17(15.97) .259 2(3.66) -.868
anti female m.th.c. 51-70 1(0.44) .844 1(2.08) -.750 1(0.48) .756
* -l=change towards oppose 0=no change l=change towards favour
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Despite the good fit of the model of independence, a few of the standardized 
residuals in table 6.10.4 are quite large, although only one of them exceeds 1.96. As 
can be seen in table 6.10.4 there are very few observations in each cell of the table, 
which leads to the non-significant relation between attitude change and context. 
Hence, in the next section, only relations between variables that were closest to 
significance are explored.
6.11 Logit analysis of changes in attitudes towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free o f nuclear weapons, and the effects o f context, 
strength o f attitude, and sex
The only background variable that seems to come close to affecting the changes in 
responses is sex of respondents, and since the only other variables that were found to 
contribute significantly to these changes were context and strength of attitude, these 
variables were analysed together.
Table 6.11.1 presents the goodness-of-fit statistics for the three basic models.
Table 6.11.1 Goodness-of-fit statistics for change in attitudes towards
declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons with 
context, strength of attitude, and sex as explanatory 
variables
Model Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Independence 51.12 14 .000
Main effects 14.06 8 .080 37.05 6 .000
Two-way interactions 4.49 2 .106 9.57 6 .144
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Table 6.11.2 shows that both context and strength of attitude had a significant effect 
on the changes in attitudes towards declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear 
weapons.
Table 6.11.2 Significance test for main effects of context, strength of 
attitude, and sex on changes in attitude towards declaring 
the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons
Effect added to 
the independence 
model in 
table 6.11.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Context 43.74 12 .000 7.37 2 .025
Sex 46.17 12 .000 4.94 2 .085
Strength 26.26 12 .010 24.85 2 .000
Table 6.11.3 Significance tests for two-way interactions between context, 
sex, and strength of attitude
Effect added 
to main effects 
model in 
table 6.11.1.
Chi-square DF Significance Conditional
chi-square
DF Significance
Context x Sex 13.75 6 .033 0.31 2 .856
Context x Strength 10.37 6 .110 3.69 2 .158
Sex x Strength 8.60 6 .197 5.46 2 .065
Table 6.11.3 shows that the interaction between sex and strength was significant at 
the .10 level, but since the three-way interaction between context, sex, and strength 
of attitude was significant at the .106 level, it is worthwhile looking at the parameters 
for the saturated model (see table 6.11.4)
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Table 6.11.4 ^.-parameters, log-odds, odds, predicted, and actual
proportion of respondents 1) changing their response, and 2) 
who changed their response, change towards oppose, and 
the effects of context, sex, and strength of attitude
EFFECT
LEVEL
X-para-
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Attitude to nukes
1. Change/(no change) -.553 * -1.106 0.331 0.249 0.298
2. Oppose/(favour) -.010 n.s. -0.020 0.980 0.495 0.479
Attitude to nukes by context 
1.1. Change - pro -.048 n.s. -0.096 0.301 0.231 0.262
1.2. Change - anti .048 n.s. 0.096 0.364 0.267 0.333
2.1. Oppose - pro -.280 * -0.560 0.560 0.359 0.360
2.2. Oppose - anti .280 * 0.560 1.716 0.632 0.567
Attitude to nukes by sex
1.1. Change - male .095 * 0.191 0.401 0.286 0.347
1.2. Change - female -.095 * -0.191 0.274 0.215 0.247
2.1. Oppose - male .063 n.s. 0.125 1.111 0.526 0.500
2.2. Oppose - female -.063 n.s. -0.125 0.865 0.464 0.447
Attitude to nukes by strength
1.1. Change - very strong -.183 * -0.366 0.230 0.187 0.209
1.2. Change - not very strong .183 * 0.366 0.477 0.323 0.426
2.1. Oppose - very strong .191 n.s. 0.383 1.437 0.590 0.583
2.2. Oppose - not very strong -.191 n.s. -0.383 0.669 0.401 0.406
Attitude to nukes by context by sex 
1.1.1. Change - pro - male .015 n.s. 0.030 0.375 0.273 0.313
1.1.2. Change - pro - female -.015 n.s. -0.030 0.241 0.194 0.211
1.2.1. Change - anti - male -.015 n.s. -0.030 0.428 0.300 0.377
1.2.2. Change - anti - female .015 n.s. 0.030 0.310 0.237 0.284
2.1.1. Oppose - pro - male .050 n.s. 0.100 0.702 0.412 0.400
2.1.2. Oppose - pro - female -.050 n.s. -0.100 0.447 0.309 0.300
2.2.1. Oppose - anti - male -.050 n.s. -0.100 1.759 0.638 0.575
2.2.2. Oppose - anti - female .050 n.s. 0.100 1.673 0.626 0.556
Attitude to nukes by context by strength 
1.1.1. Change - pro - v. strong .047 n.s. 0.094 0.229 0.186 0.205
1.1.2. Change - pro - n.v. str. -.047 n.s. -0.094 0.395 0.283 0.362
1.2.1. Change - anti - v. strong -.047 n.s. -0.094 0.230 0.187 0.213
1.2.2. Change - anti - n.v. str. .047 n.s. 0.094 0.577 0.366 0.473
2.1.1. Oppose - pro - v. strong -.186 n.s. -0.373 0.566 0.361 0.400
2.1.2. Oppose - pro - n.v. str. .186 n.s. 0.373 0.555 0.357 0.320
2.2.1. Oppose - anti - v. strong .186 n.s. 0.373 3.652 0.785 0.783
2.2.2. Oppose - anti - n.v. str. -.186 n.s. -0.373 0.806 0.446 0.455
table continued on next page
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Table 6.11.4 Continued
EFFECT
LEVEL
X.-para-
meters
Log-odds Odds Predicted
proportion
Observed
proportion
Attitude to nukes by sex by strength 
1.1.1. Change - male - v. str. -.048 n.s. -0.097 0.252 0.201 0.219
1.1.2. Change - male - n.v.str. .048 n.s. 0.097 0.636 0.389 0.530
1.2.1. Change - female - v.str. .048 n.s. 0.097 0.209 0.173 0.198
1.2.2. Change - female - n.v.s. -.048 n.s. -0.097 0.358 0.264 0.316
2.1.1. Opp. - male - v. str. .175 n.s. 0.349 2.309 0.698 0.692
2.1.2. Opp. - male - n.v.str. -.175 n.s. -0.349 0.535 0.348 0.386
2.2.1. Opp. - female - v.str. -.175 n.s. -0.349 0.894 0.472 0.455
2.2.2. Opp. - female - n.v.str. .175 n.s. 0.349 0.837 0.456 0.440
Attitude to nukes by context by sex 
1.1.1.1. Ch.-pro-male-v.str.
by strength 
-.001 n.s. -0.002 0.259 0.206 0.213
1.1.1.2. Ch.-pro-male-n.v.st. .001 n.s. 0.002 0.547 0.353 0.486
1.1.2.1. Ch.-pro-female-v.st.r .001 n.s. 0.002 0.203 0.169 0.197
1.1.2.2. Ch.-pro-female-n.v.st. -.001 n.s. -0.002 0.287 0.223 0.235
1.2.1.1. Ch.-anti-male-v.str. .001 n.s. 0.002 0.246 0.197 0.224
1.2.1.2. Ch.-anti-male-n.v.str. -.001 n.s. -0.002 0.745 0.427 0.563
1.2.2.1. Ch.-anti-female-v.str. -.001 n.s. -0.002 0.215 0.177 0.200
1.2.2.2. Ch.-anti-female-n.v.st. .001 n.s. 0.002 0.447 0.309 0.378
2.1.1.1. Opp-pro-male-v.str. .233 * 0.465 1.600 0.615 0.615
2.1.1.2. Opp-pro-male-n.v.st. -.233 * -0.465 0.308 0.235 0.235
2.1.2.1. Opp-pro-female-v.st. -.233 * -0.465 0.200 0.167 0.167
2.1.2.2. Opp-pro-female-n.v.st. .233 * 0.465 1.000 0.500 0.500
2.2.1.1. Opp-anti-male-v.str. -.233 * -0.465 3.333 0.769 0.769
2.2.1.2. Opp-anti-male-n.v.st. .233 * 0.465 0.929 0.481 0.481
2.2.2.1. Opp-anti-female-v.st. .233 * 0.465 4.000 0.800 0.800
2.2.2.2. Opp-anti-female-n.v.st -.233 * -0.465 0.700 0.412 0.412
* - 95% confidence interval for the parameter does not include 0. 
n.s. - 95% confidence interval includes 0.
As the parameters in table 6.11.4 convey, there were two variables that affected how 
many respondents changed their response to the attitude question. These variables 
were sex of respondent and strength of the attitude. Male respondents were 
significantly more likely to change their response, than were women (the observed 
proportions were 34.7% and 24.7% for men and women, respectively). Respondents 
with ‘very strong’ attitudes also showed much greater reliability than respondents 
with ‘not very strong’ attitudes. Only 20.9% of respondents with ‘very strong’ 
attitudes changed their response, as opposed to 42.6% of respondents who reported 
having ‘not very strong’ attitudes. The context did not affect reliability, i.e., although
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more respondents changed their response under the anti-context condition, this result 
was not significant.
The interaction between context, sex and strength of the attitude did not affect the 
reliability, but did affect what the change in the reported attitude was, given that 
there was a change. The predictions clearly held for women with ‘very strong’ 
attitudes; only 16.7% changed their response towards oppose in the pro-context 
group, and 80% in the anti-context group. The women respondents who did not have 
a very strong attitude towards declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons 
seemed to show a backfire effect, that is 50% of those who changed in the pro­
context group, changed towards oppose. The comparable figure for the anti-context 
group was only 41%. The majority of male respondents with ‘very strong’ attitudes 
changed their attitude towards oppose, whether they were in the pro-context or the 
anti-context group. That is, 61.5% changed their response towards oppose in the pro­
context condition, and 76.9% in the anti-context condition. The majority of the male 
respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes, on the other hand changed their 
response towards favour. Only 23.5% changed towards oppose in the pro-context, 
and 48.1% in the anti-context group.
How these differences can be explained is not very clear, although a few 
explanations may be straightforward. Looking at the proportions for those who 
changed their response for the combined levels of context, sex, and strength of 
attitude reveals that in all cases respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes were 
much more likely to change their response, and since these changes deviated quite a 
lot from the predictions, it seems likely that there were random variations among 
respondents with ‘not very strong’ attitudes. A plausible explanation for the 
‘backfire’ effect among women with ‘not very strong’ attitudes in the pro-condition 
is that they were already very much in favour of declaring the Nordic countries free 
of nuclear weapons, and thus did not have much scope to change in the direction of
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favour (i.e., a ceiling effect). Only 23.5% of these respondents changed their 
response, which is a much lower proportion than for other respondents with not very 
strong attitudes, ranging from 37.8% to 56.3% for the other groups. The one finding 
that has no obvious explanation is why the male respondents with ‘very strong’ 
attitudes who changed their response in the pro-context condition were more likely 
to change their response towards oppose than favour (since the number of 
respondents is very small further analysis is not promising).
6.11 Summary of effects of context on attitudes towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons
Over 80% of all respondents expressed a favourable attitude towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons. This narrow distribution of responses 
made it impossible to analyse the data in the same way as the data from the 
experiment on attitudes towards abortion, i.e., favour vs. oppose. The approach 
selected was to analyse changes in reported attitude between waves. Base-rate data 
on attitudes were selected in Wave 2 and the experiment on the effects of context 
upon the attitude was in Wave 3.
The analysis showed that:
• Overall there was found to be a consistency or assimilation effect of the 
context items, i.e., respondents in the pro-attitudinal condition were more 
likely to give a more favourable response than they did when the base rate 
data were collected, and respondents in the anti-attitudinal condition were 
found to give a more unfavourable response. Approximately two thirds of the 
changed responses were in the predicted direction.
• Agreement or disagreement with the attitudinal assertions was not found to 
condition the effects of the context (although approaching significance).
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• Strength of attitude was found to affect reliability in such a way that 
respondents with very strong attitudes showed greater stability than 
respondents with not very strong attitudes (20.9% of respondents with very 
strong attitudes and 42.6% of respondents with not very strong attitudes 
changed their response).
• Strength of attitude was not found to condition the effect of the context, 
despite the fact that the very strong attitudes were more stable.
• Women who did not have a very strong attitude showed a backfire effect.
6.12 Conclusion
The most apparent conclusion from the above analysis is that it is not an easy task to 
identify the ‘floaters’. The context does not have such a strong effect as to make 
respondents change their attitudes from one side to the other in any great numbers, 
neither for attitudes towards abortion nor for attitudes towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons.
Both in the case of attitudes towards abortion and attitudes towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons did strength of the attitude affect reliability 
in such a way that respondents with very strong attitudes were less likely to change 
their response. This does not necessarily mean that respondents with ‘not very 
strong’ attitudes were more susceptible to the context, and, indeed the pattern of the 
changes among these respondents suggests that these changes may to a large extent 
be explained by random variations.
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7Conclusion and discussion
7.1 Overview
The research described in this thesis was sparked off by my interest in methodology 
and questions concerning the reliability of survey responses. A great deal of research 
published in the early 1980s showed that order of questions and different question 
formats produced substantially different response patterns that were not easily 
explained (cf. Schuman and Presser, 1981). Although answers had been known to be 
somewhat sensitive to question wording and to the order of questions since the early 
20th century (Cantril, 1944; Payne, 1951) emphasis was generally laid on rigorous 
standardization and attempts were made to circumvent or eliminate these effects in 
order to establish acceptable reliability. However, in the 1980s explanations were 
called for and researchers from different disciplines joined hands in searching for 
plausible clarification. Most notable was the collaboration between survey 
researchers and cognitive psychologists attempting to map the cognitive steps 
involved in the question answering process (cf. Jabine, Straf, Tanur and Torangeau, 
1984; Hippier, Schwarz and Sudman, 1987). This co-operation has produced various 
models attempting to explain how preceding questions or response alternatives 
sometimes do and sometimes do not influence responses. One is the ‘model of 
inclusion/exclusion and the emergence of assimilation and contrast effects’ proposed 
by Schwarz and Bless (1992), a model somewhat reminiscent of Sherif and 
Ho viand’s (1961) assimilation-contrast theory of attitude change. Although there are 
some similarities in these two models there are also some very important 
distinctions. The most distinct difference may be Schwarz and Bless’s (1992) 
emphasis on the cognitive steps involved in the information processing and their
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limited recognition of the importance of ego-involvement. Furthermore, the 
emotional aspect of attitudes has been somewhat neglected in the cognitive 
approach.
What has social psychology to say about context effects? Researchers studying 
unanticipated effects in experimental research found that various ‘artifacts’ such as 
demand characteristics and experimenter effects were operating in the laboratory (cf. 
Ome, 1962, 1969; Rosenthal, 1966). Farr (1978) argued that such effects could only 
be considered as artifactual ‘if what are inherently social relations, such as those that 
exist between experimenters and the subjects who participate in their research, are 
construed by psychologists as being in fact relations of a non-social kind (because in 
that situation experimenters think of themselves as guided by a natural scientific 
model of experimentation), [and] then it is scarcely surprising if unforseen side- 
effects, artifacts, of a social nature emerge; only experimenters, conceptualizing the 
situation as non-social when it is in fact social, will be surprised’ (p. 300). This 
debate has drawn attention to the social nature of the interview situation and the 
characteristics of language. These aspects of the interview situation have been 
neglected, largely because of the emphasis on standardization and the application of 
the purely natural science model, without acknowledgement of the reactivity of 
human behaviour (cf. Duval and Wicklund, 1972).
A number of researchers have suggested that by the simple act of asking questions 
we change people’s self-perception (cf. Bishop, 1987), their attitude or even their 
behaviour (cf. Feldman and Lynch, 1988, Feldman, 1992). If so, how permanent is 
that change? Accessibility has often been called upon as an explanation for these 
changes (Fazio, 1989). However, these changes in attitudes due to increased 
accessibility of particular beliefs or aspects of an attitude are generally assumed to be 
temporary and to wear off over time. Although the claim is frequently made that
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attitudes and behaviours are being changed in the process of asking questions, it is 
rare to find studies that interview the same respondents on more than one occasion.
The experimental design applied in the present research was devised with these 
questions in mind, i.e., do we change people’s attitudes and self-perceptions by 
asking them questions? If so, how temporary or long-lasting are these changes? Is it 
possible to interpret context effects as artifactual or can they be explained with 
reference to the social nature of the interview situation? Can theories about the 
nature of attitudes explain some of the instability frequently observed in attitudinal 
responses?
Conducting a large scale sample survey is an expensive endeavour. However, a 
friend of mine, Gudmundur Runar Amason, who was working on a PhD in political 
science at the London School of Economics was also interested in using survey data 
in his research. Hence we decided to pool our funds (that is, if we would be able to 
get funding), and work together. Gudmundur was interested in studying the effects 
of media communications in the campaign leading up to the general elections in 
Iceland that were held in April 1987. Being more interested in the effects of different 
question orders and formats than in the actual contents of the questions, I selected 
questions that had similar content for the remaining questions in the questionnaire 
(see appendices) and decided to make an attempt to replicate Bishop’s (1986) 
findings, that presenting respondents with knowledge questions before asking them 
about their interest in politics, or more accurately how frequently they followed what 
was going on in government and public affairs resulted in a decline in reported 
interest. Furthermore, I chose to conduct an experiment somewhat reminiscent of 
Schuman and Presser’s (1981) experiment with open and closed formats of the 
question about the most important problems facing the nation, but different from 
their experiment in that instead of introducing closed response alternatives, I gave 
examples of possible issues in the preamble to the question. The effects of these
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variations in the questionnaire were tried in a small pilot survey on a simple random 
sample of 200 people in Reykjavik in December 1986. The results from the pilot 
study were promising in the sense that predictions about context effects were 
confirmed. However, these questions, not being attitude questions in the traditional 
sense, i.e., not questions about ‘a subjective experience involving an evaluation of 
something or somebody’ (Eiser, 1986, p. 13), but rather concerning behaviour or 
self-perception and beliefs, these experiments did not provide me with the data 
necessary to say something about context effects on attitude questions and the nature 
of attitudes. Hence, two additional experiments were designed for the main study. 
These experiments were inspired by experiments carried out by Tourangeau and 
Rasinski (1986). The two target questions asked about people’s attitudes towards 
abortion on demand and about people’s attitudes towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons. Immediately before the target questions, people 
were presented with attitudinal assertions and asked about their agreement or 
disagreement with these items. The attitudinal assertions were intended to make 
particular issues salient, either reflecting a positive or negative view of the issues 
asked about in the target questions.
In this thesis three different types of context effects have been explored: 1) 
conditional context effects, i.e., effects presumed to be dependent on the way in 
which previous questions are answered (knowledge questions and interest in 
politics); 2) context effects unrelated to the substance of previous questions, but 
related to the content of the target question (the most important problems facing the 
nation); 3) unconditional context effects, presumed to be related to the content of the 
prior questions but not to the way in which these questions are answered (attitudinal 
assertions and attitudes towards abortion and nuclear weapons). The effects were 
tested in split-ballot experiments that were conducted within a three-wave panel 
survey. A simple random sample of 1500 people in Iceland was interviewed by 
telephone. Finally, as an attempt to gain insight into people’s thought processes
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while answering survey questions and in general as an aid to interpret the results, 
two of the experiments were also included in so called think-aloud interviews (cf. 
Ericsson and Simon, 1980; 1984). Seventeen social science students at the 
University of Iceland were asked to think aloud while answering the questions.
It is argued that the changes in responses due to context or question order do not 
occur through a change in people’s attitudes or self-perceptions, but rather by 
shifting the meaning of the questions (either by narrowing or widening the frame of 
reference or by providing respondents with additional information about the intended 
meaning of the questions). This, it is argued, is due to respondents relying on tacit 
rules that govern the conduct of conversation (cf. Grice, 1975), leading them to using 
various cues in the questionnaire to interpret the intended or the pragmatic meaning 
of the questions (see Sudman, Bradbum and Schwarz, 1995). Furthermore it is 
argued that people’s attitudes and beliefs about issues they have not given much 
thought are generally subject to fluctuations and should not be expected to remain 
stable from one time to another. Although attitude or opinion measurement in 
surveys has generally relied on single items implying, that the attitude can be 
measured on a single dimension, inspection of attitude theories suggests that this is 
an oversimplification and generally speaking one would not, according to these 
theories, expect people to possess attitudes of such accuracy.
The term attitude is used in a very broad sense in the survey literature and a tentative 
classification of these terms into four different levels according to expected stability 
is suggested. According to this model one would expect attitudes at different levels 
to differ substantially, both in reliability of attitudinal responses and in susceptibility 
to context effects i f  context effects can be argued to be the result of a change in 
people’s attitude. Hence, it is important to focus on finding a way to separate random 
fluctuations due to low reliability from systematic changes in response to a particular 
context.
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Level 1 -  Random changes or consistency -  instability
At the first level one would not expect people to have a well-formed attitude. This 
level includes such terms as Converse’s (1970) non-attitudes, i.e., people are 
constrained to generate their belief, opinion or attitude on the spot when asked a 
question about a particular issue. Since people do not have a predefined attitude their 
response is likely to be highly influenced by external cues such as the context in the 
questionnaires that may make particular thoughts or aspects of the issue more 
accessible than others. At this level one would expect substantial random and 
systematic (consistency effects) changes in people’s responses to an attitude 
question.
Level 2 -  Consistency -  instability
The second level includes attitudes that are distal (such as Abelsons’s [1986] distal 
beliefs) or peripheral, i.e., attitudes towards issues or figures that are not of high 
personal importance to the respondent. However, (s)he may have certain beliefs or 
feelings towards the attitude object although not necessarily grounded in personal 
experience. Attitudes or attitudinal responses at this level may be subject to what 
Petty and Cacioppo (1986b) call a peripheral change in attitudes, i.e., various 
external influences are likely to affect the attitude but the effect is not expected to be 
permanent, leading to an instability in measurements. Increased accessibility, for 
example due to specific items or context in a questionnaire that direct respondents’ 
thoughts towards specific aspects or attributes of the issue in question, should lead to 
a consistency effect since people do not invest cognitive effort in thinking about the 
contents of the message or the previous questions in this case, i.e., people are likely 
to include the message in their thinking, hence a consistency effect.
Level 3 -  Backfire or consistency depending on agreement-permanent change
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At the third level a person is expected to have a relatively well formed attitude (a 
basal or a central attitude) towards the attitude object, usually grounded in personal 
experience. Attitude changes at this level would be likely to depend on factors such 
as the contents or the cogency of the message at hand. The change in such an attitude 
would be expected to be relatively permanent and effects are likely to be either in the 
direction of consistency or contrast, depending on the contents of the message (Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986b; see also Sherif and Hovland, 1961; and Schwarz and Bless, 
1992 for discussion of inclusion -  exclusion theories).
Level 4 - N o  change or contrast -  stability
At the fourth level, one would find emotional attitudes, categorical attitudes, values, 
or ideologies. Due to the broadly organised sets of attitudes and beliefs at this level 
one would expect high stability in attitudinal responses. Arguments for or against an 
attitude or a belief are generally found to be ineffective, but if they do not accord 
with the respondents’ view they are likely to lead to a contrast effect. Latane and 
Nowak (1994) have suggested that very strongly held attitudes may have a different 
distribution from weaker attitudes. That is, they argue that the distribution of very 
strong attitudes or attitudes to highly involving issues becomes bimodal, which 
according to their argumentaion makes these attitudes stable and highly resistant to 
change. Hence, an attitude change becomes catastrophic, i.e., as consistent evidence 
piles up, a person may abandon her/his attitudinal position altogether and adhere to 
the completely opposite view of the issue in question.
Since the above model or classification did not inform the design of the study, it 
cannot be argued that the experiments are a systematic test of the hypotheses 
presented therein. However, the questions in the experiments dealt with issues that 
were likely to vary substantially in perceived importance. Hence, this classification 
may facilitate the interpretation of the research findings.
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People are unlikely to have strong convictions about such issues as how often they 
follow what is going on in government and public affairs or about which issues are 
of greatest importance to the nation at any one time. However, they are more likely 
to hold strong convictions about issues such as abortions and nuclear weapons. 
Hence one would expect greater stability and lesser susceptibility to context items in 
responses to these questions than the two previously mentioned.
The experiments described in this thesis were intended to evoke different kinds of 
context effects but they also involved different types of contexts: 1) neutral context 
(the most important issues); 2) neutral context with the addition of self-presentation 
(knowledge questions and political interest); 3) normative context (favourable or 
unfavourable attitude assertions).
7.2 Summary of results in experiment on knowledge questions and 
political interest
Bishop (1987) suggested that merely by asking people about their political 
knowledge before asking them how closely or how often they follow what is going 
on in government and public affairs will lead to a change in their self-perceptions. In 
the present study a third of the sample was asked two difficult knowledge questions 
(who is the Speaker of the plenary session of both houses of Parliament and which 
minister is responsible for the Statistical Bureau) before being asked how often they 
followed what was going on in government and public affairs, a third was asked the 
target question before the knowledge question, and the final third of the sample acted 
as a control group and was only asked the question about how often they followed 
what was going on. In the second wave all respondents were asked the target 
question but no questions about political knowledge. Results from the experiment 
are consistent with Bishop’s findings (1986). Preceding the target question with the
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two knowledge questions reduced the likelihood of respondents saying ‘most of the 
time’ by 10%. The size of the effect, although not specifically predicted, was found 
to be greater for men than for women (13.7% and 7.6%, respectively): Also, the 
younger the respondents, the greater this effect was found to be. Finally, an 
interaction was found between the order of the questions and education, which is 
consistent with previous evidence that response-order effects are greater among 
respondents with less education (cf. Cochrane and Rokeach, 1970; Krosnick and 
Alwin, 1987; McClendon, 1986; Schuman and Presser, 1981). The likelihood of 
respondents with compulsory education saying they followed what was going on 
most of the time was reduced by nearly 18% by the presentation of the knowledge 
questions.
It is argued that because respondents appear to be affected by the knowledge 
questions regardless of whether they did or did not know the answers, it is not a 
plausible explanation that their self-perception has been changed. According to 
Bern’s (1972) self-perception theory a person infers from her or his behaviour what 
her/his attitude or opinion might be. The fact that giving the correct answer to both 
of the knowledge questions reduced, rather than increased the likelihood of 
respondents’ saying they follow what is going on in government and public affairs 
most of the time explicitly contradicted Bern’s theory. Thus, this explanation was 
rejected. Furthermore, changes in reported interest between Wave 1 and Wave 2 of 
the study were found to be different depending on the experimental condition in 
Wave 1. The most positive changes in reported political interest (following what is 
going on...) were found among respondents who were presented with the knowledge 
questions before the target question in Wave 1 and the most negative changes were 
found in the responses of the subjects who were asked the knowledge questions after 
the target question in Wave 1. Hence, the context seems to have been carried over 
from Wave 1 to 2 despite the fact that the interviews were separated by a time period 
of between two and three weeks, that is the presentations of the knowledge questions
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after the interest quesiton in study 1 reduced the likelihood of respondents saying 
they followed what was going on ‘most of the time’ in study 2. A negative change 
was also found in the control group, but despite that, there was a statistically 
significant difference in reported political interest in the control group on the one 
hand and the two experimental groups on the other. The size of the effect, however, 
was substantially smaller in Wave 2 than in Wave 1, being 7.4% in the condition 
where the knowledge questions were placed after the target question and 5.5% for 
the other experimental condition. This clearly demonstrates that it is not necessarily 
the most recent experience related to political knowledge or exposure that 
determines how people will answer a question about how well they follow what is 
going on, but rather the perceived relevance of the particular piece of information 
that comes to mind.
Following Ericsson and Simon’s (1980; 1984) research on ‘think-aloud’ protocols as 
a method for discovering the cognitive stages involved in solving a problem, 
seventeen undergraduate students at the University of Iceland were asked to think 
aloud while answering the question about political interest (and attitudes towards 
abortion and towards declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons). 
Analysis of the think aloud protocols lends support to the hypothesis that the context 
effect is due to a reinterpretation of what it means to follow what is going on in 
government and public affairs most of the time. It is argued that due to the social 
nature of the interview situation and the nature of language, respondents try to infer 
how the researcher intends the question to be understood. The obvious relation 
between the knowledge questions and the target question provided a clue to the 
interpretation of the question, the most apparent one being that somebody who really 
follows what is going on in politics should know the name of the Speaker of the 
plenary session of both houses of Parliament and which minister is responsible for 
the Statistical Bureau. Thus it is argued that the inclusion of the knowledge questions
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changed or defined the meaning of the question about how well people follow what 
is going on in government and public affairs.
7.3 Summary of experiments on the most important problems facing 
the nation
The second experiment, an experiment on question wording, was conducted to test 
the effects of including examples for clarification in the preamble to a question 
asking which issues of national importance respondents were the most concerned 
about. Although this experiment is in many respects reminiscent of Schuman and 
Presser’s experiment on open and closed question formats, it was inspired by my 
colleague’s interest in the 1987 election campaign in Iceland. His particular interests 
were in agenda setting theory and the effects that media coverage of particular issues 
might have on people’s perceptions of which issues were of greatest importance to 
the nation. (Amason, 1991).
Results from the pilot study, where only specific issues (e.g. privatization of the City 
Hospital) were used as cues showed that respondents that were not prompted with 
examples gave very different answers to the question about which issues were the 
most important. This suggested that introducing the specific examples into the 
preamble to the question changed people’s understanding of what kind of issues 
might be considered nationally important. Hence, it was decided to include three 
different versions of the question in the main study, i.e., in the control group the 
open-ended question was presented without any examples of issues, and in the 
experimental conditions specific (such as declaring the Nordic countries free of 
nuclear weapons) or general examples (such as inflation and unemployment) were 
provided in the preamble to the question.
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It was hypothesised that two rival theses might explain the effect of such a change in 
wording. The first one suggests that the inclusion of examples leads to a different 
interpretation of the meaning of the question, i.e., that a meaning shift takes place, 
due to the narrowing or the widening of the frame of reference. The second possible 
explanation suggested was the operation of an acquiescence effect, i.e., respondents 
simply assent to the examples as the most important issues.
More than 70% of respondents that were prompted said one of the prompts or the 
suggested problems was the issue of national importance they were most concerned 
about. Type of prompting was found to affect responses in such a way that 
respondents prompted with the specific examples were found to be less likely to say 
that they had no opinion on which issues were the most important in Wave 1. They 
were not, however, more likely to ‘borrow’ the prompts than respondents who got 
the general examples. In Wave 2, a modest residue of the effect of prompting in 
Wave 1 could still be detected but the size of the effect was very small, only around 
4%. The main difference between the two groups that were prompted was that the 
respondents prompted with the specific examples were more likely to proclaim 
issues other than the prompts the most important ones. In the third and final wave, 
when respondents were asked what they believed to have been the most important 
issue of national importance in the election campaign, the respondents who had been 
prompted in the first wave were found to be no more likely than the control group to 
mention the examples that had been given. However, the pattern of responses in all 
waves was to a certain extent found to depend on the type of prompting in Wave 1. 
Respondents not interested in politics were more likely to have an opinion if 
prompted with the specific rather than the general issues. In Wave 1 this certainly 
seemed to have been caused by their assenting to the examples as the most important 
issues. In Waves 2 and 3 on the other hand, these respondents were more likely to 
state issues other than the prompts as the most important.
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Type of prompting was not found to affect the proportion of non-response in any 
wave among respondents who were interested in politics (although a tendency can be 
seen in Wave 1 towards a higher non-response among respondents prompted with 
the general examples). In all three waves, respondents interested in politics presented 
with the specific examples were more likely to mention issues other than they were 
prompted with as the issues of national importance they were most concerned about. 
These results, along with the minimal differences found between the group prompted 
with the general examples and the group not prompted at all, strongly suggests that 
the specific examples had an effect on the interpretation of the question, widening 
the frame of reference. The differences that were found between the control group 
and the group receiving the general examples were such that a non-response was 
more frequent in the prompted group. It was argued that this effect might be caused 
by a narrower frame of reference, i.e., the examples might imply that the question 
was only asking about hard-core political or economic issues. Thus the open-ended 
question did not seem to capture what was intended, i.e., issues of a much greater 
variety and specificity than inflation, exports, unemployment etc.
7.4 Summary o f experiments on effects o f context on attitudes toward 
abortion and declaring the Nordic countries free o f nuclear weapons
The third experiment was designed to test whether it was possible to direct people's 
thoughts towards specific aspects of an attitude issue and thereby influence their 
response to general attitude questions by preceding the questions with items of a 
normative nature, which implied either a favourable or an unfavourable view of the 
issue in question. The data for these experiments were collected in all three waves of 
the survey. In the first wave people were asked about their attitude towards abortion 
on demand, how strongly they felt about the issue and how ambivalent their thoughts 
were. In the second wave comparable questions were asked, but this time about
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attitudes towards declaring the Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons. The data 
collected in the first two waves served as base-rate data and a measure of expected 
resistance to change, since it was hypothesised that people who feel strongly about 
an issue and do not have ambivalent feelings towards it are less likely to change their 
attitudinal response as a result of increased accessibility of certain ideas. The main 
experiments took place in the third wave. Half of the sample was asked about their 
attitudes towards abortion and the other half about attitudes towards declaring the 
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons. The attitude questions were preceded with 
two attitudinal assertions conveying either a favourable or an unfavourable view of 
the issue in question.
Basic analysis of the results did not give much reason for concern. The context items 
seemed to have had very little effect on responses to the target questions, the 
questions about attitudes towards abortion and towards declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons. Detailed analysis revealed that this impression 
was misleading. It was found that due to different kinds of effects in operation, in 
some cases a consistency or an assimilation effect and in other cases a contrast or a 
backfire effect, these effects cancelled out in the overall sample.
Both experiments showed that, the stronger the attitude the greater was its stability. 
However respondents that expressed an unfavourable attitude towards abortion in the 
first interview were unlikely to change their answer in response to the different 
context whether they claimed to have a very strong attitude or not (the size of the 
effect being 2.5% for respondents with a very strong attitude and 1.5% for not very 
strong). A very considerable effect of 23.9% (i.e., 87.8% of respondents in the pro­
attitude condition said they favoured abortion on demand vs. 63.9% in the anti­
abortion condition) was found for respondents expressing a favourable and not very 
strong attitude in the initial interview. A backfire effect (-9.6%) was found for 
respondents with a very strong favourable base-rate attitude, which lends support to
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the hypothesis expressed in the model that a change in a very strong attitude is likely 
to be in the direction of contrast.
The context effect was much greater for men than women. The size of the effect was 
nearly 22% for males with compulsory education only, 16% for men who had 
completed further education and 6.1% for women with further education, in all cases 
a consistency effect. A backfire effect of 14.9% was found for women with 
compulsory education only. It was suggested that this might be due to their greater 
emotional involvement in the issue.
Disagreement with the context items about women’s rights and traditional values led 
to a contrast or a backfire effect, i.e., the view expressed by the respondents was 
moved further away from the view expressed by the attitudinal assertions, although it 
may be argued to have been consistent with the way in which respondents reacted to 
the assertions or the context items. Hence, the findings suggest that the context effect 
in this experiment can not be said to be fully unconditional although disagreement 
with the context items leading up to the question about declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons did not seem to result in a contrast effect.
More than 80% of respondents were in favour of declaring the Nordic countries free 
of nuclear weapons. Hence analysis was not focussed on whether responses changed 
from oppose to favour or vice versa, but rather on whether changes between waves 
were positive or negative (i.e., whether responses to the target question were more 
favourable or more unfavourable than responses to the base rate question). Strength 
of attitude was found to have a highly significant effect on reliability. Very strong 
attitudes showed a much higher degree of stability: 20.9% of respondents with very 
strong attitudes changed their response as compared with 42.6% of respondents with 
not very strong attitudes. It is argued that a large proportion of these changes can be 
attributed to random fluctuations in the attitude rather than to the context. Despite
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the greater stability in very strong attitudes there was not a significant interaction 
between context and attitude strength, implying that the context affects very strong 
and not very strong attitudes in similar ways. Overall the context effect was one of 
consistency with almost two-thirds of all changes in responses in the predicted 
direction.
There was not a strong indication of respondents’ reinterpreting or comprehending 
the attitude questions about abortions and nuclear weapons in different ways 
depending on the context within which they were asked. However, analysis of think- 
aloud protocols showed that the context directed people’s thoughts towards different 
aspects of the issue. This may undoubtedly be argued to be an effect of increased 
accessibility, but it also highlights the vagueness of such general questions and the 
limited cognitive capacity of the human brain. We can never process all our beliefs 
about an issue and come to a completely accurate, rational, consistent conclusion or 
response. Hence there is bound to be substantial instability in responses to such 
general questions that must draw on the context of the communication. This does not 
necessarily have to be a drawback, but stresses the need for careful questionnaire 
construction and interpretations of results, not to mention the importance of 
respecting the ‘rules of the communication game’ (Schwarz, 1994).
7.5 Conclusion and discussion
According to the classification of attitudes proposed in this thesis one would 
postulate that as we move up the attitudinal levels (i.e., from non-attitudes to values) 
we observe greater stability of attitudinal responses, not only in terms of reliability 
but also a diminished susceptibility to context effects. However, while the results 
presented here suggest that attitudes at different levels vary in stability, they suggest 
that the difference is mainly one of a difference in random variation rather than
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varying susceptibility to context (although the evidence may be somewhat mixed). 
This confirms the finding of Krosnick and Abelson (1992) who claim to have 
disconfirmed the widely held hypothesis that context effects in survey measurements 
are greater in the case of weaker attitudes.
These results raise a number of questions about the nature of both attitudes and 
context effects. They suggest that context effects in survey measurements are not 
caused by changes in attitudes but lend greater support to Schwarz’s et al.’s (1998) 
contention that context has the observed effect because of the operation of tacit rules 
that govern conversation, i.e., these findings indicate ‘that respondents pay close 
attention to the question asked, treating the specifics of the wording and the response
alternatives offered as relevant contributions to the ongoing conversation this is,
indeed what they are entitled to on the basis of the tacit norms that govern the 
conduct of conversation. Moreover, respondents draw on these specifics in their 
efforts to infer the meaning intended by the questioner, much as the tacit rules of 
conversational conduct would want them to. Hence, the apparent artifacts of question 
wording are likely to reflect regularities of normal conversational conduct, except 
that we as researchers often fail to take these regularities into account in writing 
questions and interpreting answers’ (p. 160).
According to Zaller and Feldman (1992) there are basically three different ways to 
explain context effects and the lack of stability in survey responses. These are 1) 
non-attitudes, 2) measurement error; and 3) generation idea (people don’t hold 
attitudes or beliefs at the specificity required in surveys). The review of the attitude 
literature in chapter 1 certainly seems to agree with the generation hypothesis in that 
one should expect substantial instability in attitude measurement, not because of 
error in measurement, but also because people do not possess attitudes of such 
accuracy that they can be restricted to one point on an attitude scale. There always 
occur some natural fluctuations, especially when talking about general attitudes.
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However, I would like to argue that these three explanations are all relevant and each 
can account for some part of the results reported in this thesis. However, these 
explanations are not sufficient. As discussed above the fourth and the fifth 
explanations have to be added 4) vagueness of language; and 5) reactivity or the 
conversational characteristics of the survey interview situation.
It had been expected that the effects of knowledge questions on answers to how well 
people follow what is going on in government and public affairs were conditional 
context effects. However, the effect found reduced the likelihood of respondents 
saying they followed what was going on most of the time, almost regardless of how 
they answered (although the size of the effect depended on the way in which the 
knowledge questions were answered), and hence cannot be argued to be truly a 
conditional context effect. The same is true for the effect of pro- and anti-attitudinal 
assertions on attitudes towards abortion and declaring the Nordic countries free of 
nuclear weapons, assumed to be an unconditional effect, the effect turned out to be at 
least partially dependent on the way in which respondents answered the context 
items.
It has been shown that it is more the perceived relevance of a particular piece of 
information that determines its accessibility than the recency with which it has been 
processed. What is it that determines what is considered relevant in a survey 
interview? What is it that becomes accessible in the interview? According to 
McGuire’s syllogistic reasoning and traditional consistency theories (McGuire, 
1960; Bern, 1967; Festinger, 1957) it should be the response to the knowledge 
questions, or in the case of the attitudes, the responses to the agree/disagree items. 
However, if one assumes that a meaning shift takes place, one has to add another 
dimension, i.e., the social interaction of the interview and the reactivity of the 
situation. The respondent not only looks for a logical relation between the questions 
as they appear, but also thinks about the motives of the researcher. According to
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results from the analysis of think aloud protocols, respondents believed that the 
researcher expected to find consonance between responses to the knowledge 
questions and the question about how frequently people follow what is going on in 
government and public affairs. On the other hand, they did not seem to be as 
conscious of the relation between the attitudinal assertions and the general attitude 
question towards abortion, although the different kinds of assertions (moralising or 
concerning women’s rights) obviously evoked different thoughts that presumably led 
to the difference in responses.
Not only do respondents try to understand the semantic or the literal meaning of the 
words in the question but also the intended or the pragmatic meaning. Although the 
wording of the questions may seem clear and straightforward, there is ample room 
for re-interpretation. What does it mean to follow what is going on in government 
and public affairs most of the time? Which issues are of national importance (what 
kinds of issues are we talking about)? What do we mean when we say we favour 
abortion on demand? Does that mean unconditional support for abortions? What 
does it mean when we say that we are very much in favour of declaring the Nordic 
countries free of nuclear weapons? Does it mean that we are in favour of such a 
declaration whatever the consequences? The answer to these questions is negative. 
The question or the subject of interest is often ill-defined and open to interpretation, 
making it important for the respondent to try to determine what exactly the 
researcher or the questioner means by her/his question. It may be both the preceding 
questions and the target question’s wording that provides respondents with a kind of 
clarification of what it is the researcher means. In many cases, this can be a 
clarification that has escaped the researcher’s attention, as indeed was true of the 
effects of prompting with general and specific examples in the question about the 
issues of national importance respondents were most concerned about. Accessibility 
could possibly explain why people chose to select one of the prompts as an answer to 
the question about which issues of national importance they were most concerned
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about. However, increased accessibility does not provide an explanation for the 
different effects of prompting with general and specific issues. It seems much more 
plausible that a meaning shift took place. The nature of the prompts had an effect on 
how respondents interpreted the question itself. How can we assess which issues can 
be considered nationally important? Are high crime rates in New York and Atlanta 
of great importance to the whole of the USA? Is it of national importance to people 
in Iceland that the Nordic countries are declared free of nuclear weapons (despite the 
fact that there are no nuclear weapons in Iceland)? The answer to these questions 
might be a ‘yes’ and it might be a ‘no’. It all depends on people’s definition of 
national importance. The examples or prompts given in the question give the 
respondent a clue as to the researcher’s understanding of what can be considered to 
be of national importance.
But can it then be argued that all context effects can be attributed to vagueness in 
question wording or characteristics of communication? Schuman and Presser (1981) 
argue that the effect found in responses to questions on whether American reporters 
should be allowed into Russia to report events happening there and whether Russian 
reporters should be allowed into the USA can not be attributed to vagueness in the 
question wording, but has to be explained by a norm of even-handedness. To a 
certain extent, this may be true. But there may also be some vagueness in the 
wording that is not obvious at first sight. The questions came one after the other. 
Americans who first answered the question about the American reporters may have 
thought that of course they should be allowed to go to Russia. But the question did 
not involve any conditions, nor did it say that there were no conditions attached, and 
this indeed created the vagueness of the question. Following this question with the 
question about whether Russian reporters should be allowed into America may well 
have carried the meaning that the researcher meant that American reporters should 
be let into Russia on the condition that Russians be let into America. Hence, I do 
believe that this question is indeed vague. Generally, if an interviewer asks a
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respondent a question of this kind, for example if s(he) thinks her/his country should 
join the EC, respondents often volunteer a number of prerequisites: ‘it depends on 
what you get and what you have to give in return’, and presumably the same applies 
to the questions about the reporters.
7,6 Implications for survey results
The importance of studying context effects in surveys was highlighted in chapter 1. 
First of all, surveys are ostensibly used to monitor changes in public opinion where 
changes of about 5-10% have been regarded as ‘true’ changes in public opinion. The 
results here and from various other studies described above show that caution is 
necessary in such interpretations when shifts caused by context can reach 25% or 
even higher (although the size of such effects is most often in the area of 10%). 
Secondly, the results emphasize the importance of care when making generalisations 
about public opinion from any one question. Evidently, it is very important to pay 
close attention to the context within which the question was asked. Thirdly, some 
groups are affected while others are not, and adding still further to the confusion, 
some groups may show a contrast effect while other groups show an assimilation 
effect. This, of course, constrains the possibilities for making generalisations, but it 
also signifies the need for careful sampling.
The findings presented here confirm the existence of context effects in surveys and 
show that respondents do indeed strive to understand the intended meaning, not only 
in individual questions, but furthermore that they try to understand the logical 
relation between different questions in the survey questionnaire. Consequently, it is 
important for survey researchers and other researchers relying on information from 
survey research to accept that answers to particular questions can shift, not only as a 
result of different wordings, but also due to different contexts. Therefore, it is
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essential to try to understand how this may happen and particularly to pay attention 
to the tacit assumptions that are believed to govern any conversation. Finally, the 
findings stress the need for being cautious in drawing conclusions and inferences 
from survey research. The more ambiguous the question, the more pronounced is the 
effect of the context. As Schwarz, Groves, and Sudman (1998) claim: ‘Question 
comprehension is not primarily an issue of understanding the literal meaning of an 
utterance. Rather, question comprehension involves extensive inferences about the 
speaker’s intentions to determine the pragmatic meaning of the question. To make 
these inferences, respondents draw on the nature of preceding questions as well as 
the response alternatives. Accordingly, survey methodologists’ traditional focus on 
using the “right words” in questionnaire construction needs to be complemented by a 
consideration of the conversational processes involved in the question-answering 
process’ (p. 152).
7.7 Limitations o f the present study and further research
Not all respondents are affected by the context and some people are more likely than 
others to reinterpret the questions according to what they believe the researcher has 
in mind (demand characteristics). What are the variables that mediate the effects? 
Are they consistent from one experiment to the next? Is the inclusion/exclusion 
model capable of predicting when the information provided by the context or the 
wording of the question is used, or is it always a post hoc explanation? All of these 
questions remain to be answered and all of them deserve attention.
It was never the purpose of this study to generate a theory of attitudes nor a testing of 
existing theories. However, the results and the process of the experiments have 
drawn my attention to the need for studying the nature of attitudes, attitude change 
and the expression of attitudes through language in a much more comprehensive
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manner than has been done hitherto. In particular, questions about the role of such 
variables as strength of attitude, knowledgeability, ego involvement, etc., in 
stabilizing attitudinal responses are of utmost importance.
The classification of attitudes underlines the necessity of testing the reliability of 
differrent attitude domains. When can attitudes be argued to be ‘non-attitudes’, when 
are they peripheral, central or categorical? What are the discriminatory variables? 
Are they cognitive variables such as knowledgeability, ‘prior thinking about’, or are 
they emotional variables such as ego involvement and affect? In order to test this it is 
important to select attitudes towards issues that are of real relevance to people.
The present research leaves one with many unanswered questions regarding the 
effects of previous questions on responses to related questions that follow. For 
example, the two knowledge questions in the first experiment seemed to have 
different effects on responses. The question asking about the Speaker of the plenary 
session of both houses of Parliament seemed to have an effect consistent with what 
had been hypothesised, i.e., to have a conditional context effect. The second 
knowledge question, asking which minister was responsible for the Statistical 
Bureau, appeared to have a different kind of effect, i.e., an unconditional context 
effect. However the data do not allow testing whether this was due to the questions’ 
position in the questionnaire or whether they, for some other reason such as different 
levels of difficulty had different effects. This question might be worth pursuing in a 
further study.
The homogeneity of respondents in the think aloud experiments made it impossible 
to substantiate the claim made by Tourangeau that a contrast effect is caused by 
people counter-arguing as they answer the attitude question. All of the respondents 
in the interviews agreed with the pro-abortion context items and disagreed with the 
anti-abortion items.
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As pointed out above, the design of the present study was not informed by the 
suggested model or classification of attitudes, and was carried out prior to some 
significant developments reported here. Hence, although the model helps in 
interpreting the findings, the data do not allow systematic testing of attitude 
reliability and susceptibility at different levels.
Disentangling the meaning of the various concepts used to describe the strength of 
an attitude and the processes by which an attitude becomes strong is of utmost 
importance to obtain a comprehensive theory of the effects that attitude-strength 
variables have been shown to have on attitude selectivity, change and resistance to 
change. Krosnick et al. (1993) and Prislin (1996) have examined various strength- 
related variables and their effect on attitude stability and resistance to change and 
found that there are at least three different dimensions that these attributes 
(extremity, importance, knowledge, intensity, etc.) fall onto and these dimensions 
have different effects on the temporal stability of attitudes towards different issues. 
However, in light of the findings presented here that education may be a major factor 
interacting with attitude strength and context, Krosnick et al. (1993) and Prislin’s 
(1996) reliance on undergraduate students as subjects in their studies suggests that 
the generalisability of their findings may be suspect. As has been shown by Sears 
(1986), the majority of studies concerned with attitude change have relied solely on 
college students as subjects. He argues that college students may constrain findings 
because of their young age, their high academic skill, their weaker self-definition 
and various other characteristics. This stresses the importance of further research on 
different types of attitudes, that is, on what it is that really distinguishes ‘non­
attitudes’, ‘distal or peripheral attitudes’, ‘basal or central attitudes’ and ‘values’. 
Since one person’s attitude towards an issue can be a non-attitude while another 
person’s attitude towards the same issue is termed a value, it is unlikely that research 
on homogeneous groups of college students will shed light on this problem. A
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simple random sample of the national population is also likely to be deficient in this 
respect. That is, it is unlikely that we will find a large enough group with attitudes at
ththe 4 level to allow for the necessary analysis. Hence, purposeful sampling of 
people known to have a very strong conviction about a particular issue might be 
desirable.
Although it has been demonstrated that slight changes in context or wording can lead 
to substantial changes in respondents’ interpretations and responses, I have not made 
an attempt to argue that any one wording or order is more valid than another; rather 
one has to pay attention to the context within which the question was asked. Or as 
Schwarz, Groves and Sudman (1998) claim: ‘To interpret answers as representing in 
a literal way the inner dispositions of a population is to forget the extent to which 
survey responses are shaped by situational influences’ (p. 158).
Despite the vast amount of research on the nature of attitudes and attitude change 
that has been accumulated since early in the last century, a comprehensive theory of 
the transformations that attitudes go through on their journey from being a non­
attitude through being a peripheral attitude, then perhaps a central attitude, towards 
possibly becoming a dichotomous attitude or an ideology (if they ever take on that 
journey) is lacking.
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire in Wave 1
English translation of questionnaire, 27-30 March 19878
To be filled in by interviewer:
Number of respondent:_____
Year of birth:____________
Sex: lQM ale 2Q Female 
Constituency:____________
Name of interviewer:______
Time at the start of interview: 
Time at the end of interview:
As described in chapter 3, twelve different versions of the following questionnaire were 
administered. Respondents were randomly assigned a particular verison.
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1 Some people seem to follow what is going on □  Most of the time 1
in government and public affairs most of the □  Some of the time 2
time, whether there is an election going on or □  Only now and then 3
not. Others are not that interested. Would you □  Hardly at all 4
say that you follow what is going on in
government and public affairs most of the □  Refuse to anwer 8
time, some of the time, only now and then, or □  Don’t know 9
hardly at all?
2 Do you know who is the Speaker of the write answer:
plenary session of both houses of Parlia­
ment?
3 Do you know which minister is responsible write answer:
for the administration of the Statistical
Bureau?
4 Which issues of national importance are you a)
most concerned about these days?9
b)
c)
5a Are you very concerned about □  Very concerned 1
a) , somewhat concerned, or □  Somewhat concerned 2
hardly concerned at all? □  Hardly concerned at all 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
5b Are you very concerned about □  Very concerned 1
b) , somewhat concerned, or □  Somewhat concerned 2
hardly concerned at all? □  Hardly concerned at all 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
5c Are you very concerned about □  Very concerned 1
c) , somewhat concerned, or □  Somewhat concerned 2
hardly concerned at all? □  Hardly concerned at all 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
9 In two thirds of the questionnaires respondents were prompted with certain issues, the Albert 
affair and ‘Nuclear-free North’ in a third, and the upcoming election and pay disputes in another 
third. The remaining third of the questionnaires did not contain any prompts or examples of issues 
(see wording in chapter 3).
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6a Would you say that you have about as much □  Yes (-> q. 7) 1
information as needed to understand these □  No 2
issues?
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
6b Where would you be most likely to seek □  Talk to family 1
further information about these issues? □  Talk to workmates 2
(Name as many sources as you like and rank □  Talk to friends 3
them) □  In institutions 4
□  In the press 5
□  On radio 6
□  On television 7
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
7 How often do you discuss these matters with □  Never 1
others? □  Once in a while 2
□  Several times a week 3
□  Daily/almost daily 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
8a How much do you rely on newspapers for □  Not at all (-+ q. 9) 1
news about issues and candidates? □  Very little 2
□  Little 3
□  Somewhat 4
□  Much 5
□  Very much 6
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
8b Which newspapers do you rely on (rank) □  The Peoples’ Paper 1
□  The Daily Newspaper 2
□  Today 3
□  The Morning Paper 4
□  The Time 5
□  The National Will 6
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
8c How often do you read newspapers? □  Daily/almost daily 1
□  Several times a week 2
□  Seldom 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
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8d Which parts of the newspapers do you □  News 1
usually read first? (rank) □  Editorials 2
□  Gossip 3
□  Articles 4
□  Comics 5
□  The whole paper 6
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
8e Which news items do you remember best, if a)
any, from last weeks’s newspaper reading?
b)
c)
9a How much do you rely on television for □  Not at all (-* q. 9) 1
news about issues and candidates? □  Very little 2
□  Little 3
□  Somewhat 4
□  Much 5
□  Very much 6
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
9b Which news bulletins do you watch on □  RUVTV 1
television? □ Channel 2 2
□  Both 3
□  Neither 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
9c How often do you watch news on RUVTV? □  Daily/almost daily 1
□  Several times a week 2
□ Seldom 3
□ Never 4
□ Refuse to answer 8
□ Don’t know 9
9d How often do you watch news on Channel 2? □ Daily/almost daily 1
□ Several times a week 2
□ Seldom 3
□ Never 4
□ Refuse to answer 8
□ Don’t know 9
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9e How often do you watch current affairs □  Daily/almost daily 1
programmes on television? □  Several times a week 2
□  Seldom 3
□  Never 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
9f Which news items, if any, do you remember a)
best from last week’s television watching?
b)
c)
10a How much do you rely on radio for news □  Not at all (-► q. 9) 1
about issues and candidates? □  Very little 2
□  Little 3
□  Somewhat 4
□  Much 5
□  Very much 6
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
10b Which news bulletins do you usually listen to □  RUV 1
on television? □  The Wave 2
□  Both 3
□  Neither 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
10c How often do you listen to news on RUV? □  Daily /almost daily 1
□  Several times a week 2
□  Seldom 3
□  Never 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
lOd How often do you listen to news on the □  Daily/almost daily 1
Wave? □  Several times a week 2
□  Seldom 3
□  Never 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
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lOe How often do you listen to current affairs □  Daily/almost daily 1
programmes on the radio? □  Several times a week 2
□  Seldom 3
□  Never 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
lOf Which news items, if any, do you remember a)
best from last week’s radio listening? __
b)
c)
11a Do you get the same political information □  The same (-► q. 12) 1
out of the various media, or do they provide □  Different 2
you with different things?
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
1 lb  What is the difference? a)
b)
c)
12 Now I would like to ask you how well you think the various media distinguish between facts and their 
own opinions in the coverage of the election campaign. As I name each medium, I would like to ask if 
it distinguishes very well, somewhat well, neither-nor, somewhat badly or very badly between facts 
and opinions?
1 2 3 4 5 8 9
Very well Somwhat Neith Somewhat Very Refuse to Don’t
MEDIUM well er badly badly answer know
RUVTV □ □
nor □ □ □ □
□
CHANNEL 2
□ □ □ □ □ □
n
□ □ □ □ □ □
RUV n□ □ i—j □ □ □ □
WAVE □□ □ a □ □ □
PEOPLE’S P. □□ □ □ □ □ □
DAILY n □ □□ □ □ □
TODAY □ □ □□ □ □ □
MORNING P. □ □ □ □□ □ □
TIME □ □ □ □ □ □ □
NAT. WILL □
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13 How thorough do you perceive media coverage given to issues of national importance? Do you 
perceive it as very thorough, somewhat thorough, neither-nor, not very thorough or not thorough at 
all?
1 2 3 4 5 8 9
Very Somwhat Neither Not very Not at all Refuse to Don’t
thorough thorough nor thorough thorough answer know
MEDIUM □ □ □ □ □ □ □
RUVTV □ □ □ □ □ □ □
CHANNEL 2 □ □ □ □ □ □ □
RUV □ □ □ □ □ □ □
WAVE □ □ □ □ □ □ □
PEOPLE’S P. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
DAILY □ □ □ □ □ □ □
TODAY □ □ □ □ □ □ □
MORNING P. □ □ □ □ □ □ □
TIME □ □ □ □ □ □ □
NAT. WILL
14 In general, how often would you say you □  Daily/almost daily 1
discuss politics? □  Several times a week 2
□  Seldom 3
□  Never (—»q. 18) 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
15 Who do you most often talk with about □  Family 1
politics? □  Friends 2
□  People at work 3
□  Others (who?)
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
16 Do you usually agree with the people you □  Always/most of the time 1
discuss politics with? □  Sometimes 2
□  Seldom/never 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
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17 Which media are your main sources of □  RUVTV 1
information about the election campaign? □  Channel 2 2
(name as many as you like and rank them) □  RUV 3
□  The Wave 4
□  The People’s Paper 5
□  The Daily Newspaper 6
□  Today 7
□  The Morning Paper 8
□  The Time 9
□  The National Will 10
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
18a Which would you say gave you more □  The media 1
information about the election campaign, the □  Individuals 2
mass media or individuals you know? □  Equal, but different (-»q. 20) 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
18b Different in what way? answer:
19 Which party did you vote for in the last □  SDP 1
general election (1983)? □  Progessive Party 2
□  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Other. Which? 7
□  Was not old enough 90
□  Did not vote 91
□  Blank vote 92
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
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20a If the general election were held tomorrow, □  SDP 1
which party do you think you would vote □  Progessive Party 2
for? □  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Humanist Party 7
□  MCE 8
□  National Party 9
□  Citizen’s Party 10
□  Other. Which? 11
□  Would not vote 91
□  Blank vote 92
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
20b IF DO NOT KNOW to question 20a: But □  SDP 1
which party do you think it is most likely you □  Progessive Party 2
would vote for? □  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Humanist Party 7
□  MCE 8
□  National Party 9
□  Citizen’s Party 10
□  Other. Which? 11
□  Would not vote 91
□  Blank vote 92
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
20c IF DO NOT KNOW to question 20b: But □  Independence Party 1
which do you think is more likely that you □  Some other party 2
vote for, the Independence Party or some
other party? Additional explanations:
IF ANSWER IS NOT CLEAR WRITE
DOWN ANY ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION (for example, will vote for
either one of the Peoples’ parties, never the
Progressive)
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
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21 What is your marital status? □  Single 1
□  Married, living with someone 2
□  Divorced 3
□  Widow(er) 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
22 What is your main job? Job title:
(get title and/or a short description of what
the job entails)
Description:
23 IF MARRIED OR LIVING WITH Job title:
SOMEONE:
What is the occupation of your spouse?
(get title and/or a short description of what
the job entails) Description:
24 Did you have any formal education after the □  No 1
age of 15? □  Yes 2
IF YES: What education? Education:
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
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25 Finally, I would like to ask you a few □  More like those who are very certain 1
questions about your attitudes towards □  More like those who see this as a 2
abortion? Some people are very certain about difficult issue to reach a decision on
their feelings about when legal abortions 8
should be permitted. Other people see this □  Refuse to answer 9
issue as a difficult one to reach a decision on. □  Don’t know
Would you say that you are more like those
who are very certain, or that you are more
like those who see this issue as a difficult one
to reach a decision on?10
26 How strong are your feelings about the topic □  Very strong 1
of abortion? □  Rather strong 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Rather weak 4
□  Very weak 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
27 Do you favour or oppose abortion on □  Favour 1
demand? □  Oppose 2
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
28 All things considered, do you believe you are □  Very happy 1
very happy, happy, unhappy or very un­ □  Happy 2
happy? □  Unhappy 3
□  Very unhappy 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
This was the last question. I would like to thank you very much for your participation. Since this is a 
part of a larger project, I would like to ask you if you are ready to answer another, much shorter 
questionnaire in about two weeks time?
□  Yes
□  Perhaps
□  No
10 See chapter 3 for design of experiment on attitude questions.
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Appendix 2 
Questionnaire in Wave 2
English translation of questionnaire, 18-21 April 198711
To be filled in by interviewer:
Number of respondent:_____
Year of birth:____________
Sex: IQ Male 2 0  Female 
Constituency:____________
Name of interviewer:______
Time at the start of interview: 
Time at the end of interview:
11 As described in chapter 3, four different versions of the following questionnaire were 
administered, depending on the assignment of repondents to different groups in Wave 1.
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1 Some people seem to follow what is going on □  Most of the time 1
in government and public affairs most of the □  Some of the time 2
time, whether there is an election going on or □  Only now and then 3
not. Others are not that interested. Would you □  Hardly at all 4
say that you follow what is going on in
government and public affairs most of the □  Refuse to anwer 8
time, some of the time, only now and then, or □  Don’t know 9
hardly at all?
2 Which issues of national importance are you a)
most concerned about these days? __
b)
c)
□  Very concerned ^
3
□  Somewhat concerned
□  Hardly concerned at all 8
9
□  Refuse to answer
□  Don’t know
3b Are you very concerned about □  Very concerned 1
b) , somewhat concerned, or □  Somewhat concerned 2
hardly concerned at all? □  Hardly concerned at all 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
3 c Are you very concerned about □  Very concerned 1
c) , somewhat concerned, or □  Somewhat concerned 2
hardly concerned at all? □  Hardly concerned at all 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
4a In general, would you say you were 
interested or not interested in reading about 
politics in newspapers?
IF INTERESTED: Are you □  Very interested 1
□  Fairly interested 2
IF NOT INTERESTED: Are you □  Not very interested 3
□  Not at all interested 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
3 a Are you very concerned about
a) , somewhat concerned, or
hardly concerned at all?
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4b Turning now to the general election, do you □  Far too much 1
think the amount of space devoted to the □  A bit too much 2
election in newspapers is far too much, a bit □  About right 3
too much, about right or too little? □  Too little 4
□  Far too little 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
4c Has the coverage of the election campaign in □  Yes 1
newspapers helped you in deciding how to □  No 2
vote in the election?
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
5 a In general, would you say you were
interested or not interested in watching
programmes on politics and current affairs on
television?
IF INTERESTED: Are you □  Very interested 1
□  Fairly interested 2
IF NOT INTERESTED: Are you □  Not very interested 3
□  Not at all interested 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
5b Overall, would you say that the amount of □  Far too much 1
time devoted to the election on television is □  A bit too much 2
far too much, a bit too much, about right or □  About right 3
too little? □  Too little 4
□  Far too little 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
5c Has the television coverage of the election □  Yes 1
campaign helped you in deciding how to vote □  No 2
in the election?
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
6a In general, would you say you were
interested or not interested in listening to
programmes on politics and current affairs on
radio?
IF INTERESTED: Are you □  Very interested 1
□  Fairly interested 2
IF NOT INTERESTED: Are you □  Not very interested 3
□  Not at all interested 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
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6b Overall, would you say that the amount of □  Far too much 1
time devoted to the election on the radio is □  A bit too much 2
far too much, a bit too much, about right or □  About right 3
too little? □  Too little 4
□  Far too little 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
6c Has the coverage of the election campaign on □  Yes 1
the radio helped you in deciding how to vote □  No 2
in the election?
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
7 In general, how much would you say that you □  Nothing 1
know about the policies offered by the parties □  Not very much 2
in this election? □  A little 3
□  A fair amount 4
□  A great deal 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
8a If the general election were held tomorrow, □  SDP 1
which party do you think you would vote □  Progessive Party 2
for? □  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Humanist Party 7
□  MCE 8
□  National Party 9
□  Citizen’s Party 10
□  Other. Which? 11
□  Would not vote 91
□  Blank vote 92
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
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8b IF DO NOT KNOW to question 20a: But □  SDP 1
which party do you think it is most likely you □  Progessive Party 2
would vote for? □  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Humanist Party 7
□  MCE 8
□  National Party 9
□  Citizen’s Party 10
□  Other. Which? 11
□  Would not vote 91
□  Blank vote 92
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
8c IF DO NOT KNOW to question 20b: But □  Independence Party 1
which do you think is more likely that you □  Some other party 2
vote for, the Independence Party or some
other party? Additional explanations:
IF ANSWER IS NOT CLEAR WRITE
DOWN ANY ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION (for example, will vote for
either one of the Peoples’ parties, never the
Progressive)
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
9 Which party did you vote for in the last □  SDP 1
general election (1983)? □  Progessive Party 2
□  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Other. Which? 7
□  Was not old enough 90
□  Did not vote 91
□  Blank vote 92
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
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10 Do you favour or oppose declaring the □  Favour 1
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons? □  Oppose 2
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
11 How strong are your feelings about nuclear □  Very strong 1
weapons? □  Strong 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Vague 4
□  Very vague 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
12 All things considered, do you believe you are □  Very happy 1
very happy, happy, unhappy or very □  Happy 2
unhappy? □  Unhappy 3
□  Very unhappy 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
This is the end of the questionnaire. We have now spoken to you twice. Now, I want to ask for your 
' permission to call you once again, shortly after the election. Do you think that will be possible?
□  Yes
□  Perhaps
□  No
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire in Wave 3
English translation of questionnaire, 27.-29. April 198712
To be filled in by interviewer:
Number of respondent:_____
Year of birth:____________
Sex: IQ Male 2□ Female 
Constituency:____________
Name of interviewer:______
Time at the start of interview: 
Time at the end of interview:
12 Four different versions of the questionnaire were administered. See questions 11-13.
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1 Which issues of national importance did you 
fmd most important during the election 
campaign?
a)
b)
c)
2 Did you watch the programmes reporting the □ Yes 1election results on TV? 2
□  No (-*  q. 5) 8
9
□  Refuse to answer
□  Don’t know
3 Which TV channel did you watch? □  RUV TV ( -  q. 5) 1
□  Channel 2 (-> q. 5) 2
□  Both 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
4 Which TV channel did you fmd better on the □  RUVTV 1
election results? □  Channel 2 2
□  Both were even 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
5 Did you listen to the programmes reporting □  Yes 1
the election results on the radio? □  No (-► q. 8) 2
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
6 Which radio channel did you listen to? □  RUV (-» q. 8) 1
□  Wave (-* q. 8) 2
□  Both 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
7 Which radio channel did you find better on □  RUV 1
the election results? □  Wave 2
□  Both were even 3
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
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8 Which media were your main sources of □  RUV TV 1
information during the election campaign? □  Channel 2 2
(Name as many as you like and rank them). □  The State’s Radio 3
□  The Wave 4
□  People’s Paper 5
□  Daily Newspaper 6
□  Morning Paper 7
□  Time 8
□  National Will 9
□  Refuse to answer
□  Don’t know
9a Did you vote in the parliamentary election □  Yes 1
last week? □  No 2
□  Refuse to answer (-► q. 10) 8
□  Don’t know 9
9b Which party did you vote for? □  SDP 1
□  Progessive Party 2
□  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Humanist Party 7
□  MCE 8
□  National Party 9
□  Citizen’s Party 10
□  Did not vote 91
□  Blank vote 92
□  Refuse to answer 98
□  Don’t know 99
10 Which party did you vote for in the general □  SDP 1
election in 1983? □  Progessive Party 2
□  Independence Party 3
□  Peoples’ Alliance 4
□  Democratic Alliance 5
□  Women’s List 6
□  Other. Which? 7
□  Was not old enough
□  Did not vote 90
□  Blank vote 91
92
□  Refuse to answer
□  Don’t know 98
99
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Version 1
Now, I would like to read two statements to you and ask you to tell me if  you agree or disagree.13
11 Women should stay at home and leave □  Strongly agree 1
running the country up to men. □  Agree 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
12 Even for such jobs as police officers, women □  Strongly agree 1
should be evaluated on the basis of their □  Agree 2
individual qualifications rather than their sex. □  Neither nor 3
□  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
13 Do you favour or oppose abortion on □  Favour strongly 1
demand? □  Favour 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Oppose 4
□  Oppose strongly 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
14 All things considered, do you believe you are □  Very happy 1
very happy, happy, unhappy or very un­ □  Happy 2
happy? □  Unhappy 3
□  Very unhappy 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
13 A quarter o f the sample answered a question about attitudes towards abortion preceded with ‘pro­
abortion’ statements.
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Version 2
Now, I would like to read two statements to you and ask you to tell me if you agree or disagree.14
11 The trouble with modem society is that it is □  Strongly agree 1
too easy not to take responsibility for your □  Agree 2
actions. □  Neither nor 3
□  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
12 It is wrong for a married person to have □  Strongly agree 1
sexual relations with someone other than the □  Agree 2
marriage partner. □  Neither nor 3
□  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
13 Do you favour or oppose abortion on □  Favour strongly 1
demand? □  Favour 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Oppose 4
□  Oppose strongly 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
14 All things considered, do you believe you are □  Very happy 1
very happy, happy, unhappy or very un­ □  Happy 2
happy? □  Unhappy 3
□  Very unhappy 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
14 A quarter of the sample answered a question about attitudes towards abortions preceded with
‘anti-abortion’ statements.
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Version 3
Now, I would like to read two statements to you and ask you to tell me if you agree or disagree.15
11 Unilateral elimination of British nuclear □  Strongly agree 1
weapons would increase the Soviet Union’s □  Agree 2
military superiority. □  Neither nor 3
□  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
12 Closing down the NATO control stations in □  Strongly agree 1
Iceland and Greenland would lead to total □  Agree 2
domination of the Soviet nuclear fleet in the □  Neither nor 3
North Atlantic. □  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
13 Do you favour or oppose declaring the □  Favour strongly 1
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons? □  Favour 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Oppose 4
□  Oppose strongly 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
14 All things considered, do you believe you are □  Very happy 1
very happy, happy, unhappy or very un­ □  Happy 2
happy? □  Unhappy 3
□  Very unhappy 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
15 A quarter of the sample answered a question about attitudes towards nuclear weapons preceded
with ‘pro-nuclear’ statements.
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Version 4
Now, I would like to read two statements to you and ask you to tell me if you agree or disagree.16
11 Increasing the number of nuclear weapons □  Strongly agree 1
elevates the danger of a nuclear war. □  Agree 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
12 The only sensible way to prevent a nuclear □  Strongly agree 1
war is to eliminate all nuclear weapons. □  Agree 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Disagree 4
□  Strongly disagree 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
13 Do you favour or oppose declaring the □  Favour strongly 1
Nordic countries free of nuclear weapons? □  Favour 2
□  Neither nor 3
□  Oppose 4
□  Oppose strongly 5
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
14 All things considered, do you believe you are □  Very happy 1
very happy, happy, unhappy or very un­ □  Happy 2
happy? □  Unhappy 3
□  Very unhappy 4
□  Refuse to answer 8
□  Don’t know 9
This is the end of the questionnaire and we would like to thank you very much for your kindness and 
assistance in answering all our questions.
16 A quarter of the sample answered a question about attitudes towards nuclear weapons preceded
with ‘panti-nuclear’ statements.
328
